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East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-168
Wednesday
28 August 1996

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Daily Report
East Europe

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Albania: Berisha Confident PS 'Cannot Be Reformed'

AU2708162396 Tirana ATA in English 0744 GMT 27 Aug 96

[Address by President Sali Berisha at the Democratic Party National Council meeting in Tirana on 26 August: "Second Socialist Party Congress Proved to Albanians and the World That the Albanian Socialist Party Cannot Be Reformed"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 26 (ATA)—In the meeting of Democratic Party [PD] activists, President Berisha stressed that the congress of the Socialist Party [PS] proved once more before the Albanians and the world that the Socialist Party cannot be reformed. The congress held under the motto "Down With the King and Long Live the Old Royal Court With the New King" and the Party of Labour of Albania [PLA] with a new name advocated completely that ideas of Enver brought in the lead of the Albanian left wing the Alia-Nano clique and this is a bad omen for the Albanian left, said Berisha in the meeting.

This clique consists of groups of Albanian secret police which exerted terror on Albania and which for the interests of clans and personal interests have pledged to completely destroy the Albanian left wing. In its yesterday's congress, as it was expected, said Berisha, the place of the reformers was taken by former ministers of Ramiz Alia, hardened collaborators of the State Sigurimi, those who in the last communist dictatorship of Albania organized the putsch in the Officers United School, the Shkoder massacre and the plundering in the country's cities, those who stole the food articles, the drugs for the sick and starving people, who closed the universities and who pledged for killings in the name of the state and who called for blood, sluggishness in the parliament, those who sought to plunge the country into a civil war, who described the Shkoder martyrs and the courageous people who broke the Berlin wall in Tirana as hooligans.

This clique, said Berisha further on, which in order to escape trials for the ugly crimes it has carried out, has isolated PS from all the world. Due to this, PS of Albania found itself in the last congress as the most isolated political force of the globe, the most isolated in the PLA history. The congress of clans had only one message of greetings from foreign representatives which in no case was a greeting for PS, said Berisha pointing out that never before a left wing party in Europe and in the world has convened in such loneliness. It showed itself for the past two days before Europe and the world as a Stalinist party demanding power. The PS drama is total and without any hope.

Totally manipulated by most anti-Albanian elements, involved in secret and anti-national agreements, the PLA under a new name, is a relic of shame of our national history, said Berisha.

The Albanian Socialist party is today more Enverist than never in the past five years. It represents at present the most discrete political force in Albania and in Europe. It is the last detachment of Stalinists in Europe. These adventurers imagine Albania to be Bosnia, they call for bloody clashes. They have no future. They convened to denounce Stalin and Servet, they condemned Enver and elected his son, they denounced Ramiz and brought in the lead his ministers and denounced the Euro-Socialists.

Victims of the latest Stalinist processes of this party were the Euro-Socialist youths and genuine social democrats in it, said Berisha. He added that the PLA today more than ever boasts of its age. It started the campaign of reformation, it divided into clans as an aged party, and closed the campaign as an old party.

In this situation, the PD responsibility for the development and consolidation of democracy becomes ever greater. It is resolute to guarantee an electoral process which will ensure free and fair elections. We tell those who want to use dictate, boycott in order to undermine this process, knowing that a profound defeat lays in store for them, that they are failing and have no future, said President Berisha.

Albania: PS Under 'Absolute Rule' of Alia-Nano Clique

AU2708155196 Tirana ATA in English 1256 GMT 27 Aug 96

[Report by A. Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 26 (ATA)—Second Congress of the Socialist Party [PS], which ended on the first hours of Monday [25 August] was considered "an arena which openly reflected the splits and groupings which have gripped the PS for more than a year and were clearly expressed after May 26 elections."

"This Congress held under the motto 'Down with King, Long Live the Old Royal Court and the New King' shows that the PS came out of it more closely to Enverism. It came out as a true association of Enver Hoxha. This Congress put the PS under absolute rule of the Alia-Nano clique. This clique has today assumed total destruction of the Albanian left wing," said President of the Republic Sali Berisha, in a meeting of the Democratic Party [PD] National Council held Monday.

While the PD Chairman Tritan Shehu said that "this congress did not resemble a party congress, but a sect's meeting based on conspiracy and on principle that two friends are wolves for each other."

Fatos Nano was reelected the PS leader, having no other candidate as alternative, which is a violation of this party's statute. Nano ranked ninth after the voting of the candidatures in the PS General Leading Committee. Some 144 delegates voted against Nano's election as party leader.

Namik Dokle (PS deputy chairman) said, with regards to Nano's ideas in his motion, that "it was very important some of them were further deepened, specially the denouncing the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha and his follower Ramiz Alia."

Berisha said: "It (PS) appeared to Europe and the world as a Stalinist type party, where the efforts for reformation turned to struggle for power making use of Stalinist methods."

The PS leader for Tirana, Musa Ulqini, one of Nano's opponents, speaking about the fact of 144 votes against Nano said: "This shows the level of emancipation the PS members have, who do not look at Nano an unerring figure of number one."

Sources from the PS said that during the voting procedure have noticed many irregularities which have brought about violations of voting procedure, accompanied with tension during the counting procedure from the commission members, representatives of the two groupings.

The PS congress considered as the congress of reformation, satisfied itself only with the scrapping of Marx from it programme and resignation of Pellumbi, while in the new General Leading Committee were included almost all previously known names proposed either by the congress or Nano, a good number of them ex-ministers of Ramiz Alia and ex-communists.

"They gathered to denounce Stalin and denounced Servet (Servet Pellumbi, former PS deputy chairman, who resigned) gathered to denounce Enver and reelected his son, gathered to denounce Ramiz and put at the head his ministers," said Berisha.

While Shehu said "inside the PS rules the psychology of conspiracy. All accuse each other of treason, of acting behind the scene. The PS suffers of a struggle between clans, unprincipled groupings which is a struggle within the species and not a principled political struggle. They had a reformation way, that one suggested by the President in his message, the dissolution of their party and its restructuring from the foundation based on principles of social democratic parties and those of a left wing party."

Some 75 per cent out of 110 thousand members, the PS pretends to have, are ex-members of the PLA [Party of Labor of Albania].

The PD chairman said: "This congress had the characteristic of a deep isolation, great loneliness inside and outside Albania. The only greeting, that of the Socialist International, was a request and lecture for reformation, an expression of support for Albania and not for the PS. No word for Nano or the PS Presidency but only for Euro-Socialists, on condition of their reformation."

Francois Vallin, secretary general of the European Socialist Party, was invited but he not only did not come but did not send a greeting telegram to the Congress either.

Nano has hardly attacked even the Albanian Euro Socialist Youth Forum (FRESh) which according to Shehu "were those who really aspired for real reformation, but were heavily attacked, putting thus the PS wide apart from the moment of reformation and the true social democracy."

The second PS congress issued a statement which said that its deputies would not take their seats in the Parliament. It also said that the PS "will boycott the local elections unless all their demands are fulfilled, and in this we will not tolerate."

The PS, which boycotted the May 26 elections some hours before closing of the ballot, has also boycotted a round table of the president with political parties and another one initiated by the PD with parties represented in the local government.

Albania: Pellumbi Attacks Nano's 'Absolute Power'

AU2708161496 Tirana ATA in English
1253 GMT 27 Aug 96

["From the Report of Second Socialist Party Congress Submitted by Socialist Party Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 27 (ATA)—Comrade delegates, I would like to address you with the demand to be really up to the historical moment we are living, and that passions and splits which have sprouted long ago are with gravely dangerous consequences for the party. Besides, there is no reason for us to discus with passion and to be nervous.

If we declare our party passions, offences and labels for each other, then we not only will have no reformation but we will take ourselves some years behind and this is to be regretted...

Patterns are introduced but the presidential pattern is not for our party because if we talk of patterns I may mention here the studies of Veixneker who is the greatest specialist on parties not only in Europe but also in the world and Mr. Islami might have had the chance to read some of his books during his stay in Germany for more than two years.

According to the French pattern, they have suggested Fatos Nano precisely this question because as you have seen today in papers, Nano has sent the list of the General Leading Committee. Shall we apply this pattern...? If we want a reformation, it does not accept dictates and concretely speaking, if you do not approve the petition I will withdraw from the working group for the political report of the congress and this is what he did. Where is tolerance? Hence, either a dictate, an absolute power in the party or entitle me the right of the veto or I do not accept to be elected. What is this? How can one ask the right of a veto in the party? Why the chairman should have an absolute power? What is he going to solve with these vetoes? Why doesn't he has faith in the forums...? It was not spontaneously when, after the petition of Fatos Nano, I declared and I will still ask in the congress not to be elected, and I was sincere because I thought that my resignation would be in the interest of the party's reformation.

But I cannot be silent when I see that there is speculation with the reformation of the party in order to bring here elements who cannot reflect the image of a reformed party, because I do not want to sacrifice the job I have made without any interest, not for a post, but I feel bad at ease when I think that after the petition, scenarios are being hatched up and attacks are being launched at me going so far as describing me a collaborator with Berisha. Shame on those who consider me a collaborator of Berisha. I can never accept such an accusation... Comrades, these are my concerns (You must consider them properly.) One cannot play with the party, with a total of 110,000 members and with 4,000 organizations because Kastriot Islami wants to become a secretary and leaves no stone unturned going so far as to declare that I have played the role of the person who organized the Tirana conference in 1956.

But all these are being made for set aims and I feel regret because some elements are exploiting the name of Fatos Nano because the report or the long address read here yesterday has not been written by Fatos Nano, it has been written in the computer of Kastriot Islami. Then the letter of Gramoz Ruci was read. I condemn that letter because it is not Ruci's. It has been written by Guro Zeneli and others have shortened and edited it, what are all these games? This is my concern.

Albania: Majko Finds 'Faults' With PS, Nano at 2d Congress

AU2708201896 Tirana ATA in English 1649 GMT 27 Aug 96

["From the Discussion of Pandeli Majko in Socialist Party Second Convention"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 27 (ATA)—An individual, who openly criticizes you in the course of a discussion is a respectable person, but on the other hand the phenomena of "faults" in the circle of debate has a negative impact.

This phenomenon has emerged in Socialist Party [PS] from the reformation concept under the psychology of the "campaign," which together with the political inferiority has brought about, beyond the normal standards, the debate in PS. To explain this phenomenon, I will only repeat two questions that my friend Dr. Alfred Paloka has published in ZERI I POPULLIT newspaper and also answered by him.

Those questions more or less were: "...may be Albanians, socialists or non socialists... will believe that PS reformation would be guided by persons, whom had been ex-ministers or former high ranking officials under communist regime of Hoxha or Alia? May be all those former officials of communist regime... empowered not only to impede the democratic processes, but also with other responsibilities to the detriment of the country, today will be trusted or supported as PS reformers? ... By all means no!"—concludes a little bit cynically my older friend.

Yesterday, impressions from the convention were many and contradictory, starting from the speech of the PS Chairman Fatos Nano and finishing with the speeches of deputy chairmen, like two extreme points within which other discourses took place.

So, Fatos Nano, on one hand offered a vision for the future policy, and on the other hand the deputy chairmen tried to present a vision for the future, but also on Fatos Nano as a person. He by all means considering what the deputy chairmen, his best friends during these years, emerges now not like that hero, imagined by every one who spoke from morning till night for the PS victory and against Berisha regime. Facts show that Fatos Nano has criticized and offended even his friends, whom loved and still love him.

In a letter that I sent some days ago in his cell, the only one during these three years he suffers the punishment, I wrote starting with "Dear Ali Pasha of Tepelena..." and I wished him reelection as chairman of the PS. I wished him from the bottom of my heart. Closing the letter I signed as "Marko Bocari."

Historically it said that Ali Pasha beheaded Marko Bocari.

Albania: Deputy Chairman Dokle Addresses PS Congress

AU2708204296 Tirana ATA in English
1654 GMT 27 Aug 96

["Address of Namik Dokle, Socialist Party Deputy Chairman, to the Second Socialist Party Congress"—ATA headline; all quotation marks as received]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 27 (ATA)—Being the first in "the list of reflections" of the Chairman Nano it would not be fair if I did not reply. Chairman Nano knows so well the fact that only in one point I do not allow even God to question in me: the human and political honesty. I have neither thrown mud at someone nor do I allow anyone to throw mud at me. I hate servility just like I hate ungratefulness.

This is my first perhaps unexpected reflection for all the topics envisaged by Chairman Nano in the petition, messages and interviews. Only on this basis I have taken all my political decisions and acts. On this occasion, I would like to express my gratitude for Fatos who has noted somewhere that "Here only Namik is referred to as a person with a pure consciousness and an empty pocket!" But it is understandable that I do not fully agree with him, because Socialist Party [PS] has scores of such people both in leadership and in the grass root organizations.

PS has a full political vision of Albania's integration into all Euro-Atlantic structures and the consolidation of the cooperation with the U.S. Let us not forget that no farther that three years ago there were people in PS who said: "Why do you meet with U.S. diplomats? They are spies of CIA and NATO." And all these politically naive people found support in the very wrong expression of Chairman Nano that the U.S. political envoy in Tirana has come "with a knife in his mouth" as if he were an Iraqi terrorist(!)

Such absurdities have come to an end in PS and I believe that its chairman has had time to reflect despite some of his fans who, although wearing U.S. ties, continue to divide U.S. diplomats into "good ones" and "CIA spies." It seems that it has not yet freed and cannot free itself from the terminology favouring Enver Hoxha or Ramiz Alia.

The press has speculated that in his petition Nano has copied in his handwriting what Berisha has addressed to the PS Congress. It is based on the fact that both the petition and the letter of Berisha have the same topics or terms. Moreover, also in the formal aspect, the two propose that the above should be reflected in the form of resolutions. There is nothing to worry in this aspect. The known political topics are treated and retreated by all serious politicians. Of course, each according to his way and for the immediate or perspective interests.

But what worries me is the lack of a topic in both references: the final disassociation from Ramiz Alia and his policies, because in the final say it was the time of Ramiz Alia when Albanians were given ration cards even for ordinary food articles. I am convinced or at least believe that Chairman Nano is ready to reflect on this topic, but he is prevented by those who have computerized in Tirana his manuscripts from Benca (perhaps they are those who in the Nano's message have added the words "Let us analyse the thesis of the chairman messages"). They do not have any idea of reformation in the whole formation but pose as "bride-grooms of renovation" wearing costumes and ties according to political seasons. It may be quite by chance that some of the former ministers appointed by Ramiz Alia have been self-styled as "supporters of the petition in the PS." But we have the right to take preventive measures even for this spontaneity in order not to create in the party structures of the past.

I have proposed Chairman Nano that all the thesis and topics of reformation should necessarily be presented by him (Chairman Nano) through a political platform to the congress of the Socialist Party. It would encourage the debate and movement within the PS. Chairman's authority would also increase.

Proceeding from this question I have presented clearly and openly to the General Leading Council of the PS "that to think that only you are right and the others have nothing rational in their proposals means that you are still having concepts in favour of Enver and Ramiz: "Either with me or against me" and followed by "Those who are with me should be in queue!" Such unities except one another beginning with the ordinary member up to the chairman.

I do never intend here strictly ranked isolated political acts. But my concern is related with the political acts which should support each other and not prevent each other. Therefore I want to make clear the words cited by Chairman Nano in my regard. It is natural that no one, neither me, is against "the period of changes" but against the way applied by some people who brought the reformation on the second plane and placed meaness on the first place (meaness so much criticized by Chairman Nano himself.) If it were for the time and not for the moment I also join those who consider the act as delayed. We should have made many things before because any political hesitation harms the political act of the party. It is very positive that now, upon the chairman Nano's initiative, we overpassed the hesitation expressed in his letter of July 30, 1995 in which he asked for "improvements in the program besides Marx.." to be made in the party congress.

I have the impression that all these political spontaneities have not been combined by Nano. I know that he is very keen in politics. Anyhow I have the moral right to raise the question: Who is commanding the publications or events? Who fears that time is leaving him behind and that a way to hurry up should be found?

With regard to "Sali Rexhepi's case which is not an argument, I think that there is no need for reflection. I regret that Chairman Nano comes to make so trifle accounts when saying that "One out of five has left, what about 345!" Hence I had to recall that "one of three candidacies" that he proposed for the presidency, went to another party immediately after we accepted the proposal of Chairman Nano or that "one out of his three" candidates was his wife, an act which forced the noble poet Agolli to write: "My Sadija would have been better."

It seems to me that Chairman Nano, the Presidency and the General Leading Committee during the days when the congress was being prepared have managed to find common points: the solidarity in changes by respecting debate to the maximum.

There is something enigmatic only with regard to the correspondence and the messages of the chairman from prison. They may be divided in three groups:

1. Open public messages. There has been no sign of censorship at all.

2. Critical messages for the work of PS. Remarks by the chairman for political sluggishness, lack of initiative, isolation within itself, infliction of collegiality, apathies and inertia in ZERI I POPULLIT have been reflected but not always at the proper level.

3. Special opinions for PS leaders and deputies.

These have been reserved by the presidency. I still think that we did well to have reserved them not to cause pertubations in the work of the comrades in order to respect the convictions of one another.

Among many cases allow me to cite only a few lines from some of the letters by the chairman:

From the letter dated April 3, 1995.

"I cannot agree with the tactic, it is not the moment," "Let us leave the comrades time to correct themselves in order not to irritate them," etc, at a time when the same childish acts and evils are continuing to vegetate within our ranks.

..Just for illustration I am considering the last two extreme cases: the ill-tempered and empty inertia of Pandeli Majko. He himself does not know what he is asking through "interviews" without the repeated identities (as the latest in the DITA INFORMACION) and on the other hand the latest meanness by Bashkim Zeneli with his diversionist articles," anonymous, in KOHA JONE, not to mention here the chronicles of the "anticult" speeches by Maqo Lakrori in districts, of the type toiling for something different but all remains the same. All these are happening when you and me are clashing with pure political criminals of the Berisha clique!

In the letter of June 18, 1995.

The acts of some of the elected like Maqo Lakrori, Bashkim Zeneli, Pandeli Majko, Ndue Legisi and others are considered as ... "finally a diversionist harmful movement and as far as not corrected, as deliberate, in the form of the parallel work with leaders and the posts of other comrades, the political arrogance towards deputy chairmen and the efforts to lynch yourself by denigrating the others or by feeding secretly the press with false tensions for PS (but true for their heads).

By analysing this question further on, Fatos writes: "In this context (M.L. etc) I would like to make clearer the why for the splitting and unprincipled positions and tactics of the type "With Nano—Against Nano" which is reflected in two aspects.

a) Artificial division of comrades...

b) Near Nano today to hit other senior officials (deputy chairman) and against Nano tomorrow to pass PS completely on the positions demanded by Berisha, Spahia, Dosti, and others."

From the letter of September 10, 1995:

"The tails of Sali, that is, Sali's advocates in the PS, should be cut without hesitation and as soon as possible, beginning with Zeneli and Cuci up to Maqo. The formulae is real incapability, inactivity, revival!

Do you understand that with the scheme of "anti-genocide laws" of Berisha PS is losing publicly all the main active politically figures with an electoral reputation"! In our present group of deputies one out of scores of Tefiks [plural form of Tefik], Xhevats, Pandelis and Bashkims has remained?!

But now we have another panorama. We have tried to keep our friends by respecting their diversity in opinions and you can see, if we had dismissed them as the chairman is demanding, his petition would have lacked some important signatures.

Hence, the morale of understanding has its dialectics.

Albania: PS Congress Elects New Management Committee

AU2708165096 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 27 Aug 96 p 1

["List of New Members of the PS General Management Committee Produced by the Congress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Of the 150 candidates for the Socialist Party [PS] General Management Committee, the following 61 won seats. On the basis of the PS Statute, the 38 chairmen of the PS district branches, the chairman of the Eurosocialist Youth Forum (Ilir Meta) and the chairman of the Socialist Women's Forum (Ndreko) are automatically members of the party's General Management Committee. The 61 members elected by secret ballot at the congress are:

1. Dritero Agolli, 510 votes
2. Namik Dokle, 497 votes
3. Et'hem Ruka, 450 votes
4. Arta Dade, 444 votes
5. Ermelinda Meksi, 443 votes
6. Rexhep Mejdani, 443 votes
7. Luan M. Rama, 439 votes
8. Shkelqim Cani, 437 votes
9. Fehmi Abdiu, 437 votes
10. Fatos Nano, 432 votes
11. Maqo Lakrori, 410 votes
12. Ylli Polovina, 408 votes
13. Limoz Dizdari, 403 votes
14. Shaqir Vukaj, 392 votes
15. Fatos Muco, 387 votes
16. Ilir Zela, 383 votes
17. Erion Brace, 371 votes
18. Bashkim Fino, 357 votes
19. Ylli Bufi, 356 votes
20. Enver Reci, 355 votes
21. Ndre Legisi, 348 votes
22. Piro Dodbiba, 347 votes
23. Violeta Manushi, 336 votes
24. Agron Dibra, 329 votes
25. Pandeli Majko, 328 votes
26. Sherif Bundo, 327 votes
27. Elmaz Sherifi, 324 votes
28. Fatri Sinani, 316 votes
29. Spartak Braho, 315 votes
30. Agron Tato, 311 votes
31. Lush Perpali, 308 votes
32. Halil Lalaj, 307 votes
33. Hamdi Jupe, 307 votes
34. Anastas Angjeli, 303 votes
35. Besnik Bare, 303 votes
36. Monika Kryemadhi, 300 votes
37. Artan Banushi, 298 votes
38. Luan Shahollari, 298 votes
39. Theodhor Bej, 298 votes
40. Kastriot Islami, 297 votes
41. Rexhep Cuko, 293 votes
42. Bektash Zeneli, 293 votes
43. Hasan Hoxha, 293 votes
44. Arben Malaj, 288 votes
45. Bashkim Koi, 285 votes
46. Fatmir Kumbaro, 280 votes
47. Sabit Brokaj, 279 votes
48. Aferdita Stefani, 278 votes
49. Luan Hajdaraga, 278 votes
50. Ahmet Ceni, 271 votes
51. Leontjev Cuci, 265 votes
52. Lili Nushi, 263 votes
53. Gjergj Koja, 262 votes
54. Kujtim Dashi, 259 votes
55. Ardian Myslimi, 259 votes
56. Flamur Hoxha, 257 votes
57. Vasillaq Kureta, 255 votes

58. Bilal Drai, 254 votes

59. Jorgji Kote, 252 votes

60. Spartak Poci, 249 votes

61. Aulona Minga, 245 votes

Albania: Platoon Gets High Marks in 'Cooperative Osprey '96'

AU2708162196 Tirana ATA in English 1243 GMT 27 Aug 96

[Report by A. Pasko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Camp Lejuene, August 27 (ATA)—Third phase of peacekeeping exercises "Cooperative Osprey '96" organised in Camp Lejuene, North Caroline, closed Monday [25 August] at noon.

The Albanian platoon's duty was "to defend a humanitarian caravan" which fell into an ambush. It was the first military formation which "fall under enemy's fire." Its reaction in front of the unexpected "fire" of the enemy was immediate (like during all the exercises with unexpected situations.)

The military and journalists who had come to follow the military drill gave their best opinions for the quickness and the way the Albanian platoon decided to use in the given situation. The militaries said this was the "most correct" combined reaction of the training until now.

The exercise continued then some 20 km away, in Camp Davis, where a meeting of "the humanitarian caravan of North and that one from South was simulated." The Albanian platoon acted here in joint actions with two U.S. and one Romanian platoon, as well as with a Polish one and another from the Baltic countries which added to the first company during the third phase of the training.

Military means used during this phase were armed lorries of type LAV, military transporting trucks, helicopters, military airplanes C-130. These airplanes were used for the airlifting of the Albanian troops from Camp Davis to their campsite.

The peacekeeping exercise "Cooperative Osprey '96" started on August 12 in Camp Lejuene, North Carolina. Three NATO member countries and 16 members countries of the Partnership for Peace Accord participate in this exercises. During its first three phases the peace keeping forces were trained how to give solutions in on humanitarian situations, bearing in mind situations met in Bosnia.

The phase which ended yesterday, was the most important phase, as it aimed a complex situation training, where elements practiced until now were interwoven with each other. During these days the training aimed compact actions of different troops coming from different countries.

Many journalists, besides those who regularly follow the training, have arrived to Camp Lejuene to follow them.

Albania: First Private Foreign Bank To Open in Tirana

AU2708162296 Tirana ATA in English 1226 GMT 27 Aug 96

[Report by M. Noti]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 26 (ATA)—The first foreign private bank will be opened along with other Albanian state banks or half-state owned ones.

"Tirana Bank," with its main shareholder the Greek bank of Pire, will start its activity at with an initial capital of $2 million.

"It is the first bank among three other foreign banks, which has received licence to carry on its private activity from the Albanian Bank," said Miranda Rama, director in the Supervision Department of the Albanian Bank.

Thus, the banking system has opened way to private banks among which the branch of National Bank of Greece, centered in the Business Center VEVE and the private Malaysian International Commercial Bank.

Albania: Orthodox Church Protests Greek 'Interference'

AU2708204896 Tirana ATA in English 1829 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 27 (ATA)—The Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church (KOASh) protested today, for the first time, against the interference of the Greek Church in its inner affairs.

"Making use of the last speech of his Eminence, Andrea of Konitsa Metropolitan, held after the evening clergy service of August 14, we stress it is high time, Father Andrea understands he has no right, according to Canon Rights to interfere in inner affairs of another Orthodox Autocephalous Church," said a protest of this church sent to Albanian Telegraphic Agency.

Archbishop Iannulatos, at the beginning of this month, expressed his opposition toward a decision of the Oecumenic Patriarchate through two letters regarding the consecration by this Patriarchate of the three new archbishops for the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church.

He pointed out that these actions were valuated as "hastened actions which cause unfavourable reactions and consequences for the life of church in Albania."

"No church canon gives him the right to offer public lectures to the head of another autocephalous Orthodox church," said the KOASh's statement today.

The Albanian Committee for the defence of the KOASh sent a protest on August 1, to the Oecumenic Patriarchate Fanari in Istanbul which said: "Orthodox believers and all Albanian people consider it an ill-willing act of interferences in the inner affairs of KOASh."

Patriarchate, which is a supporter of the Greek Orthodox Church, even then did not take into consideration the autocephaly of the Albanian Orthodox Church.

The KOASh statute, tomos, compiled by Fan Noli in 1924, approved in 1926 by King Zog and completely acknowledged in 1937 by Patriarchate called the Albanian Autocephalous Church in its document of acknowledge as "our young separated sister."

"KOASh will never allow any one, inside or outside Albania, to use it for the creation of tension between Albania and Greece," said the statement, right before a visit to Albania of the Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos, at the end of this month.

"We believe that the best thing to do is continuation of dialogue with Albanian authorities and not a new unexpectedness," had Iannulatos written when he rejected the consecration of the three new archbishops.

Albania: Schools To Contine Teaching Greek in South

AU2708204596 Tirana ATA in English
1827 GMT 27 Aug 96

[Report by P. Shuteriqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 27 (ATA)—Albanian Council of Ministers decided among others, in its meeting Monday [25 August], to continue the teaching in the Greek language even in the second form of the secondary schools in Dervican, Bularat, Aliko, and Livadhja (southern Albania).

"This decision shows once more the good intentions of the Albanian state and democratic government for the strengthening of the friendship relations with the Greek people," said Minister of Education and Sports Edmond Lulja. "It is included in the context of implementation of the Law on Pre-University Education System which envisages the creation of conditions for minority pupils to study in their mother tongue," said Lulja.

The decision is continuation of correct implementation of international agreement Albania has adhered to, in the field of human rights and education of minorities.

Three southern districts of Albania: Gjirokaster, Sarande, and Delvine, where the Greek minority live, have some 50 schools of the eight-year level, 50 others of primary level, four of the secondary level and a pedagogical secondary one in Gjirokaster, which has a special branch to prepare teachers for the Greek minority.

All measures are taken to supply all pupils of the Greek minority with necessary text books, a part of which prepared by the Albanian Institute of Pedagogical Studies and printed by the Greek state free of charge. They will serve the education of 3,000 pupils of the Greek minority in their mother tongue. Some 368 out of 400 teachers who teach in those schools belong to the Greek minority.

Dozens of students from the Greek minority are continuing higher university studies in the University "Eqerem Cabej" in Gjirokaster and hundreds of other youths from this minority are continuing them in other high schools and universities all over Albania.

Bulgaria: Videnov Receives Slovak Defense Minister Sitek

AU2808092796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 28 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 28 August Prime Minister Zhan Videnov received Jan Sitek, Slovak minister of defense, who is visiting Bulgaria.

The traditionally good relations between the two countries have been developing even more in recent years, Mr. Videnov pointed out during the talks, the government Press Center reports.

The agreement between the two countries' Ministries of Defense, which was signed in 1995, is a good foundation for developing positive military cooperation. This opinion was expressed by both sides to the talks. Developing contacts in the military-technical area and in production-sharing in aviation were discussed. Mr. Sitek informed the prime minister that a joint military exercise will take place on Bulgarian territory.

Bulgaria: Pavlov Holds Talks With Slovak Counterpart

LD2808102296 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0500 GMT 28 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek continued his visit to Bulgaria yesterday. He is visiting Bulgaria at the invitation of his counterpart Dimitur Pavlov. Our correspondent Bernard Rostecky reports from Sofia about the agenda and course of the second day of his visit:

[Rostecky] At a meeting with journalists yesterday, Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek recalled in detail his talks with his Bulgarian counterpart. He emphasized that the talks would result in closer cooperation, in particular in the military and technical sphere. The orientation of Slovak and Bulgarian military repair companies is similar and both sides can only benefit from solving technical problems on a mutual basis. They can also benefit from complementing each other.

In the sphere of air defense training, the Bulgarian side offers good terms for the use of its training ground, which is one of the best in Europe. In return, Slovakia could offer the Lest military training ground or the use of the potential of the Military Research Technological Institute in Zahorie.

The ministers also discussed in detail commercial issues, (?including) spare parts for the equipment of the two Armies and social and sport issues. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: General Staff Chief Departs for Romania

AU2808083096 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0800 GMT 28 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel General Tsvetan Totomirov, commander of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, left for a three-day visit to Romania on 28 August.

Gen. Totomirov will meet the commander of the Romanian General Staff, who invited him to Romania, and will be received by Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca. Gen. Totomirov will also visit various units and training centers. The talks will focus on the reforms in the two countries' armies and the results of their cooperation until now. Specific measures on mutual assistance in equipment maintenance and cadre training are expected to be agreed.

Bulgaria: Zhelev Blamed for Defense Industry Plight

AU2808090996 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 28 Aug 96 p 2

[Commentary by Vasil Popov: "President Is Responsible for Situation of Military-Industrial Complex"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Presidency is responsible for the situation of the Bulgarian defense industry, and it could play an key role in constructing and expanding the military-industrial complex, according to national security experts, members of the "Together for Bulgaria" Association [supporters of Bulgarian Socialist Party candidates for the presidency/vice presidency]

Through the Consultative Council, the head of state can control and analyze the state of the military-industrial complex and the arms business, direct strategy, and cooperate with the executive branch in guiding the most profitable sphere of our industry, the experts stressed at a news conference on 27 August.

A program for improving the prospects of the military-industrial complex has been prepared. It will be proposed to the Pirinski-Marazov presidential candidates duo, Association Chairman Yavor Genov said. Engineer Iliya Gunchev, director of Metalkhim and the Vazov Machine Building Plants; General of the Reserves Boris Todorov, former deputy minister of defense in charge of arms; and Ivan Portalski, director of the Strategic Studies Scientific Research Center, spoke about the military-industrial complex situation and prospects.

Bulgaria: Cost of Joining NEOCOCOM Questioned

AU2808101896 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
28 Aug 96 p 13

[Article by Lyubomir Denov: "We Were Pushed Into Arms Schengen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 27 August Yavor Genov, chairman of the "Together for Bulgaria" Association, which unites Socialists—national security experts—said that the cost of Bulgaria's admission to NEOCOCOM [new Coordinating Committee on Export Controls] will be to "refrain" from selling arms to over 20 nonembargo countries.

Last year Bulgaria was rather strangely dropped from the list of the constituents of the organization that became the successor of the international structure which until 1989 had blocked the access of the former socialist countries to dual-use technologies. At the time, it was said that the United States and Russia opposed our membership.

The "blacklist" of states closed for our arms deals, includes Cuba, Vietnam, China, the DPRK, Laos, Cambodia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Angola, and Mozambique.

Engineer Iliya Gunchev, Metalkhim-holding general director, pointed out that this is an incomplete list. He stubbornly refused to comment more seriously on the compromises we were forced to make in order to be admitted to this notorious organization. However, he pointed out that "refraining" is a mere ban, because only Iraq and, partly, Libya, are embargo states.

According to engineer Gunchev, the ban on selling our arms also includes the former Yugoslav republics. At the same time, the United States is putting tonnes of arms there through Iran, Romania, and Croatia.

A source from the arms branch, who wishes to remain anonymous, said that Sudan is in one of the first places on the "black" list. Recently, it was precisely this African state that emerged as a favorable market for our arms.

Several months ago, a former industry minister, Kliment Vuchev, reported that an arms deal with Sudan worth $240 million had been frustrated. This was a serious blow, especially when one considers the fact that the peak in our "postrevolutionary" export in 1994-95 amounted to a total of $390 million.

Is this not a rather high price for finding ourselves in the company of the so-called trustworthy states?

Is this political move not another nail in the defense industry's coffin against the background of the cruel stagnation that engulfed our defense industry?

Indeed, who needs access to leading arms technologies if we do not have the money to purchase even one of them? Currently, our military enterprises cannot afford even the expenditures for the modifications Moscow has made in some productions for which we have also been licensed.

We are gaining a political image at the expense of economic losses, Ivan Portalski said from the association of socialist arms experts.

Is Videnov thus not repeating the mistake of his predecessor Filip Dimitrov, who in 1992 said on the Golan Heights that Bulgaria would not sell weapons to the Arab countries? Then, as now, the goal was the same—gaining the benevolence of the superpowers, and first of all the United States. The result then and now is the same—our defense industry continues to sink.

However, while we have to refrain, Western arms producers expanded their sales precisely among the "black list" states from 20 to 85 percent. This means that they are allowed, but we are not.

The criteria on the basis of which we have been asked "to refrain" is more than strange. Sudan for example, is on the list because a Sudanese terrorist has been involved in a bloody action in Israel or Egypt. According to the same logic, the United States must be compromised because Americans killed Martin Luther King and the Kennedy brothers.

Bulgaria undoubtedly must assume its place in NEOCOCOM. What we said so far should by no means be considered a criticism of the Bulgarian membership in this authoritative organization. We must take into consideration the international rules of the game if we really want to develop a strong defense industry.

However, the question refers to the price we will have to pay and the ethics of our rulers, because the series of lethal compromises could render our membership in NEOCOCOM meaningless.

Furthermore, if we are asked to make another sacrifice our citizens must be told what and why the sacrifice. It is known that this way it hurts less.

For a rather long time, the leaders of the defense industry have played dumb when asked about the cost of our NEOCOCOM membership. Only one of them dared to utter that, in addition to banning our sales of weapons, we have been forced to declassify information about our arms sales in the last five years. Another figure from the arms branch, who wishes to remain anonymous, sighed after seeing the "blacklist" and said: I wish it were only this.... This means that the ticket to the show called NEOCOCOM is much more expensive than we know.

Bulgaria: Editorial Sees IMF Policy as 'Dictatorship'

AU2808081396 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 28 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by Aleksandur Angelov: "IMF Dictatorship Replaces Dictatorship of Proletariat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If Marx were still alive he would, on the basis of the Bulgarian experience, have added a new chapter to *Das Kapital* and entitled it "IMF Dictatorship Replaces Dictatorship of Proletariat."

The dialectics of our social development have proved with a deadly explicitness that the Comrades who used to dictate their antieconomic laws with an incurable insistence are being followed by the Gentlemen from the IMF. Furthermore, according to Newton's Law, the IMF Gentlemen are reacting with the same crushing force, although in the opposite direction.

The situation of the Bulgarian people has not improved as a result of this fierce neutralization. On the contrary, it has become twice as bad. Just as the comrades used to point out the right direction and nationalize property, now the IMF is pointing out the direction and melting the people's income and savings. The only joy left for the people is to see how the new dictators are dictating most of all to the old ones, and quietly gloat.

Bulgaria: Cabinet, Unions Said Using IMF as 'Scarecrow'

AU2808082996 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 28 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by Slavka Bozukova: "IMF as Scarecrow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The IMF has completely turned into a scarecrow for the people. It is clear to the people that whenever the IMF emissaries come to Sofia a price shock and bankruptcies in banks, or a jump in the dollar rate and taxes are not far behind.

It appears that our rulers find it convenient to blame the foreign emissaries for their failures. Thus they tighten the belts of their voters with a clear conscience.

However, this time the people's hatred will strike the ministers even stronger, because if there are more bankruptcies among banks the IMF will not allow the people to withdraw their savings. This news bomb was thrown again by the trade unions. After failing to reach an agreement with the cabinet, they are willingly disclosing the secrets of the agreement with the IMF.

The trade unions are right in sounding the clarion, because by implementing the IMF instructions our country is slowly approaching the Chilean model. The fact that everyone is using the IMF in the manner he considers suitable, is another issue. Let us hope that the patience of the Washington financiers does not wear out.

Bulgaria: Commission Refuses To Register Candidates

AU2708172596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the Central Electoral Commission refused to register for participation in the presidential elections the two teams of candidates of the Left and the united opposition. The reason given for the refusal to register the Left's candidates, Pirinski and Marazov, was the lack of evidence showing how Georgi Pirinski acquired his Bulgarian citizenship. In the case of the opposition's candidates, Stoyanov and Kavaldzhiev, the commission discovered about 10 irregularities in their supporting documents.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party and the united democratic forces will appeal against the decisions of the Central Electoral Commission to the Supreme Court, which is obliged to issue a ruling within three days. The decision of the Supreme Court is final and binding on the Central Electoral Commission.

Bulgaria: Videnov Comments on Electoral Commission's Action

AU2708184796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 27 Aug 96

[Report supplied by BTA]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the refusal of the Central Electoral Commission to register the Left's presidential candidates Pirinski and Marazov for the elections, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov declared at a meeting with the chairmen of the BSP municipal councils in Lovech Oblast that this is undoubtedly the result of the distressing political confrontation in the commission, for which the Democratic Left and its team of candidates are least to blame. The commission cannot gather the necessary majority of two-thirds of the commission members present to register any team of candidates for the presidential elections, Videnov said, and added: This very day we will prepare our appeal to the Supreme Court against the commission's decision. Undoubtedly the opposition's candidates Stoyanov and Kavaldzhiev will be doing the same, although in my opinion the shortcomings in the application for registration by the united democratic forces, and in particular by the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] coalition, cannot be corrected. We do not exclude the possibility of the Supreme Court issuing any ruling, including one that runs counter to common sense and sound logic, Zhan Videnov declared.

Bulgaria: Refusal To Register Candidates Seen as 'Racket'

AU2808082896 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 28 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by Nevena Kopandanova: "Obvious Racket"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 27 August decision of the Central Electoral Commission can be described as a political racket. According to the commission's chairman, the two presidential candidate duos were measured by the same yardstick, despite the fact that one pair cannot pass the test of the Constitution, while the other only has irregular documents—again according to the Constitution. This yardstick painfully reminds us of the friendship with the Big Brother—USSR—which produced among other things also the people's wisdom, that it is better to divide in a fraternal manner, rather than equally.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] again remained loyal to its principle—to observe the law only when it suits its interests. Those were the rules of the Bulgarian-USSR friendship, and the rules that prompted the party to nominate Pirinski, and thus boldly trample on the Constitution it created. Those also were the rules used by the BSP members of the electoral commission in measuring the judicial correctness of the candidacies. In other words, if you refuse to approve our pair, we will overtrump yours. This is called an obvious political racket, something in which the Socialists became experts.

Bulgaria: BSP Options for New Candidates Discussed

AU2808094196 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 28 Aug 96 p 11

[Article by Ekaterina Nikolova: "BSP Could Split in Searching for New Presidential Duo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In six days the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] will be forced to begin its presidential elections campaign anew. If the Supreme Court rules that that the refusal of the Central Electoral Commission to register the Pirinski-Marazov duo is correct, the Socialists will have to search for another duo. The inability of the rulers to nominate suitable and winning political figures for the posts of president and vice president clearly emerged in determining their presidential elections ticket. The deadlock created by the lack of cadres gives the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] several options, each of which is a losing one.

An internal BSP poll regarding presidential candidates shows that Aleksandur Lilov and Nikolay Kamov are the ones that most members prefer after Pirinski. However, both declared in June in writing their unwillingness to participate in the race. Those at No. 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters] think that the strategist [Lilov] is unlikely to change his position. It also is unlikely that the former BSP leader would sacrifice Kamov. The eventual candidacy of the BSP spokesman would terminate his political career, and neither he nor Lilov would benefit from this precisely at a moment when the power in the BSP is being redivided.

This leaves Sendov [National Assembly chairman]. Preferred by two or three red organizations, the chairman of the National Assembly was in last place on the list of BSP presidential candidates preferences. He was insulted by this and told the ruling party that even if they ask him later he will not respond. Blagovest Sendov is vain, and it would be easy to convince him to participate in the race, however, the BSP does not want him. His odds are low and his political fame is based on blunders. Therefore the BSP is viewing the fourth variant as the most suitable one, nominating Minister of Culture Marazov as a presidential candidate. Currently, Marazov is Pirinski's running mate as the candidate for vice president. The BSP will later search for a suitable candidate for the post of vice president. The BSP Organizational Department has demanded that the BSP Executive Bureau begin the implementation of this scheme by starting talks with General Mikho Mikhov, commander of the Air Force Main Staff, and Counterintelligence Chief General Brigo Asparukhov. However, it is well known that Gen. Mikhov does not want to sacrifice his military career because of the BSP's problems, while if the scandalous Asparukhov is nominated the Socialists will become the laughing stock of the country. Thus a part of the BSP leadership continues to search in vain for Socialists-intellectuals or public figures, who are not directly linked to the party and state leadership, hoping that this will wash away the shame of Pirinski's failure. While the search for a new duo continues, the election campaign tactic of the Executive Bureau and Videnov's circle is to provoke a political scandal and block the presidential elections campaign.

Against this background, an open issue remains of the fate of the Elections Staff led by Filip Bokov and the more than 100 "Together for Bulgaria" associations.

If the Socialists suddenly announce that they do not need any longer those civil committees because they have another candidate, they will lose voters. On the other hand—if the associations continue to exist, they would inevitably jeopardize the BSP's integrity. A part of those associations already declared their readiness to register on the basis of the Law on Entities and Families, while others plan to register as political parties. Those structures are directly linked to the people of Lilov and Lukanov in the Elections Staff. They were created in support of Pirinski, who continues to be a serious rival of Videnov's for the party's leading post. If, after the campaign's failure, Pirinski is presented to the voters as Videnov's victim, and independent socialist structures support him, the split in the ruling party's ranks and creating a new BSP could turn out to be a mere formality.

Bulgaria: Mozer Ouster Considered Coup Against Democracy

AU2708111096 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 26 Aug 96 p 9

[Article by Rumyana Bratovanova: "Coup in BZNS—Bad Day for Bulgarian Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zhelev did not wait for the fourth anniversary of the 28 August 1992 Boyana fields event [a news conference at which he criticized Filip Dimitrov's cabinet and after which the cabinet lost a confidence vote in parliament and resigned], to get mixed up again in opposition affairs. A few hours before they dealt rather roughly with Anastasiya Mozer at No. 1 Vrabcha Street [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union—BZNS headquarters], the president again expressed his opinion and sank into orange [BZNS] internal party affairs. Abandoning bon ton, our Chaplin—Zhelyu Zhelev—again threw cake in the face of the BZNS aparatchiks. They cursed him—but he is right again. This is the case because everything that happened at the questionable forum of the BZNS Permanent Board inspires the following conclusion: Someone soiled the place that was cleaned for two years to serve as grounds for the unification of the opposition.

A recapitulation of events shows that 24 August was a very bad day for Bulgarian democracy. The BZNS without Mozer and the support of Stefan Savov's Democratic Party would be something similar to Drenchev's, Petrov's or any other of the 20 or so organizations which each calls itself BZNS. The Bulgarian Socialist Party is the only one to benefit from the attempt against Mozer. At No. 20 Positano Street, they hate the lady more than any other opposition leader: She is genetically doomed to anticommunism, comes from Uncle Sam's country, succeeded in staying away from the opposition infighting, and with skillful actions succeeded in placing the bankrupt BZNS in parliament. Thus she threatened the red fortress—the villages. What would the achievements of the People's Union be without brilliant people such as Stefan Savov, Ventseslav Dimitrov, Aleksandur Dzherov, Nikolay Khristov, and so on? The BZNS tribunes Petko Iliev and Georgi Pinchev would have hardly entered parliament. And it was again Mrs. Mozer who, after a controversial but ascending strategy, succeeded in getting the vice presidential nomination for Todor Kavaldzhiev.

Pinchev and Iliev can already reserve their places in the Hall of the Destroyers of Democracy. Their "victory" will split the BZNS, will subject the People's Union to a test, and will create a lot of new and unnecessary problems for the united democratic forces. The peaceful election of the Stoyanov-Kavaldzhiev duo could now be stopped by the redundant issue of who is with whom in the BZNS. Mr. Savov [Democratic Party leader], who has never allowed himself to be pushed around, said that he will say nothing until Mrs. Mozer comes back.

There has been a watch on Zhelev out of concern that he would grab the power, especially at the time of the 1994 caretaker cabinet. From the first day he entered No. 2 Dondukov Street [the Presidency], he has been suspected of organizing a coup. However, history will pronounce its judgment. It is not Zhelev who turned the August Boyana fields into a coup against democracy. An analysis of this fact will save wasting political energy.

Zhelev will not hasten to register as a presidential candidate despite the fact that one-third of the Bulgarians are against the blue-red [Union of Democratic Forces-Bulgarian Socialist Party] division of power. In the present legislative framework, it is senseless to appear as an independent candidate. However, Zhelev is partly responsible for the fact that in the last seven years the fate of democracy in our country has depended on the whims of the mastodons and the political garbage collectors.

What happened at No. 1 Vrabcha Street is not only a coup—it is a strike to the heart of the united opposition. Mozer, as the BZNS chief secretary, brought to parliament and to big politics those who have now bitten off her head—the two gentlemen Pinchev and Iliev. This is the truth, and it makes no difference whether Mozer is good or Zhelev wrong, or whether this is a new beginning. Only political dwarfs cannot understand that the people are hoping that they will not have to live their old age in the era of the red hunger for bread.

Bulgaria: Videnov Meets Japanese Transport Minister

AU2308134996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 23 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Japanese Government intends to send experts to Bulgaria soon to help in transportation and infrastructure projects. This was announced at a meting of the visiting Japanese Transportation Minister Yoshiyuki Kamei and Prime Minister Zhan Videnov.

The leader of the Bulgarian Government briefed the guest on the projects that are being developed and the efforts to make use of our country's geostrategic advantages, despite the current difficulties of the Bulgarian economy.

The Japan's transportation minister said that Japan is expecting an official invitation to join the Burgas port reconstruction project. Japan is prepared to cooperate and share its experience. The specific interest in the Burgas port project is a result of this port special role as a sea crossroads between Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, the Japanese minister said.

The situation of the Sofia airport and the possibility of accelerating its reconstruction were also discussed during the meeting. Zhan Videnov declared his intention to accelerate the work of the experts, and the Japanese side expressed readiness to cooperate in modernizing the airport's control tower system.

Bulgaria: Videnov Discusses Economic Problems in Lovech

AU2708181596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 27 Aug 96

[BTA report]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Lovech today, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov began a working meeting with chairmen of municipal councils, mayors, company directors, regional police chiefs, and managers of bank branches from the whole oblast. Cabinet ministers and Nora Ananieva, deputy chairman of the National Assembly, also took part in the meeting.

In his speech, Prime Minister Videnov analyzed the problems in the production and banking sectors and oulined measures for stabilizing the two sectors. At the moment, the cabinet is mainly concentrating on rehabilitating or liquidating the large companies in the transportation and energy sectors, Videnov said. The prime minister noted that the situation in the banking sector continues to be extremely unstable and that great difficulties continue to be encountered in the foreign exchange market. For this reason, he said, the government will do everything possible to support the national currency.

The prime minister also spoke about the updated budget and the need to restrict expenditure. Inflation is 100 percent at the moment, he said, but the percentage by which the budget was updated is less than this. To cope with the situation, the cabinet is increasing budget revenues and reducing expenditure as much as possible by rigorous restructuring in all sectors.

Bulgaria: Losses From Embargo on Iraq Estimated

AU2708090296 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 27 Aug 96 p 14

[Staff report: "Our Losses as Result of Iraqi Embargo Amount to $2 Billion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The BALKAN NEWS AGENCY reported on 26 August that Bulgaria has lost $2 billion as a result of the sanctions imposed on Iraq.

In 1990 the direct losses were $868 million. They resulted from the failure to supply 3.828 billion [figure as published] metric tons of oil on the basis of the protocol with the USSR, according to sources at the Ministry of Trade. Our state lost another $27 million as a result of the failure to receive 140,000 tons of oil as partial payment for Iraq's debts to Bulgaria. We lost a further $568 million as a result of the failure to receive the 2.5 million tons of oil we were supposed to receive from Iraq within the framework of the accelerated payment of the debt to Bulgaria, and yet another $52 million as a result of importing only 469,000 tons of oil from Libya as partial payment of Libya's debts to Bulgaria.

Czech Republic: Deputy Minister Discusses Aid to Bosnia

AU2808074596 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 27 Aug 96 p 3

[Interview with First Deputy Interior Minister Jaroslav Kopriva by Jan Decker; place and date not given: "Bosnia-Herzegovina Appreciates Czech Assistance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] First Deputy Interior Minister Jaroslav Kopriva comments in our interview on the present situation regarding the assistance of the Czech Republic to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Last week he visited Bosnia and discussed specific help and projects there.

[Decker] You undertook the trip to Sarajevo together with a group of Bosnian returnees, who were coming home after years spent in our country. Can you tell us how many refugees asked to return home, and how this repatriation is organized?

[Kopriva] At the beginning of the year, there were approximately 1,200 refugees in the Czech Republic. One-third of them used the opportunity to apply for repatriation to Bosnia-Herzegovina. To date, a total of three charter flights have been sent and transported more than 200 returnees to Sarajevo. We are preparing one more flight, which should complete the procedure. With these people I do not see their will to return as the main problem but, above all, where to put them upon return. According to Article 7 of the Dayton Peace Accord, however, this is the concern of the High Commissioner's Office, which, in cooperation with the Sarajevo minister for refugees, assumes all responsibility for the refugees immediately upon arrival. It has not happened so far that someone has ended up unprovided for. Indeed, we get every returnee to confirm to us that he has a place to return to.

[Decker] Is it possible to specify which ethnic origin dominates among the refugees, and in extension among the returnees?

[Kopriva] With a few exceptions, they are, above all, Bosnian Muslims.

[Decker] Were you able to observe their first reactions upon return?

[Kopriva] The very arrival in Sarajevo is very painful because the airport is situated on the site that the battle lines passed through, so everybody was quite taken aback. I must say that I did not see any emotional reactions. Maybe they come later, at the place of their future abode. Here, it really depends on where they come to because the situation is not the same everywhere. There are instances when the returnees go back to places where they would be in the majority, and the mood there is different from where the returnees remain as individual cases.

[Decker] The government decided in its Resolution No. 318 to release $300,000 to a UNHCR [UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees] trust fund for the reconstruction of buildings in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Your ministry was supposed to arrange the transfer, which you handled yourselves. What purpose are these funds to serve?

[Kopriva] The aid will be transferred in two instalments of $150,000 each. The first was passed in the form of a check directly to the high commissioner's trust fund, with the provision that we recommend the funds to be used in the place of the refugee repatriation, and the second part is designated for direct shipments of material and services for the reconstruction of Sarajevo, which should be executed by a Czech business entity. It would mean particularly glazing windows in Sarajevo, as they are mostly without glass as a result of the long fighting.

[Decker] In addition to the aforementioned contribution, you discussed a plan for development assistance.

[Kopriva] The development assistance plan was decided on by the government last year. A total of 60 million korunas was released for this, and it is being implemented at three locations: Tesanj, Maglaj, and Sanski Most. During my sojourn there, I visited all of these places to verify the implementation.

[Decker] Can you be specific about the content of the individual programs of the plan?

[Kopriva] The programs are basically to help improve conditions for the returnees. At the Tesanj site, the program is aimed directly at help to returnees, as facilities to be used for their accommodation are being repaired there. Of course, in no case is it a matter of building a new refugee camp but, rather, repairs to individual family housing. In Maglaj, it is a program of more general help for the development of the city, which is divided into a health-care part, which includes direct supplies, and the decisive part, which is the reconstruction of a local primary school. Reconstruction began a month ago, and it is progressing for instruction to begin there on 1 September. I had a very good feeling about the implementation of the last-mentioned project. Regarding Sanski Most, it is again health-care assistance. We plan to bring in a mobile dental clinic, which should help improve the local situation. In addition, we will implement help similar to that in Tesanj.

[Decker] So, your overall impression is favorable?

[Kopriva] The overall impression from the implementation of the project is favorable, although in some places it is just the beginning. Nevertheless, one thing is clear. At all three locations, the Czech Republic has a very good reputation, and the representatives of the UNHCR really appreciate the contribution and the manner in which we get involved in the project and try to resolve it.

Czech Republic: Klaus: Trade Deficit Necessary in Short Term

LD2708191496 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1620 GMT 27 Aug 96

[Regular weekly interivew with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondent Lucie Weissova on 27 August; place not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Weissova] Yesterday, the Statistical Office published the trade balance deficit forecast for the end of 1996, when it is expected to reach something like 150 billion Czech korunas; that is, it should be much worse than even the most pessimistic estimates. In these regular interviews, you have never appeared worried by this issue. What would you like to say now?

[Klaus] The published July figure has not come as a surprise. I have known it for about two weeks, and I must reiterate that,. although this result is not a pleasing one, it is nothing too dramatic, either. The information became known, on purpose, last Friday, when I held talks with the finance minister, the central bank [Czech National Bank] governor [Josef Tosovsky], and our leading businessmen in Kolodeje [chateau near Prague]. No, these figures do not inspire applause and rejoicing, but there is nothing dramatic about them, either.

[Weissova] What do you think has caused this deficit?

[Klaus] The reason for all this is something quite logical, unavoidable, and, in the short term, even necessary. On the one hand, exports are not growing in any spectacular way because, in the world—in Europe and in Germany, in particular—no particular boom is in evidence, and this weakens some of our exports. In the past few years, some of our exports to Germany and to Western Europe were successful. On the other hand, our country is experiencing very fast economic growth, and that increases demand, including demand for imports. So, in the short run, without curbing our economic growth and without stepping hard on the brakes—something we do not want and cannot afford—there is not an easy cure for this situation.

[Weissova] Some commentators say that this deficit was caused by the election year, when political parties were promising and, above all, giving away too much.

[Klaus] [Passage omitted] The fact that there would be more strain on the budget this year was known to all of us, and the finance minister had repeatedly warned about it. If you recall, this was our main defense in the face of populist proposals that tax cuts should go on and on. We kept saying: Be careful, consult the expenditure side of the budget first, establish which areas you are able to make savings in, and only after that discuss by how much taxes can be cut. Taxes were cut considerably last year, and some deputies, guided by the vision of election success, pretended that this was not so and that tax cuts should continue.

So, as for the strain on the budget, I think the budget is more or less balanced now. I know the latest figures at the end of last week. I hope that tomorrow the government will approve a proposal to make certain budgetary cuts in the last four months of this year. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Chemapol 'Riddled With' Ex-State Security Agents

AU2808095296 Prague CESKY TYDENIK in Czech 27-29 Aug 96 No 172, p 1

[Commentary by Martin Petrasek: "For a Start"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Definitive proof that "anticommunism" is an empty word for an overwhelming majority of citizens of the Czech Republic and that settling accounts with collaborators of the communist regime has been closed forever, if it ever actually began, was provided last week. Even the last of the incorrigible naive people who still believed in the reason and the dawn of the memory of the nation of indifferent people must have lost their illusions. The media carried a report that the gigantic petrochemical company Chemapol had taken over Omnipol, the largest Czech arms trading company and—nothing. One huge, great nothing. The reminder of the brutally important fact—namely, that Chemapol is riddled throughout with former State Security agents—was drowned in a confusion of trivial information. It was strikingly obvious how reticently the passages about this fact were written, as if only out of necessity. The response from the readers corresponds to this: Nothing, nothing, nothing.

Let us lay it out: The general director of the company, which controls the oil-products market in this country, was a collaborator of a criminal organization. The specialty of this organization, called State Security, was shadowing, arresting, terrorizing psychologically and physically, imprisoning, and killing people who stood up against another criminal organization, called the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Although the State Security past of Director General Vladimir Junek is generally known and was even reported by the Interior Ministry two years ago, State Security agent Junek could nevertheless become the boss of such a strategically important Czech firm. After the state authorities allowed this horror to take place, others followed: Chemapol gained control of the company publishing the daily SVOBODNE SLOVO, purchased a parcel of shares of the television station Premiera, and, several days ago, took over the aforementioned Omnipol. And the reaction from high places? We have not heard a single warning....

A word is enough to the wise, but some are otherwise, one could paraphrase a proverb. How much more does one need to say, and how much evidence to present to make the people understand how terribly they were cheated in 1989 and what transparent monstrosities are being played with them now, seven years later? If an overwhelming majority of the nation really does not comprehend all this, and its mental capacity really does not reach any further than a pint of beer, a soccer game, and a televized lottery, there is nothing left for us but to endorse the opinion that the Czechs do not deserve democracy, that it is an unnecessary luxury for us and that we do not know how to deal with it. Everything should be otherwise: After 40 years of left-wing totalitarianism, 40 years of right-wing totalitarianism and then (perhaps) democracy.

Slovakia: Meciar Says FM Leaving for Health Reasons

LD2708182296 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar referred to Article 111 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic yesterday when proposing the dismissal of three members of the cabinet. At today's news conference at the government office he explained the proposal as follows:

[Begin Meciar recording] In connection with the assessment of the two-year period since the 1994 elections, we have noted that there have been many positive aspects in the government's work. At the same time we have been assessing the tasks we face in the period up to 1998, including our opportunities, resources available, the strategy of our future progress, and so on.

We have also assessed the work of the individual members of the government and their specific problems, including their personal, health and other problems. Following this assessment a decision was made and yesterday I submitted to the president of the republic my proposal to dismiss the following members of the government from their ministerial posts and from the government:

Minister Juraj Schenk from the post of the minister of foreign affairs,

Minister Jan Ducky from the post of the minister of economy, and

Minister Ludovit Hudek from the post of the minister of the interior.

The reasons for these departures vary from case to case. In the case of Minister Schenk, these reasons go back as far as 1994 when he accepted the post despite knowing that he had certain health problems. Because of the state of his health he has requested to be definitively relieved of his post from 1 September. There is no other reason.

I would like to say that I have worked with two ministers of foreign affairs, and watched one from a distance, but of the four ministers of foreign affairs the Slovak Republic has had so far Minister Schenk was the best and the most efficient. The only reason for his departure, despite my pledging with him to stay, has been the state of his health. Minister Schenk and I have agreed ways of further cooperation. We will continue to maintain a close personal relationship and will continue personal cooperation.

The dismissed Minister Jan Ducky is leaving on the basis of a mutual agreement following his resignation. But on the basis of the assessment of the political tasks for 1997 and 1998, Minister Ducky will stay in politics and will continue as a parliamentary deputy for [Meciar's] Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. Today I appointed him as my adviser and tomorrow morning he will start working in the office. I have also discussed with him his further social activities and these should continue as early as next week.

The appraisal of the Minister of the Interior Ludovit Hudek has also been positive as regards his personal and professional qualities. He has fulfilled his role and made a particularly great contribution to the restructuring of the state administration. However, we have also assessed the situation in the police department of the Interior Ministry where neither he, nor I, nor other members of the government, including our coalition partners, could have been satisfied.

The replacement of the interior minister is not the last word in the changes in the security department of the Slovak Republic. In fact this is only the beginning and the forthcoming changes will be extensive and far-reaching. They have been necessitated by a decline in the discipline of the police corps where, although many policemen work in an honest way, there are also quite a few people who do things differently. We now face the task of transforming the police corps and it has been decided to start this process with new people, not only as regards the minister, but also such posts as the Interior Ministry's chief of staff and other posts. [passage omitted]

These, then, have been the reasons and facts behind my decision to propose the changes in the government, which have now been implemented. No other changes have been or are being planned. We will continue appraising the performance of other government officials, including state secretaries and departmental chiefs, in a similar way and I cannot rule out that all these posts will be subject to significant changes in the near future. The aim of these changes is to improve quality.

I would like to appreciate the work of all the three departing ministers and thank them for all they have done. I believe that the new ministers will continue with new energy the task of implementing the Slovak Government's program. [end recording]

Slovakia: Report Views 'Serious Problem' of Information Leaks

AU2708172196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 27 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by "(sp)": "According to a Government Report, the Publication of Classified Information in the Media Is a Serious Problem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—A report by Interior Minister L. Hudek, discussed by the Slovak Government on 20 August, describes the publication of classified information in the mass media as a serious problem. He cites as an example the publication in SME of a secret report on the activity of the Slovak Foreign Ministry. In this context, we must point out that this involved the publication of the transcript of a meeting between Foreign Minister J. Schenk and British Ambassador to Slovakia P. Harborne, who said, among other things, to the head of our diplomacy: "In our opinion, it is regrettable that the step toward removing the president was based on a procedure unimaginable in a democratic country. An investigative body composed only of coalition representatives operates secretly, without those who are accused being able to examine the evidence. This casts a bad light on the Slovak Republic."

In the material that the government discussed last Tuesday [20 August], it also states that law No. 100/1996 facilitates the adoption of measures to improve the protection of classified information. This involves the issuing of new lists of matters subject to state and official secrecy and designating the persons who are to have access to classified information in accordance with newly stipulated criteria. It will be possible to impose a fine of up to 10,000 korunas on or prohibit the activity for up to two years of a person who has committed an offense in the sphere of safeguarding classified information. In this connection, in reply to a question on how he assesses the publication of information whose "secret" nature points, for example, to the undemocratic methods applied by the state authorities, Deputy L. Pittner said: "Every official, especially if he works in the security services, has a tendency to maximize the range of classified information. In every case, the limit is set by the law that defines what is subject to state and official secrecy. On the other hand, the public has a right to information if it serves to reveal the scheming practices, for example, of the bodies wielding state authority. Therefore, I think that it depends on whether the mass media is willing to take the risk and publicize cases of this kind. If it had not been for this, the Watergate affair or the illegal practices of the CIA, which led to purges within this apparatus, would never have been made public." Apropos the risks for the people who provide information to the media, for example, from within the secret service, L. Pittner said the following: "Even a Slovak Information Service [SIS] officer cannot be bound by an oath of secrecy if he is required to commit a crime, because the SIS can only fulfill the tasks that the law assigns it."

Slovakia: Parliament Asked To Strip KDH MP of Immunity

AU2708182596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 27 Aug 96 pp 1-2

[Article by "pt, bog": "Investigator Asks Parliament To Strip KDH MP Ladislav Pittner of Immunity; Theoretically, 39 Votes Suffice To Strip Ladislav Pittner of Parliamentary Immunity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—Anton Poliak (Association of Workers of Slovakia), chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Mandate and Immunity Committee, has summoned Ladislav Pittner (Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]) to an in camera meeting of the committee on 10 September 1996. "At the in camera meeting, I will propose that the committee discuss the request of an investigator with the Municipal District Office of Investigations in Bratislava-I for the committee's agreement with the initiation of criminal proceedings against you," Anton Poliak writes in the summons. Speaking to SME, Ladislav Pittner said that he did not know "for which reasons the Municipal District Office of Investigations had asked that I be stripped of my parliamentary immunity." "I consider it typical of our present when my parliamentary activity, in which I have been trying to solve a serious criminal act [reference to Pittner's activities as chief of the 'independent civic commission' investigating the background of the abduction of Michal Kovac Jr.], provokes such measures on the part of the executive. This is something I am unable to explain. It would be tragic if this were to be the start of political trials," Ladislav Pittner added. [passage omitted]

Should the Mandate and Immunity Committee give the go-ahead to the start of criminal proceedings against Ladislav Pittner, according to the NRSR rules of procedure the matter will have to be decided by a vote in the NRSR plenum. [passage omitted] For the request to be approved, it must be supported by more than 50 percent of deputies present. Since the NRSR has a quorum when at least 76 deputies are present, 39 votes suffice, theoretically, for Ladislav Pittner to be turned over to the law. The government coalition currently avails itself of 82 seats. The investigator's request that Ladislav Pittner be stripped of his parliamentary immunity for the needs of criminal prosecution will be decided by the NRSR Mandate and Immunity Committee, in which the government coalition avails itself of the majority of seats, on 10 September. Ladislav Pittner is, among other things, chairman of the independent civic commission set up to investigate the circumstances of the abduction of the president's son to Austria. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: HZDS Daily To Get New Chief; 'Hard Core' To Leave

AU2708182096 Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak 27 Aug 96 p 2

[CTK report: "End of the 'Hard Core' in SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA?; Jan Smolec Is Supposed To Explain the Fate of Millions Collected From Readers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"Prime Minister Meciar has always found time for us when he had problems and needed our help: when he was dismissed from his post, at the time of the elections, or during the coalition crisis. Now as the editors of the daily that everyone calls progovernment and pro-Meciar are calling for help, the prime minister somehow does not listen," Peter Strelinger, until now deputy chief editor of the daily SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, writes in a letter to the director of the SALUS publishing house, through which the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] publishes the daily.

In the letter, Strelinger goes on to reject his dismissal from the post of deputy chief editor with effect from Sunday [1 September]. He draws attention to the fact that, last week, he presented to Government Office Head Z. Kramplova "specific evidence" of corruption, harassment of editors, and the poor condition of equipment in the editorial office, in the hope that Vladimir Meciar would reconsider the appointment of Eduard Fasung, currently chief editor of PRACA, as SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA chief editor. At the same time, Strelinger calls upon Jan Smolec, the departing chief editor, to explain the fate of the 2 million korunas that have been collected from readers as well as the fate of hard currency deposits, something the trade union organization has been trying to ascertain for two years to no avail.

According to information from the daily's editorial office, the majority of editors forming the "hard core" of the editorial staff are supposedly planning to give notice, should Eduard Fasung take up his post in the [SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] editorial office on 1 September.

Jozef Darmo, director of Slovak Television [STV] and chairman of the Association of Slovak Journalists, regards these protests as an expression of unrealized ambitions. "I regret that Peter Strelinger turned down the Ludovit Stur prize in protest against other matters (...) He was aspiring to become SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA chief editor and later even chief editor of NARODNA OBRODA, and, when he failed, he chose this course of action," Jozef Darmo told CTK.

Slovakia: Hungarian Official Assesses Budapest Summit

96CH0158A Bratislava SZABAD UJSAG in Hungarian 24 Jul 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Edit Bauer, vice chairman of the Coexistence Political Movement, by Sandor Neszmeri; place and date not given: "In Conformity With the Basic Treaty; Vice Chairman Edit Bauer on the Debate That Evolved After the Hungarian-Hungarian Summit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Neszmeri] Are you scared? Have you been frightened? I have in mind the fact that during the past two weeks you could hear virtually nothing else in Slovakia than the need to expel from parliament the five Hungarian representatives who have participated in the early July "Hungary and Hungarians Beyond the Border" conference, and have signed the resultant Joint Declaration. To top it off, the tone was set not by the Slovak National Party, but by Dusan Slobodnik, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in parliament, who would not find it inconceivable to expel the parties of the Hungarian coalition from parliament, to disband those parties, claiming that no international document prescribes independent parliamentary representation and the operation of separate political parties as a right to be exercised by minorities.

[Bauer] I do not believe that Mr. Dusan Slobodnik is unfamiliar with international documents or with the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty, and this is why I have been saying for quite some time: The big problem some Slovak politicians have is that they selectively read and interpret various international agreements, treaties, and positions. All they understand from reading various documents is what is appropriate for them and corresponds with their political intents, i.e., they actually misinterpret things and convey the misinterpretations to the public. Since the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty has been ratified, Recommendation No. 1201 of the Parliamentary General Meeting of the Council of Europe is no longer a mere international standard or political declaration insofar as Slovakia and Hungary are concerned, it is law, because Section 15 of the Basic Treaty states that the two countries adopt the Recommendation as part of their internal laws, in other words, that they treat the Recommendation as law. Section 6 of Recommendation 1201 clearly states that national minorities have a right to form their own parties and political organizations. In other words, Mr. Slobodnik did not tell the truth when he said that there was no legal basis for the existence of Hungarian parties in Slovakia or that there was no international document of mandatory force on the basis of which such parties could operate.

Representation in parliament is a different matter. In Croatia and Slovenia, for example, laws provide for the way minority parliamentary representatives can be elected along with votes cast for various political parties. We do not have such a law, and Hungarian parties in Slovakia run in the elections under conditions identical to those which apply to Slovak parties: Representatives are elected to serve in parliament based on the will of the voters. Accordingly, the representatives' mandates could not be terminated even if we suppose that the parties could be terminated for some reason, the parties in whose colors these representatives entered the legislature. Incidentally, I also have difficulty perceiving a situation in which the Hungarian political parties of Slovakia could be abolished based on some law, but I should add that in this country the government and the coalition have made countless attempts to violate the Constitution and laws, steps have been taken which go so far as to exhaust the meaning of state terrorism. Accordingly, one cannot rule out the possibility of new illegal actions like this.

The charge that we are forming an alliance with an "alien power" to "subvert the country's constitutional and legal order" is simply ridiculous, as is the voicing of "treason" defined on that basis. I remind you of the European Human Rights Charter, Section 10, which guarantees freedom of speech, and let me tell you that Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk made reference to this provision in his response to OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] High Commissioner for Minorities Max van der Stoel, in which he made clear that no minority politician can be the subject of a criminal proceeding just because he defines and voices the need for territorial autonomy. Human rights, the right to free speech would be violated by Slovakia if they would initiate criminal proceedings against us on grounds of any of our views.

[Neszmeri] The first charge based on the closing declaration of the Budapest meeting was made by the state secretary of the Slovak Foreign Ministry, who asserted that the declaration amounted to interference with the internal affairs of Slovakia, and Mr. Josef Sestak said that mentioning autonomy was contrary to law because not a single international document provided for autonomy as a mandatory solution to be applied by the various states.

[Bauer] Since the promulgation of the New European Charter in Paris, the situation and legal status of minorities is no longer the internal affair of any country, and the state secretary should be perfectly aware of that. Not to mention the fact that the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty clearly states that the parties to the Treaty accept responsibility for the minorities residing within the territory of the other country, accordingly, they not only have a right, but, in a certain sense, they have a duty to deal with the situation of minorities.

True, international documents do not mandate the signatory and ratifying countries to automatically resolve the minority situation by making autonomy a reality, and minorities cannot claim autonomy as a natural right either. On the other hand, it is not true that international documents do not recognize and contain provisions about various forms of autonomy. Many people make frequent reference, in conjunction with this, to the report filed by the so-called Venice Committee, and point to a provision of the document according to which not a single international agreement makes it obligatory to states to create territorial or other forms of autonomy. However, these people disregard two further statements which are very important. The Report makes reference to the Council of Europe general agreement concerning the legal status of minorities, which underscores the right of minorities to effectively participate in settling their own affairs. Incidentally, this general agreement is also part of the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty, and therefore the parties to the Treaty can be held legally accountable for complying with its provisions. The Council of Europe's Parliamentary General Meeting Recommendation No. 1201 suggests that this right may be resolved in three ways, notably by establishing local autonomy, or government administrative autonomy, or a special status. Regarding effective participation, the Venice Committee Report underscores personal autonomy and states that the issue revolves not around local government administration, but local autonomy. Accordingly, the Report virtually equates effective participation with personal autonomy. And in dealing with the issue of how to resolve the minorities' effective participation in dealing with their own affairs, the framers of the Report state that individual states may go beyond the establishment of special status, and may create situations which transform the internal order of the state into a certain kind of federal system.

But the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty is also part of the Copenhagen Declaration of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], which deals in detail with the autonomy issue as well as with the integrity of countries, and treats the two issues in parallel. It was on this basis that Max van der Stoel reminded the Slovak foreign minister that not even territorial autonomy would conflict with the country's integrity. Based on all this, it is my view that the hysteria campaign mounted by Slovak Government circles in conjunction with the Budapest Declaration is designed for use when it turns out that Slovakia cannot be a member of either NATO or the EU. By then they will have to find a scapegoat, and we, Hungarians are always good scapegoats.

[Neszmeri] During the past several weeks, countless Western politicians came to visit Slovakia. I found that all of them have forgotten the language of diplomacy, and contrary to their previously manifested conduct, they stated very openly and clearly even to journalists what they expected from Slovakia. These expectations included the termination of the parliamentary majority system, the development of self-governance, and handling of the minority issue pursuant to European standards. Meanwhile, documents have seen the light of day—in the final analysis, the Report of the Venice Committee was such a document—which made it clear to Slovakia, too, that the method to be used to settle the minority issue is to realize one or another form of autonomy. I wonder, does any of this contribute to creating hysteria, to the nervous reactions? In other words, the pressure on Slovakia regarding the establishment of minority autonomy.

[Bauer] The open and candid talk by politicians is obviously related to the fact that it has become clear to them, too, that Slovakia does not sense, does not perceive the nuances of the diplomatic language, the expectations and warnings couched in diplomatic terms. Because what they are saying nowadays, point by point, in a manner understandable to the public, was already contained in a document they had written a long time ago in conjunction with the expansion of NATO as conditions for countries intending to join. I believe that these are only the "form" aspects of the matter because "substantive" aspects also exist. And the substance rests in the fact that, in conjunction with the post-communist countries, it is becoming increasingly clear—and Slovakia is an example in this regard—that there is a difference between making statements about rights, and the actual opportunities to exercise rights. This duality consists of the fact that although constitutions and laws enumerate various rights, these rights become inaccessible to the citizenry. And this duality is particularly visible in the case of minorities, such as Slovakia's failure to recognize collective rights, even though only groups can exercise countless individual rights—certain legal provisions can be exercised only through the collective or within the collective. I could also put it this way: In the absence of certain self-administration or self-determination, minorities are simply unable to enforce their rights. This is why the international documents mention "effective participation"; they found out that the right to comment is not enough because on that basis not a single minority proposal would be passed—particularly in the wake of the practical realization of the majority principle—but instead, the experts talk about a right to intervene and a right to participate. On this basis, one often finds in West Europe that minorities have a right to veto provisions that deal with their own affairs. I am an optimist; having seen this developmental trend I am convinced that Slovakia, too, must proceed in this direction. Only in this way can democratic development be ensured and our country become an integral part of Europe.

[Neszmeri] Thank you for the conversation.

Slovakia: Approved Draft Amendment on Universities

AU2308172296 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA (DOKUMENT supplement) in Slovak 14 Aug 96 pp a-c

[Working document discussed and approved by the Slovak Cabinet on 20 August: "Fourth Version of the Draft Amendment on Universities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Education Ministry of the Slovak Republic submitted the fourth draft of the bill that amends and complements Law No. 172/1990 of the Code on Universities as rendered in National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] Law No. 41/1994 of the Code, and on changes in the names of some universities.

According to preliminary information, the Government of the Slovak Republic will discuss the draft amendment on Tuesday, 20 August. NARODNA OBRODA carries the full text of the bill.

With the new text of Article 15, Section 1, Letter c), the amendment deals legislatively with the problem of university financing, and that in accordance with the state policy in the sphere of the development of university education, the state policy of employment, the state policy of the development of science and technology, and with regard to the evaluation of the work of universities and faculties by the Accreditation Commission.

With the new text of Article 6, Section 1, the amendment facilitates a financial contribution from the state budget even to nonstate universities founded by law (Article 33a, Section 1). The amount of the contribution is decided by the minister on the basis of the application by the founder, and that with regard to the opinion of the Accreditation Commission and the Council of Universities.

The addition to Article 15 of new Letters h) and i) emphasizes the power of the Education Ministry to supervise the observation of laws and other generally binding regulations in the university admission procedure and to inspect the decisions that are in effect of the university academic officials except for the appellation procedure according to this law in matters to which the general regulation on administrative procedures apply according to Article 34 of this law.

Article 16a further specifies the text of Section 4 in the sense that the work of the Council of University Students will be financially supported directly from the Education Ministry chapter of the budget for the current year, and that by means of targeting funds for the work of its secretariat.

According to the new text of Article 22, Sections 2, 3, and 4, in addition to universities and faculties, doctoral studies can be offered by external educational institutions that, according to Section 3, are scientific facilities of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and other scientific, research, technical, and artistic institutions, and were granted the right to offer such a course of studies in a single area of science or art by the Education Ministry acting on a recommendation or with regard to the opinion of the Accreditation Commission. According to Section 4, all interested institutions with the right to offer doctoral studies in the same field form a joint specialization commission that will conduct admission examinations, examinations, comprehensive examinations, and dissertation defenses in the given field on the same qualitative level at each of these institutions (faculty, university, scientific institution). The proceeding of the joint commission in granting academic-scientific or artistic-academic degrees is defined in Article 22a, Section 7. In connection with the aforementioned changes, it was necessary to introduce to the bill a new text of Article 12.

In the draft amendment, new stipulations of Article 33a, Section 7 and Article 37a, Section 1 deal with the problem of the prevention of activities of branches of foreign universities or similar educational institutions, which are, according to this law, nonstate schools in the Slovak Republic.

NR SR Bill That Amends and Complements Law No. 172/1990 of the Code on Universities as Rendered in NR SR Law No. 41/1944 of the Code, and on Changes in the Names of Some Universities

Article 1

Law No. 172/1990 of the Code on Universities as rendered in NR SR Law No. 41/1944 of the Code is amended and complemented as follows:

1. In Article 1, Section 1, the following text is added: "and at the same time are a component of the scientific, research, and development basis of the Slovak Republic."

2. Article 1, Sections 3 and 4 are as follows:

(3) The main tasks of universities are to provide university education and to conduct creative scientific research or creative artistic work. Universities have the right to offer university education and the exclusive right to grant academic titles to graduates of university studies; they have the right to conduct scientific training or artistic training in the form of doctoral studies and the exclusive right to grant scientific-academic or artistic-academic degrees to its graduates.

(4) In connection with the performance of their main tasks, the universities and faculties may engage in business activities. [Footnote: Article 36 of NR SR Law No. 303/1995 of the Code on Budget Rules.]

3. In Article 2, Section 4, "engage in activities and" is inserted after the word "movement."

4. Article 3 is as follows:

Article 3

(1) Universities are founded, merged, subdivided, and closed down by law; their name and seat is established in the same manner.

(2) At the time of the foundation of a university, it is decided which faculties may be opened here.

(3) Any changes in the division of the university into faculties can only be introduced after three years from the day the law founding the school goes into effect.

(4) After the university is founded, until a rector is appointed, the duties of the statutory head of the university are performed by a professor or a faculty member authorized by the education minister of the Slovak Republic (henceforth only "the minister"). The professor or a faculty member authorized to perform the duties of the statutory head of the university will arrange for the election of the academic senate of the faculties and the university within six months from the day the law founding the school goes into effect.

5. Article 4, Section 2 is as follows:

(2) Individual faculties are founded, merged, subdivided, or closed down by the rector with approval from the academic senate of the university, following the statement of opinion by the Accreditation Commission and approval from the Education Ministry; the name and seat of the faculty is established in the same manner.

6. Article 4 is complemented by Sections 3 and 4 as follows:

(3) At the time of the foundation of a faculty, it is decided which fields of studies can be offered at the newly founded faculty. Any changes in the fields of studies can only be introduced after three years from the day the faculty is founded.

(4) After the faculty is founded, until a dean is elected, the duties of the statutory head of the faculty are performed by a person authorized by the rector of the university. The person authorized to perform the duties of the statutory head of the faculty will arrange for election of the academic senate of the faculty within six months from the day the faculty is founded. After the faculty is founded, until the faculty senate is elected, its duties are performed by the university senate with the exception of duties according to Article 10, Section 2, Letters b), c), e), h), and ch).

7. After Article 4, the following new Article 4a is inserted:

(1) The faculty (university) preparing teachers, pedagogues, and experts for preschool institutions, other educational institutions, and primary and high schools has instruction bases that comprise faculty (university) training schools and faculty (university) training educational institutions selected, with approval by the Education Ministry, on the basis of a proposal by the dean (rector). The instruction bases of the faculty (university) preparing teachers of specialization courses in schools of nursing are faculty training schools, which are selected by the health minister of the Slovak Republic acting on a proposal by the dean. The details of the selection, operation, management, work, and financing of these training schools and training educational institutions are defined in a generally binding regulation issued on the basis of this law.

(2) The instruction bases of medical schools and faculties of pharmacy and nursing are clinics established in hospitals and faculty hospitals and faculty pharmacies. [Footnote: Article 56, Sections 2 and 4 of NR SR Law No. 277/1994 of the Code on Health Care as rendered in subsequent regulations.]

(3) Universities and faculties may establish joint facilities with other research, technical, educational, health, arts, and economic institutions. [Footnote: NR SR Law No. 303/1995 of the Code on Budget Rules.]

NR SR Law No. 278/1993 of the Code on State Property Administration. Mutual relations between the universities and faculties and these institutions are established by an agreement.

8. Article 6 is as follows:

Article 6

(1) The state universities are financed from the state budget and manage state property. [Footnote: NR SR Law No. 303/1995 of the Code on Budget Rules. NR SR Law 278/1993 of the Code on State Property Administration.] The nonstate university (Article 33a) could be given a subsidy for its operation from the state budget if it is a part of the network of universities in the Slovak Republic recognized by the state. The amount of subsidy from the state budget for the operation of a nonstate university is decided on the basis of the application by the founder after a statement of opinion from the Accreditation Commission and the Council of Universities.

(2) Universities, faculties, and other facilities of the university may raise funds for their operation also from other sources, particularly from business activities [Footnote: Article 36 of NR SR Law No. 303/1995 of the Code on Budget Rules.], other entities, domestic and foreign donations, and inheritance. [Footnote: Article 18, Section 3 of Slovak National Council (SNR) Law No. 318/1992 of the Code on Inheritance Tax, Gift Tax, and Tax on Transfer of Real Estate.]

9. Article 9 is complemented by Sections 6 and 7 as follows:

(6) Professors, faculty, scientists with the Doctor of Sciences [D.Sc.] title, and scientists awarded the scientific classification degree I and IIa [Footnote: Article 3 of the edict of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences No. 55/1977 of the Code on Further Improvement of Qualifications and Assessment of Creative Abilities of Scientists.] form an absolute majority in the academic senate of the university (faculty), and students one-quarter to one-third of the senate members.

(7) The academic senate of the university (faculty) elects the chairman of the senate from among the professors, faculty, and scientists, according to Section 6, or artists who are senate members.

10. Article 10, Section 1, Letter a) is as follows:

a) assumes a binding position regarding the proposals by the rector to found, merge, subdivide, or close down faculties, following the statement of opinion by the Accreditation Commission.

11. Article 10, Section 1, Letter c) is as follows:

c) selects a candidate for rector from among the professors and faculty of the university at least three months prior to the conclusion of his term of duty, and proposes the dismissal of the rector. It presents the proposals to appoint or dismiss the rector to the minister. After the dismissal of the rector or a premature termination of his term of duty for other reasons (e.g. for personal or health reasons), proposes to the minister that a person from among the academic officials of the university or from among the professors and faculty of the university be authorized to perform the duties of rector until a rector is appointed.

12. In Article 10, Section 1, Letter e) a comma and the words "merging, subdividing, and closing down" are inserted after the word "founding."

13. In Article 10, Section 1, Letter h) the word "delegates" is replaced by the word "elects."

14. In Article 10, Section 1, a new Letter i) is added after Letter ch) as follows:

i) on the basis of a proposal from the faculties, following the statement of opinion by the Accreditation Commission, approves the fields of study with the exception of doctoral studies.

The hitherto Letter i) is denoted Letter j).

15. Article 10, Section 2, Letter b) is as follows:

b) elects the dean from among the professors and faculty of the faculty at least one month prior to the conclusion of his election term, and dismisses him. After the dismissal of the dean or a premature termination of his term of duty for other reasons (e.g., for personal or health reasons), proposes to the rector that a person from among the academic officials of the faculty or from among the professors, and faculty of the faculty be authorized to perform the duties of dean until a dean is elected.

16. In Article 10, Section 2, Letter d) a comma and the words "merging, subdividing, and closing down" are inserted after the word "founding."

17. Article 10, Section 2, Letter f) is as follows:

(f) discusses proposals to establish fields of studies and programs of studies of the faculty with the exception of doctoral studies.

18. In Article 10, Section 2, Letter ch) the word "delegates" is replaced by the word "elects."

19. In Article 11, Section 1, the following sentence is added at the end:

The university scientific board is chaired by the university rector.

20. Article 11, Section 2 is as follows:

(2) The university scientific board

a) approves the program of development of the scientific, research, or artistic work at the university and at the faculties,

b) discusses and evaluates the standard of the scientific, research, or artistic work and of the doctoral studies at the university,

c) discusses and evaluates the standard of the educational work at the university,

d) approves the criteria for faculty appointments and for granting the title of professor,

e) discusses and approves proposals from the faculty scientific board to appoint professors; if the proposal is not approved, the board returns it with its comments to the faculty scientific board,

f) approves proposals from the faculty scientific board to start doctoral studies in the particular field of science or arts and submits them to the Education Ministry,

g) grants the academic title of "doctor scientarium" (abbreviated as DrSc.)

h) grants to prominent local and foreign persons the title of "doctor honoris causa" ([honorary doctor] abbreviated as Dr.h.c.),

ch) discusses and approves proposals for the award of the scientific-educational (artistic-educational) title of "visiting professor."

21. Article 11 is complemented by Section 3 as follows:

(3) If a university is not subdivided into faculties, the university scientific board performs also the duties of the faculty scientific board according to Article 12, Section 2.

22. Article 12 including the subhead is as follows:

Article 12

Faculty Scientific Board

(1) The members of the faculty scientific board are appointed, upon approval of the faculty academic senate, by the dean from among the teachers and scientists of the faculty and other prominent experts. The number of other prominent experts represents one-third of the total number of the members of the faculty scientific board, and priority is given to representatives of outside educational institutions (Article 22, Section 3) offering doctoral studies. The faculty scientific board is chaired by the dean.

(2) The faculty scientific board

a) discusses the program of the scientific, research, or artistic work at the faculty and proposes it to the university scientific board for approval,

b) discusses and evaluates the standard of the scientific, research, or artistic work and of the doctoral studies at the faculty,

c) discusses and evaluates the standard of the educational work at the faculty,

d) approves the programs of study at the faculty.

e) decides on granting of the scientific-academic title of "philosophiae doctor" (abbreviated as PhD.) or artistic-academic title of "artis doctor" (abbreviated as ArtD.)

f) submits criteria for appointments to the faculty and criteria for appointment professors to the university scientific board,

g) discusses appointments to the faculty and decides on the results,

h) discusses and submits to the university scientific board proposals for the appointment of professors and the award of the scientific-academic (artistic-academic) title of "visiting professor" to prominent experts for the time of their work at the faculty,

ch) discusses and approves proposals for the award of the scientific-educational (artistic-educational) title of "visiting faculty" [docent] to prominent experts for the time of their work at the faculty,

i) discusses and approves proposals for the program of doctoral studies at the faculty in the relevant fields, and submits proposals for the establishment of fields of doctoral studies at the faculty to the university scientific board for approval.

23. Article 13 including the subhead is as follows:

Article 13

Rector, Dean, Associate Rector, Associate Dean

(1) The rector is the representative of the university, is in charge of the university, represents it and acts on its behalf. The rector answers for his work to the university academic senate; in matters listed in Article 15, Section 1, Letters c), d), ch), and i) also to the minister.

(2) The rector appoints faculty and, acting on the proposal by the university scientific board, awards the scientific-educational (artistic-educational) title of "visiting professor."

(3) The rector submits to the Education Ministry proposals for university faculties to be founded, merged, subdivided, or closed down following the statement of approval by the university academic senate.

(4) The rector founds, merges, subdivides, or closes down scientific educational, development, economic, and data-processing facilities and special-purpose facilities of the university.

(5) Acting on the proposal from the faculty academic senate, the rector authorizes someone to act as dean until a new dean is elected.

(6) The dean is the representative of the faculty, is in charge of the faculty, represents it and acts on its behalf. The dean answers for his work to the faculty academic senate, and to the extent defined in the statutes of the university also to the rector.

(7) The dean founds, merges, subdivides, or closes down scientific educational, development, economic, and data-processing facilities and special-purpose facilities of the faculty.

(8) Acting on the proposal from the faculty scientific board, the dean awards the scientific-educational (artistic-educational) title of "visiting faculty" [docent].

(9) The associate rector act on behalf of the rector to the extend defined by the rector, and the dean is represented to the extent defined by himself by the associate deans. The rector appoints associate rector on approval by the university academic senate, associate dean is appointed by the dean upon approval by the faculty academic senate. The associate rector answers for his work to the rector, the associate dean to the dean.

(10) The term of office for the rector, associate rector, dean, and associate dean is three years. The same academic office may be held for two consecutive terms at the most. After a dismissal of the rector or after a premature termination of the term of office of the rector for other reasons, until the appointment of a new rector, the duties of the statutory head of the university are performed by a person from among the university academic officials or from among the professors and faculty of the university, who is authorized by the minister on the basis of a proposal by the university academic senate. After a dismissal of the dean or after a premature termination of the term of office of the dean for other reasons, until the election of a new dean, the duties of the statutory head of the faculty are performed by a person authorized by the rector from among the faculty academic officials or from among the professors and faculty at the university.

24. Article 14, including the subhead, reads:

Article 14

Universities' and Faculties' Senior Staff

(1) Senior staffers of a university are the quaestor [kvestor], the heads of its scientific, educational, developmental, economic, and data-processing workplaces, and the heads of its special-purpose facilities. Senior staffers of a faculty are the secretary of the faculty, the heads of its scientific, educational, developmental, economic, and data-processing workplaces, and the heads of its special-purpose facilities. The posts of universities' and faculties' senior staffers are filled by means of selective procedure. The method of selective procedure is determined by the university's or faculty's regulations on selective procedures.

(2) The quaestor is in charge of the university's economic and administrative operation. The faculty secretary is in charge of the faculty's economic and administrative operation. The quaestor is subordinated to the rector, the faculty secretary is subordinated to the dean.

25. Headline of the sixth part reads:

The Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic, the Council of Universities, the Council of University Students, and the Accreditation Commission.

26. Article 15 reads:

Article 15

(1) The Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic (hereafter referred to only as "Ministry of Education")

a) establishes conditions for the development of universities and university education,

b) coordinates the activity of universities,

c) distributes financial resources allocated to it among individual universities in conformity with the state employment policy, state policy in the sphere of developing university education, and state research and development policy, taking into account the evaluation of the work of universities and faculties by the Accreditation Commission, and monitors the use of those resources,

d) registers the universities' and faculties' statutes,

e) issues consent with the establishment, merger, partition, and abolition of university faculties in conformity with the state policy in the sphere of developing university education. It does so at the proposal of the rector after the Accreditation Commission delivers its opinion (see Article 4, Section 2),

f) establishes departmental institutes and workplaces to fulfill the universities' tasks. These institutes and workplaces are legal entities,

g) at the proposal or on the basis of the opinion of the Accreditation Commission, decides on granting or withdrawing the right of a university or faculty to hold state examinations, comprehensive examinations, and defenses of theses in the respective fields of study, to hold dissertation examinations and defenses of dissertation theses in the respective scientific or artistic fields of study, to award scientific or artistic degrees in the respective scientific or artistic fields, as well as to carry out habilitation procedures and procedures for the appointment of professors. If the ministry withdraws the right to hold state examinations, comprehensive examinations, and defenses of theses in the respective fields of study, to hold dissertation examinations and defenses of dissertation theses, and to award scientific-academic or artistic-academic degrees in the respective scientific or artistic fields, it will decide, at the proposal or based on the opinion of the Accreditation Commission, at which other university or faculty these examinations, defenses of dissertation theses, and procedures for the awarding of scientific-academic or artistic-academic degrees will be held, following agreement with the pertinent university or faculty,

h) at the proposal or based on the opinion of the Accreditation Commission, decides on granting or withdrawing the right of a university, faculty, or external educational institution (Article 22, Section 3) to offer doctoral studies in the respective scientific and artistic fields,

ch) in the sphere of awarding scientific-academic and artistic-academic degrees, coordinates the activity of university bodies (faculties) that are authorized to decide on awarding scientific-academic and artistic-academic ranks and guarantees uniform evaluation of the scientific or artistic standards of candidates for scientific-academic or artistic-academic degrees in the respective scientific or artistic field,

i) monitors the observance of generally binding legal regulations in the admission process for university studies,

j) reexamines legally valid decisions of the universities' academic functionaries with the exception of appellate procedures in matters according to this law, which are subject to general regulations on administrative proceedings (Article 34) [Footnote: Law No. 71/1967 of the Code on Administrative Proceedings (Administrative Code).]

(2) The minister

a) at the universities' recommendation, submits to the president of the Slovak Republic proposals for the appointment of professors and for the appointment and dismissal of rectors,

b) prior to the appointment of a new rector, entrusts the execution of the duties of a rector, for a maximum of three months, to an academic functionary of a university, or to a professor or docent, at the proposal of the university's Academic Senate.

27. Article 16, Section 2, reads:

(2) The Universities' Council is composed of representatives of universities and faculties elected by the Academic Senates of universities and faculties.

28. Article 15 is being supplemented with Section 4, which reads:

(4) Membership of the Council of Universities is honorary. Members have the right to claim compensation for expenses related to the execution of this function according to a special regulation. [Footnote: Law No. 119/1992 of the Code on Compensation for Travel Expenses as rendered in subsequent amendments.] The Ministry of Education financially secures the activity of the Council of Universities by means of the appropriation of special-purpose funds for the operation of its secretariat.

29. A new Article 16a is being inserted after Article 16, which reads:

Article 16a

Council of University Students

(1) The Council of University Students is a representative of university students, representing their interests in relation to the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic.

(2) The Council of University Students is composed of elected representatives of the student parts of the universities' and faculties' Academic Senates. Only a university student can be elected member of the Council of University Students.

(3) The Council of University Students

a) represents the interests of university students to the outside,

b) delivers its opinion on substantive issues, proposals, and measures in the sphere of university studies.

(4) Membership of the Council of University Students honorary. The Ministry of Education financially secures the activity of the Council of University Students by means of the appropriation of special-purpose funds for the operation of its secretariat. Compensation for expenses incurred in conjunction with the execution of the duties of a member of the Council of University Students is provided according to a special regulation. [Footnote: Article 1, Section [illegible], Letter d) of Law No. 119/1992 of the Code on Compensation for Travel Expenses in the rendition of subsequent amendments.]

30. Article 17, including the subhead, reads:

Article 17

Accreditation Commission

(1) The Accreditation Commission is established by the Government of the Slovak Republic as its advisory body. The government appoints as members of the Accreditation Commission distinguished members of universities and specialist and scientific institutions.

(2) The Accreditation Commission

a) delivers its opinion on proposals for the establishment, merger, partition, or abolition of universities and faculties (Articles 3 and 4, Section 2) and on proposals for universities' and faculties' fields of study (Article 10, Section 1, Letter i),

b) delivers its opinion on the request of the founder of a nonstate university for financial contribution from the state budget (Article 6, Section 1),

c) carries out activity in accordance with Article 15, Section 1, Letters g) and h).

31. Headline of the seventh part reads:

University Study, Scientific Education, and Lifelong Education of Citizens.

32. Article 18 is being supplemented with Sections 5 through 8, which read:

(5) The school year starts on 1 September of the current year and ends on 31 August of the subsequent year. The organization of the school year is determined by the faculty's statutes or, if the university is not divided into faculties, by the university's statutes.

(6) Conditions for the admission of foreign nationals for university studies are the same as for citizens of the Slovak Republic. In justified cases, the faculty's Academic Senate can adequately adjust these conditions at the dean's proposal.

(7) Under conditions spelled out in the faculty's statutes, the dean can permit the interruption of university studies. During the interruption of studies, the student does not have the rights and duties of a student under Article 26.

(8) The student can complete a part of his studies at another university or at a foreign university. If this part of his studies forms part of the program of studies, the dean does not interrupt the student's studies.

33. A new Article 18a is being inserted after Article 18, which reads:

Article 18a

Types of university studies are

a) bachelor studies, which are an integrated part of university studies lasting a minimum of three years. Following the completion of bachelor studies, the student can continue university studies according to letter b), which last a minimum of one year.

b) master and applied science [inzinierske] studies, which last a minimum of four years, and doctoral studies in the medical and veterinary professions, which last six years.

c) doctoral studies, which are a form of scientific or artistic education. In the regular form, doctoral studies last three years and in the external form five years.

34. Article 19 reads:

Article 19

(1) According to individual types, university studies are completed as follows:

a) bachelor studies with a state examination. Part of the state examination is defense of the final thesis, if determined so by the faculty's statutes or, in case of universities that are not divided into faculties, by the university's statutes,

b) master studies, applied science studies, and doctoral studies with a state examination. If so determined by the faculty's statutes (or, in case of universities that are not divided into faculties, by the university's statutes), the state examination may also comprise the defense of the diploma thesis,

c) doctoral studies with the defense of the dissertation thesis, following a dissertation examination.

(2) By the diploma thesis and by the state examination, the student should demonstrate the ability to work creatively in the field that he studied. By the dissertation examination and the defense of the dissertation thesis, the candidate for a doctor's degree should demonstrate the ability for independent scientific work, the ability to create a top-level work of applied science or art, or the ability for top-level artistic performance.

35. Articles 20 and 21 read:

Article 20

The student ceases to be a university student with the completion of university studies (Article 19, Section 1, Letters a) and b), with expulsion from studies because of poor academic performance, with expulsion from studies on the basis of a legally imposed disciplinary measure, or with the discontinuation of studies. If the student does not complete his studies within the period laid down in the program of studies, he ceases to be a university student by the end of the school year, in which he was to complete the university studies.

Article 21

(1) In accordance with Article 18a, letters a) and b), universities grant the graduates of university studies the following titles:

a) in bachelor studies, the title "bachelor" (abbreviation "Bc."),

b) in master studies the academic title "master" (abbreviation "Mgr."), in artistic fields of study the academic title "master of art" (abbreviation "Mgr.art."),

c) in applied science studies in technical, agricultural, and economic fields, the academic title "engineer" (abbreviation "Ing.") and in the field of architecture and urban planning the academic title "engineer architect" (abbreviation "Ing.arch."),

d) in doctoral studies in medical professions, the academic title "doctor of medicine" (abbreviation "MUDr."), and in veterinary professions, the academic title "doctor of veterinary medicine" (abbreviation "MVDr.").

(2) Graduates of fields of study, in which the academic title "master" is being awarded, can take a comprehensive examination [rigorozna skuska], part of which is the defense of a thesis. After the passage of this examination, universities grant them the following academic titles:

a) in natural sciences, the title "doctor of natural sciences" (abbreviation "RNDr."),

b) in pharmaceutical fields of study, the title "doctor of pharmacy" (abbreviation "PharmDr."),

c) in social sciences and the arts, the title "doctor of philosophy" (abbreviation "PhDr."),

d) in legal fields of study, the title "doctor of law" (abbreviation "JUDr."),

e) in education and physical education studies, the title "doctor of pedagogy" (abbreviation "PaedDr."),

f) in theological studies, the title "doctor of theology" (abbreviation "ThDr.").

(3) In accordance with Section 1, universities issue to the graduates of university studies a diploma listing the field of study, the title or academic title, and the state examination certificate. To graduates of master studies

who pass a comprehensive examination, the universities issue, in accordance with Section 2, a diploma listing the field of study and the academic title. Universities issue to the graduates of university studies also other certificates in accordance with Sections 1 and 2.

36. New Articles 22 and 22a through 22c are being inserted after Article 21, which read, including the headline:

Doctoral Studies

Article 22

(1) Doctoral studies are the highest form of university studies. The aim of doctoral studies is to prepare the doctorand [doktorant] for independent creative scientific research work or for masterly artistic work through the acquisition of comprehensive theoretical knowledge and the assimilation of the methodology of scientific or artistic work, demonstrated on a scientific or artistic project, and thus offer to the doctorand the highest level of university education in the respective field of science or art.

(2) Universities or faculties and external educational institutions according to Section 3 train doctorands in fields of science and art established by means of generally binding legal regulations issued in accordance with this law.

(3) An external educational institution is a scientific workplace of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, or another scientific, research, technical, or artistic establishment, to which, at the proposal or based on the opinion of the Accreditation Commission, the Ministry of Education grants the right to offer doctoral studies in at least one field of science or art.

(4) Institutions listed under Section 2 that have been granted the right to offer doctoral studies in the same field of science or art establish for the purpose of doctoral studies a joint expert commission.

(5) Doctoral studies take place in the regular form or in the external form.

Article 22a

(1) An applicant for doctoral studies can be accepted for these studies if he has completed university studies according to Article 19, Section 1, Letter b). The accepted applicant becomes a doctorand on the day of enrollment.

(2) Part of a doctorand's program of studies in the regular form of scientific or artistic education is the performance of teaching or another expert activity, the extent of which is laid down in a generally binding regulation issued according to this law.

(3) Under conditions laid down in a generally binding regulation issued according to this law, the dean or head of the external educational institution can interrupt the doctorand's studies at his request. During the interruption of doctoral studies, the doctorand does not have the rights and duties of a doctorand.

(4) The doctorand can complete a part of his studies at another university, another scientific, technical, or artistic institution, or at a foreign university. If this part of the studies forms part of the program of studies, the dean or head of an external educational institution does not interrupt the doctorand's studies.

(5) A doctorand accepted for the regular form of doctoral studies has rights and duties according to Article 25.

(6) A doctorand ceases to be a doctorand with the consummation of the period set for his studies, with the discontinuation of studies, or with the expulsion from studies due to the nonfulfillment of the program of studies.

(7) Following the successful defense of the dissertation thesis, the commission for the defense of dissertation theses in the respective field, or a joint expert commission established according to Article 22, Section 4, if the defense took place before this commission, submits, within 30 days after the defense of the thesis, to the appropriate scientific board of the faculty that is authorized to decide on awarding scientific-academic or artistic-academic degrees in the given field, a proposal to award a scientific-academic or an artistic-academic degree, along with a report and documentation on the defense of the thesis. The scientific board of the faculty will decide on the proposal to award a scientific-academic or an artistic-academic degree no later than six months after it receives the proposal.

(8) Universities award to the graduates of doctoral studies in scientific fields the scientific-academic degree "philosophiae doctor" (abbreviation "PhD.") and to the graduates of doctoral studies in artistic fields the artistic-academic degree "artis doctor" (abbreviation "ArtD."). Scientific-academic and artistic-academic degrees are listed in abbreviated form after the holder's name.

(9) Universities issue to graduates of doctoral studies a diploma listing the scientific or artistic field and the awarded scientific-academic or artistic-academic degree, as well as the name of the institution that trained them for independent creative scientific or artistic work.

Article 22b

(1) For the purpose of health insurance, sickness benefits, pension insurance, and payments of contributions

to the Slovak Republic Employment Fund, a doctorand attending the regular form of doctoral studies has the status of an employee. [Footnote: NR SR Law No. 273/1994 of the Code on Health Insurance, Financing of Health Insurance, Establishment of the General Health Insurance Company, and Establishment of Departmental, Branch, Enterprise, and Civic Health Insurance Companies in the rendition of subsequent amendments. NR SR Law No. 274/1994 of the Code on the Social Insurance Company in the rendition of subsequent amendments. NR SR Law No. 10/1993 of the Code on the Slovak Republic Employment Fund and on Changes and Amendments to Some Other Laws in the rendition of subsequent amendments.]

(2) The labor-related legal relations between a doctorand attending the regular form of doctoral studies and the university, faculty, Slovak Academy of Sciences, or another scientific, research, technical, or artistic institution are governed by:

a) the Labor Code, with the exception [illegible] the following provisions:

Articles 27 through 33, Articles 35 through 47, Articles 49 through 60, Article 65, Articles 68 through 71, Articles 74 and 75, Articles 96 through 99a, Articles 111 through 119, Articles 122 and 123, Article 129, Article 137, Article 142, Articles 142b through 144, Article 147, Article 155, Articles 163 through 168, Articles 227 and 227a, Article 267, and Article 269. The provisions of Labor Code Articles 61 through 64 will be used if and where appropriate,

b) decree of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic No. 223/1988 of the Code on the Implementation of the Labor Code in the rendition of subsequent amendments, with the exception of the following provisions:

Article 1, Article 3, Article 6, Article 15, Article 35, Article 39, Article 40, Sections 2 and 3, and Article 47, Section 2.

(3) The faculty, university, or external educational institution according to Article 22, Section 3, extends to a doctorand attending the regular form of doctoral studies a scholarship, which is qualified as a salary. The scholarship is provided throughout the duration of doctoral studies. Details on the provision of the scholarship will be set out in a generally binding legal regulation issued on the basis of this law.

(4) The scholarship of a doctorand attending the regular form of doctoral studies who meets the tasks of the program of studies in an environment that is damaging to health will be raised by an amount corresponding to the supplementary payment for which employees are eligible. [Footnote: Decree of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 227/1992 of the Code on the Provision of Special Supplementary Payments for Work Under Difficult Working Conditions and Under Conditions Damaging to Health.]

37. Article 23 reads:

Article 23

The University provides university studies in fields of study that are determined in the university's statutes.

38. An additional Letter c) is being added to Article 24, Section 1, which reads:

c) secure the teaching of foreign languages and state language examinations for citizens and the teaching of the Slovak language as a foreign language and the Slovak language state examination for foreign nationals with consequences according to special regulations. [Footnote: Article 28 of NR SR Law No. 279/1993 of the Code on School Establishments. Decree of the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic No. 44/196 of the Code on Language Schools, State Language Schools, and State Language Examinations.]

The numbering of footnotes 1 through 3 in Article 24 changes to 12 through 14.

39. Article 25, including the headline, reads:

Article 25

Recognition of Documents on University Studies Issued by a Foreign University

(1) Diplomas or other documents on university studies or completed examinations, as well as documents on awarding scientific-academic or artistic-academic ranks (hereafter referred to only as "documents on studies") issued by a foreign university are valid on the territory of the Slovak Republic only if they have been expressly recognized (nostrified). The decision on nostrification is made by a university offering the same or similar studies or involved in the same field of science. In disputed cases, or if no analogous university exists in the Slovak Republic, the decision is made by the Ministry of Education. During nostrification, the decision is also made on recognition of the title or academic title, and scientific-academic or artistic-academic rank according to this law.

(2) Documents on studies issued by a foreign university do not require nostrification if the Slovak Republic has concluded with the state in question an international agreement on the mutual recognition of the equality of educational diplomas.

40. Article 26, Section 1, Letters d) and f) read:

d) have representation in the self-administered bodies of the university, faculty, and in the University Students' Council,

f) put across freely views and comments on the system of university education and establish for these purposes bodies representing university students in the Slovak Republic.

41. Article 26, Section 2, reads:

(2) Universities

a) extend to students scholarships and material provisions under conditions set out in a generally valid legal regulation,

b) establish conditions for students to study foreign languages and to engage in physical education and sports.

42. Article 27, including the subhead, reads:

Article 27

University Teachers and Research Staff

(1) The following staff operate at universities as teachers engaged in scientific, artistic, and educational activity: professors, docents, expert assistants, and assistants. Lecturers operate at universities as teachers engaged in educational activity. Scientists and artists can also operate at universities.

(2) Educational activity at universities can be performed also by scientists or artists.

(3) The acquisition of the scientific-pedagogic or artistic-pedagogic title of "docent" is conditional on successful habilitation on the basis of a habilitation thesis. The habilitation proceeding starts with the application and submission of a habilitation thesis.

(4) The acquisition of the scientific-pedagogic or artistic-pedagogic title "professor" is conditional on the previous acquisition of the title docent according to Section 3.

(5) The scientific-pedagogic (artistic-pedagogic) title "visiting professor" is granted by the rector, at the proposal of the university's scientific board, to an external collaborator during his work at the university who is demonstrably a distinguished scientific (artistic) personality in the respective field of science (art).

(6) The scientific-pedagogic (artistic-pedagogic) title "visiting docent" is granted by the dean, at the proposal of the faculty's scientific board, to an external collaborator during his work at the faculty who has demonstrably achieved outstanding scientific results or created masterly works of art.

(7) The posts of teachers and research staff at universities and faculties are filled on the basis of selective procedures. The method of selective procedure is determined by the university's or faculty's regulations on selective procedure.

(8) The contract of employment with a professor, docent, and scientist awarded the scientific qualification degrees I and IIa is concluded for an indefinite period.

(9) The contract of employment with visiting professors, visiting docents, expert assistants, assistants, lecturers, and research staffers, with the exception of scientists according to Section 8, is concluded for a definite period, for a maximum of five years. The assistants' contract of employment can be extended for a maximum of another two years. The expert assistants' contract of employment can be extended for a maximum of another five years. The contract of employment of lecturers, artists, and research staffers can be extended according to the dean's decision. The contract of employment is automatically extended by the period of maternity leave, extended maternity leave, and the performance of basic military service or alternative civilian service. At medical, pharmaceutical, and veterinary faculties and university workplaces where the activity of teachers and research staffers is conditional on the completion of stages of specialized training, the period of extension of the contract of employment will be determined by the dean; this period must not exceed a maximum 10 years.

(10) The dean or the rector, if the university is not divided into faculties, can relieve a university teacher of the fulfillment of teaching duties for an appropriate period of time and permit him to devote himself only to scientific or artistic work.

(11) The contract of employment of university teachers, research staffers, and artists is terminated at the end of the school year, in which they complete their 65th year of age, unless their contract of employment is terminated on the basis of special regulations. [Footnote: Article 42 of Labor Code.] With the consent of the Academic Senate of the faculty (university), the dean (rector) can meet the request of a university teacher to have the contract of employment extended beyond this age limit. The dean (rector) can meet the request of a professor, docent, or research staffer for the continuation of scientific work at the university even after his employment is terminated.

43. Article 28, Section 1, Letter h) reads:

h) the method of choosing a candidate for the post of rector, the method of adopting a proposal for his dismissal, and the method of selecting a candidate entrusted with executing the post of rector by the minister in accordance with Article 10, Section 1, Letter c) of this law.

44. Article 28, Section 3 reads:

(3) A condition for the validity of the statute of university, including its changes and supplements, is its registration by the Education Ministry in which the compatibility of their stipulations with this law and the other generally binding legal regulations is taken into consideration.

45. The words "and the faculty's regulations for the admission procedure" are appended to the end of Article 29, Section 1.

46. Article 29, Section 2 reads:

(2) A condition for the validity of the statute of faculty, including its changes and supplements, is its registration by the Education Ministry following its prior approval by the university's academic senate, in which the compatibility of their stipulations with the statute of university is taken into consideration. In registering the statute of faculty, the compatibility of the stipulations for the statute of faculty—or its changes and supplements—with this law and the other generally binding legal regulations is taken into consideration.

47. In Article 30, Section 1, Letter a) the words "by NR law" are replaced by the words "by the decision of the defense minister."

48. In Article 30, Section 1, Letter h) the words "Article 27, Section 6" are replaced by the words "Article 27, Section 11."

49. Article 30, Section 1 is supplemented by Letter ch), which reads:

ch) the criteria according to which the students' necessary suitability for university study in academic fields is determined, and the method for verifying this, will be decided upon by the defense minister.

50. Article 30, Section 2 reads:

(2) The activity of the Education Ministry and the minister in accordance with Article 3, Section 4; Article 15; Article 25, Section 1; Article 28, Section 3; Article 29, Section 2; Article 41; Article 43b, Section 4; and Article 43e, Section 2 is carried out by the Defense Ministry and the defense minister.

51. Article 30 is supplemented by Section 3, which reads:

(3) The defense minister, at the suggestion of the military academies, will submit to the Slovak president proposals for the appointment of professors.

52. Article 31, including the subhead reads:

Article 31

Police Academies

(1) The stipulations of this law relate to the police academies and faculties, with the following exceptions:

a) faculties at the police academies are established, merged, subdivided, and closed by the decision of the Slovak interior minister (henceforth just "interior minister") following the prior approval of the Accreditation Commission. Their name and seat are stipulated in a similar manner;

b) the interior minister submits to the Slovak president proposals to appoint or dismiss the rectors of police academies;

c) the interior minister, at the suggestion of the police academies, submits to the Slovak president proposals for the appointment of professors;

d) the interior minister, at the suggestion of the rector, appoints and dismisses the associate rectors of police academies and the deans and associate deans of their faculties;

e) the Slovak Interior Ministry (MV) disburses financial resources to the police academies, their faculties, scientific, pedagogical, development, economic, and data-processing workplaces and special-purpose facilities, and supervises their use;

f) the Interior Ministry approves the number and structure of the staff of police academies and their faculties;

g) the Interior Ministry approves the fields of study and their orientation;

h) at police academies, the Interior Ministry, at the suggestion of the dean, approves the criteria for determining the necessary suitability of the applicants for study. At police academies that are not divided into faculties, this is done at the suggestion of the rector;

ch) the Interior Ministry establishes the scientific, pedagogical, development, economic, and data-processing workplaces and special-purpose facilities of the police academies and faculties;

i) publishing the results of scientific research in accordance with Article 2 and the right of students in accordance with Article 25, Section 1, Letter b) is implemented in harmony with the regulations for protecting state and official secrecy;

j) the stipulation contained in Article 27, Sections 9 and 11 relates equally—in harmony with a special regulation—to the teachers and scientific staff of police academies who are employed as members of the Police Corps. [Footnote: Slovak National Council Law [SNR] No. 410/1991 of the Code on the Conditions of Employment for Slovak Republic Police Corps Officers as rendered in subsequent regulations.]

(2) The activity of the Education Ministry and minister in accordance with Article 3, Section 4; Article 15; Article 25, Section 1; Article 28, Section 3; Article 29, Section 2; Article 41; Article 43b, Section 4; and Article 43e, Section 2 is carried out by the Interior Ministry and interior minister.

53. New Article 33a is inserted after Article 33. Including the heading, it reads:

Article 33a

Nonstate Universities

(1) A university other than a state university, including the branch of a foreign university or similar educational institution (henceforth just "nonstate university"), can only be established and abolished by law following the fulfillment of the conditions laid down in Sections 2-4.

(2) A physical person or a legal person may submit a request to establish or abolish a nonstate university; it is submitted to the Slovak Education Ministry.

(3) A request to establish a nonstate university must contain:

a) the means of financial provision;

b) a proposal for division into faculties, if the university is to be divided into faculties;

c) a proposal for the statute, study program, and provisional arrangement;

d) documentation on the scientific and pedagogical qualifications of the teachers, scientific staff, and arts staff who will teach at this university.

(4) The Education Ministry will consider the fulfillment of the conditions for establishing a nonstate university within six months of receiving the opinion of the Accreditation Commission; it will also consider a request to abolish a nonstate university within six months of receiving it.

(5) In nonstate universities, university study is obtained in return for the payment of the study costs.

(6) The stipulations of this law relate equally to nonstate universities. The stipulations contained in Article 15, Section 1, Letters b), e), f), and i) and Section 2, Letter b); Article 26, Section 2; Article 30; and Article 31 do not relate to these universities.

(7) Nonstate universities cannot operate on the territory of the Slovak Republic if they are not established in accordance with this law.

54. Article 34 reads:

Article 34

The general regulations on administrative proceedings relate to the decisions made in accordance with this law.

55. Article 35, Section 1 reads:

(1) The Slovak Government regulates by decree the particulars for the establishment and activity of the Accreditation Commission.

56. New Article 35a is inserted after Article 35. It reads:

Article 35a

The Education Ministry stipulates by a generally binding legal regulation:

a) particulars for the admission procedure, the course and completion of doctoral studies, and for the provision of a scholarship for doctorands completing regular doctoral studies in the fields of science and arts;

b) particulars for comprehensive examinations and defending theses;

c) particulars for the establishment, operation, management, activity, and financial provision of faculty (university) training schools and faculty (university) training school facilities;

d) particulars for providing for university students during teacher training or specialist training.

57. New Articles 37a and 37b are inserted after Article 37. They read:

Article 37a

(1) The founder of a branch of a foreign university or similar educational institution that is not a nonstate university in accordance with this law, but is operating on the territory of the Slovak Republic prior to 1 October 1996, will close it within two months of this date.

(2) An institution that is not a university in accordance with this law must not use a name consonant with or similar to the name of a university, in particular, it must not use the designation university or college in its name.

(3) The founder of an institution that is not a university in accordance with this law, but uses a name cited in the previous section prior to 1 October 1996, will change its name within two months of this date.

(4) The Education Ministry will impose a fine of up to 10,000,000 korunas [Sk] on anyone who violates the obligations stipulated in Sections 1-3. The fine is payable within 30 days of the date on which the decision to impose it becomes valid. The yield from the fines is state budget revenue.

Article 37b

(1) A civic association that is not a Council of University Students in accordance with this law must not use a name consonant with the name "Council of University Students." A civic association that uses this name prior to 1 October 1996 will change it within two months of this date.

(2) If a civic association violates the obligations stipulated in Section 1, the Education Ministry will impose a fine of up to Sk500,000. The fine is payable within 30 days of the date on which the decision to impose it becomes valid. The yield from the fines is state budget revenue.

58. Article 41 reads:

Article 41

Universities extant on the day this law comes into force and external educational institutions may offer doctoral studies in the appropriate fields of the sciences or arts only on the basis of a decision made by the Education Ministry."

59. Article 42 reads:

Article 42

Universities established in accordance with the current regulations, cited in the appendix, are state universities in accordance with this law. [Footnote: Appendix to the law: List of Universities]

60. New Articles 43a-43e are inserted after Article 43. They read:

Article 43a

The conditions of employment for assistants, specialist assistants, lecturers, arts staff, and science staff who do not possess the recognized scientific qualification level I or IIA, concluded for a nonspecified period, will, after 1 October 1996, be changed to conditions of employment for a specific period up to 31 August 2001.

Article 43b

(1) The scientific training of postgraduates carried out by a form of internal scientific postgraduate study, external scientific postgraduate study, special-purpose scientific postgraduate study, and scientific postgraduate study for the staff of educational workplaces that commenced prior to 1 October 1996 must be completed by 31 December 1998 at the latest in accordance with the current regulations; as of 1 October 1996, no new postgraduates will be admitted into the aforementioned forms of scientific training. [Footnote: Law No. 53/1964 of the Code on Awarding Scientific Degrees and on the State Commission for Scientific Degrees. Law No. 39/1977n of the Code on the training of new scientific staff and on further increasing the qualifications of scientific staff. Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences Bulletin No. 53/1977 on the training of new scientific staff and on study internships as rendered by Bulletin No. 5/1986. Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences Bulletin No. 54/1977 that amends some of the particulars for the work-related legal relations of participants in scientific training and study internships and for providing scholarships as rendered in subsequent regulations. Slovak Commission for Scientific Degrees Bulletin No. 65/1977 on the procedure in awarding scientific degrees as rendered in Bulletin No. 302/1990.]

(2) Universities, faculties, and external educational institutions at which doctoral studies are carried out may allow current science postgraduates from all of the training workplaces in the Slovak Republic to transfer, at their request, to doctoral studies in the appropriate scientific field. In allowing a transfer to doctoral studies, they recognize the examinations already taken by the participants in scientific training.

(3) A faculty or university, if a university is not divided into faculties, at which scientific training is carried out by a form of postgraduate study in accordance with the current Article 22, will transfer postgraduate students to doctoral studies.

(4) A Slovak Academy of Sciences scientific workplace or other institution for science, research, technology, or the arts that is authorized to carry out the scientific training of postgraduates in accordance with the current regulations and applies for the right to offer doctoral studies within six months of this law coming into force may implement this study exceptionally before the decision is made by the Education Ministry to recognize or refuse this right in accordance with Article 15, Section 1, Letter h).

Article 43c

(1) The awarding of the scientific degree 'candidate of sciences' (abbreviated as 'CSc') is abolished and the academic-scientific title of doctor (abbreviated as 'Dr.') is recognized. [Footnote: Article 2, Section 1, Letter a) of Law No. 53/1964 of the Code on awarding scientific degrees and on the State Commission for Scientific Degrees. Slovak Commission for Scientific Degrees Bulletin No. 67/1977 on the procedure in awarding

scientific degrees as rendered in Bulletin No. 302/1990. Article 22, Section 3 of Law No. 171/1990 of the Code on universities.]

(2) Graduates of scientific training on whom the scientific degree of candidate of sciences or the recognized academic-scientific title of doctor has been conferred in accordance with earlier regulations before this law comes into effect are also authorized to use the academic-scientific degree in accordance with Article 22a, Section 8. The appropriate university will issue a certificate of this at their request.

(3) A university may confer an arts-academic degree in accordance with Article 22a, Section 8 on graduates of postgraduate study in arts who have been awarded a diploma in postgraduate study in arts in accordance with the earlier regulations. [Footnote: Slovak Socialist Republic [SSR] Education Ministry Bulletin No. 55/1981 on postgraduate study in arts.]

(4) University graduates who completed their studies in the fields of architecture and urban planning before 1 October 1996 and were not awarded the academic title of 'engineer-architect' (abbreviated as 'Ing. arch') are authorized to use this title; the university will issue a certificate of this.

(5) University graduates who completed their studies in the arts disciplines before 1 October 1996 and were not awarded the academic title of 'master of arts' (abbreviated as 'Mgr. art.') are authorized to use this title; the university will issue a certificate of this.

Article 43d

A university may, in accordance with Article 21, Section 2, confer an academic title on university graduates who, in accordance with the current regulation, were awarded the academic title of 'master' and obtained an academic-scientific title or scientific degree in the appropriate scientific field before 1 October 1996. The university will issue a certificate of this.

Article 43e

(1) Academic senates of universities and academic senates of faculties elected before 1 October 1996 will execute their activity—as long as they are composed in accordance with this amendment—in their current composition until the end of their electoral period. If their composition is not in harmony with this amendment, they will execute their activity until 31 January 1997 at the latest.

(2) The universities and faculties will harmonize their statutes with this law and will submit them to the Slovak Education Ministry for registration before 31 January 1997.

(3) The Council of Universities, in cooperation with the academic senates of the universities and the academic senates of the faculties, will organize elections to the Council of University Students at universities and faculties within two months of this law coming into effect.

61. Article 44a is inserted after Article 44. Including the subhead, it reads:

Article 44a abolishes:

1. Article 1; Article 2, Section 1, Letter a); Article 5; Article 7; Article 12, Section 5; Article 13; and Article 14 of Law No. 53/1964 of the Code on awarding scientific degrees and on the State Commission for Scientific Degrees.

2. Articles 1, 2, 3, 4-32; Articles 42-44; and Articles 47-54 of Law No. 39/1977 of the Code on training new scientific staff and on further increasing the qualifications of scientific staff.

3. Law No. 232/1992 of the Code on police academies and on establishing a police academy.

4. Education Ministry directive No. 39 270/67-III/2 of 14 December (registered in section No. 47/1967) for state language tests at universities.

5. The SSR Education Ministry directive on the economic provision for university students during their training (registered in section No. 10/1970).

6. The SSR Education Ministry amendment that alters directive No. 6801/70-VS of 13 May 1970 (registered in section No. 38/1970) on the economic provision for university students during their training.

7. The SSR Education Ministry amendment No. 3100/1973 KV-ML of 19 March 1973 to provide physical training at universities (registered in section No. 15/1973).

8. The SSR Education Ministry amendment No. 6421/1983-302 of 28 June 1983 on further improving the qualifications of university teachers (registered in section No. 19/1983).

9. Article 4a of Education Ministry Bulletin No. 106/1996 of the Code that changes and supplements Ministry of Education, Youth, and Physical Training Bulletin No. 326/1990 on providing scholarships for university students. The words 'and on a scholarship for postgraduate students' are omitted from Article 9, Section 3 of the aforementioned bulletin.

62. The appendix to Law No. 172/1990 of the Code on universities, as rendered in subsequent regulations, reads:

List of Universities

Comenius University, Bratislava

Pavel Jozef Safarik University, Kosice

Slovak Technical University, Bratislava

Technical University, Kosice

University of Veterinary Medicine, Kosice

Konstantin Filozof University, Nitra

Slovak Agricultural University, Nitra

Matej Bel University, Banska Bystrica

Trnava University, Trnava

Jozef Murgas University, Zilina

Economic University, Bratislava

Technical University, Zvolen

University of the Performing Arts, Bratislava

University of the Applied Arts, Bratislava

Police Corps Academy, Bratislava

Military Academy, Liptovsky Mikulas

General Milan Rastislav Stefanik Air Force Academy, Kosice.

Paragraph II

NR SR Law No. 563/1992 of the Code on dividing Nitra University is changed as follows:

In Article 1, Section 1, the words "Pedagogical University" are replaced by the words "Konstantin Filozof University" and the words "Agricultural University" are replaced by the words "Slovak Agricultural University."

Paragraph III

SNR Law No. 121/1979 of the Code on changing the name of the Transportation University in Zilina is changed as follows:

In Article 1, the words "the University of Transportation and Communications in Zilina" are replaced by the words "Jozef Murgas University in Zilina."

Paragraph IV

Legal measure No. 370/1992 adopted by the SNR Presidium on establishing the Slovak Republic Police Corps Academy is changed as follows:

In Article 1, Sections 1 and 2 the words "Slovak Republic" are omitted.

Paragraph V

SNR Law No. 185/1993 of the Code on establishing the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas, on changing the name of the SNP [Slovak National Uprising] Air Force Academy in Kosice, and on military education in the Slovak Army is changed as follows:

1. In Article 3, Section 1, the words "General Milan Rastislav Stefanik Air Force College" are replaced by the words "General Milan Rastislav Stefanik Air Force Academy."

2. In Article 3, Section 2, the words "General Milan Rastislav Stefanik Air Force College" are replaced by the words "General Milan Rastislav Stefanik Air Force Academy."

3. In Article 4, Section 1, the words "General Milan Rastislav Stefanik Air Force College in Kosice" are replaced by the words "General Milan Rastislav Stefanik Air Force Academy in Kosice."

4. In Article 4, Section 3, the words "General Milan Rastislav Stefanik Air Force College in Kosice" are replaced by the words "General Milan Rastislav Stefanik Air Force Academy in Kosice."

Paragraph VI

The NR SR chairman ordains that the complete version of law No. 172/1990 of the Code on universities, as follows on from the changes and supplements executed by NR SR law No. 41/1994 of the Code and by this law, is declared in the Slovak Republic Legal Gazette.

Paragraph VII

This law comes into force on 1 October 1996.

Slovakia: Ministry of Education Rejects History Textbook

96CH0162A Bratislava THE SLOVAK SPECTATOR in English 31 Jul-13 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by Jana Dorotkova: "Matica Slovenska Cancels History Textbook"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Everything had gone smoothly for the publishers and authors of a series of history textbooks for basic schools until one detailing 20th century Slovak history was ready to be printed.

In early April, five out of six members of an oversight committee at the Ministry of Education recommended that the book be printed. Despite this, the Ministry of Education announced in July that it would organize a new tender to find a publisher.

"As far as I know, this is the first time (since 1989) the ministry has turned down an authorized textbook," said Stanislav Madaras, director of the Orbis Pictus Istropolitana publishing house that was to publish the book.

The Orbis Pictus textbooks on world history was a hit with teachers and students alike because they brought historical events to life.

"We think it's better to help children see the connections, instead of flooding them with dates and names," said Dusan Kovac, coordinator of the project and a director of the history institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (SAV).

The author's latest venture, titled *Slovakia in the New Century*, was also popular with five out of the six committee members. It was not popular with the sixth member, however, especially the sections pertaining to the Slovak state that existed at least de facto between 1939 and 1945 and the Czechoslovak state from 1918 to 1945.

One person's objections normally would not cause the project to be voted down on the oversight committee. But this person, a 29-year-old Slovak historian named Robert Letz, also shares the same views as Matica Slovenska.

According to Matica, the 1939-1945 Slovak state was an achievement of the emancipation drive to the Slovak nation. Others view it differently, seeing it as a time when the Slovak nation was a puppet state of Hitler's Nazi regime and when its president, Jozef Tiso, ordered that tens of thousands of Slovak Jews be shipped to their death in concentration camps.

As for pre-war Czechoslovakia, Matica representatives stress that during this period Slovaks were abused and humiliated by Czechs, who refused to admit that the Slovaks could have a nation.

Letz presented the authors with 30 pages of detailed corrections, additional dates, quotes and names, especially concerning the Slovak state period between 1918 and 1945. "I will agree with its publication only after a thorough incorporation of the suggestions," Letz wrote.

However, Letz had the competition. The other five committee members said they would vote the textbook down if all Letz's suggestions were incorporated. The authors accepted about 25 percent, they said.

Ferocious Opponents

For Letz and Matica Slovenska, it was not enough.

"Slovak history is a fight for national sovereignty and Slovak statehood," wrote Jan Benko, vice-chairman of the history section of Matica Slovenska. "National history...must have its pride. This 'textbook' lacks the sense and pride of national history. It therefore cannot educate our children to become patriots. They cannot, they must not, learn from this textbook. It therefore will only be preserved in the archives, as a historic document showing the way of thinking of a group of historians."

Jana Huttova, chairman of the Slovak Association of History Teachers, vehemently disagreed with Matica's judgement.

"It worries me that, again, the rightest interpretation of history is the only one being sought," Huttova said. "History is not about who's good and who's evil, history is about facts. History should not judge, it should analyze the reasons. Kids should be shown that it is possible to interpret events in many ways."

Asked to comment, publisher Madaras chose his words carefully. "We still hope the minister will change her mind," he said. "I have to be diplomatic, because I want to have these books published."

His company, Orbis Pictus, is a small private firm publishing only school textbooks, meaning that Madaras cannot afford to, as he said, "turn off the cash tap."

Orbis Pictus has produced popular learning materials. Besides the success with the world history books, the firm's alternative textbooks for mathematics were used by 80 percent of the teachers in Slovakia in two years.

Slovakia: Prescription To Remedy Deficit Sought

96CH0162B Bratislava THE SLOVAK SPECTATOR in English 31 Jul-13 Aug 96 pp 1, 5

[Article by Richard Lewis: "Meciar Vague on Remedy for Ailing Economy"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Slovakia's trade deficit is hurting but the government is not indicating what its remedy will be.

When the Slovak Statistical Office released its latest report on Slovakia's trade balance on July 23, it showed the trade balance swung another 1.34 billion Sk in the red in June; the half-year total now stands at negative 27 billion Sk ($900 million—see chart on page 5 [not reproduced here]).

The news sounded alarms in the government as officials grappled with how to stop the hemorrhaging in the one leg they've been able to stand strongly on for the last year and a half.

Obviously aware of the news before it became public, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar launched a preemptive strike, giving his analysis on the country's economic situation on July 14.

"Negative (economic) trends are seen in two areas—wage growth exceeds productivity growth, and foreign trade is running a deficit," Meciar pronounced. "In a short period of time, the government will have to adopt vigorous measures to improve this year's economic results."

Slovakia's worsening economic indicators present the government with its biggest current challenge.

"The government is facing a situation it has never been confronted with before," signalled a commentary in the daily PRAVDA. "One and a half years (after Meciar became prime minister), it really is high time to do more rational things than liquidating coupon privatization and investment funds. Can the government do it?"

If the answer is yes, just when is anyone's guess. A week after Meciar's proclamation, government spokeswoman L'udmila Bulakova still couldn't give a timetable. "Right now there is nothing to talk about," she said. "It's just something that (Meciar) mentioned, and it actually hasn't been discussed yet."

Bulakova did say the Cabinet is expected to start discussions on an economic revival plan when it reconvenes on August 13.

While the government procrastinated, the more or less independent National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) scribbled its prescription to nurse the ailing economy to health. At a press conference on July 17, NBS Governor Vladimir Masar outlined that the Central Bank "decided to reevaluate the effectiveness of its current monetary tools with the intention of maintaining the internal and external stability of the Slovak crown and to support healthy economic growth."

To that end, Masar said the NBS upped commercial banks' obligatory minimum reserves to 9 percent of primary deposits as of August 1. It also raised the Lombard lending rate from 13 to 15 percent, effective July 17, and widened the Sk fluctuation band from plus/minus 3 to plus/minus 5 percent.

The widening of the crown raised some officials' eyebrows who saw it as a "counter-measure" to keep the crown from being devalued or revalued. One government official close to developments called it a "reasonable compromise" between politicians already looking toward the next elections and advice from international monetary organizations not to expand the band so much as to jeopardize the crown's eventual linkage with a single European currency.

Some observers viewed the NBS's medicine as bitter now but healthy for the long-term. A PRAVDA commentary from July 18 predicted the measures "will have a slightly attenuating effect on the economy in the short-term" because it will cause 12 billion Sk to be yanked from circulation, thus short-circuiting the Cabinet's expected GDP growth. However, the commentary added, the steps "are necessary in the fight against the increasing danger of rising inflation, which threatens long-term economic development."

But Masar warned his institution can't do it alone. "I would like to stress that these measures (by NBS) will be effective only if other subjects responsible for the development of the economy will match what we're doing," Masar said. "These measures are not a panacea. If the other subjects do not take any steps to follow us, then our measures will lose their effect. So I hope that based on discussions with Premier Meciar that these steps will follow."

Asked what specific steps he would like taken, Masar said, "The NBS expects other bodies responsible for economic policy to pass legal measures to enhance bankruptcies, introduce pro-export policies, and support the restructuring of the three largest Slovak banks."

Ask those government ministries how they've responded to Meciar's mandate and Masar's message, and the silence on the other end of the line is deafening. A spokesman at the Justice Ministry said no one was able to answer questions on bankruptcy legislation because the entire department was on vacation.

The director of foreign trade at the Ministry of Economy, the only person allowed to talk to the press about export policy, was also on vacation.

While officials agreed that the trade deficit is the key element in Slovakia's economic sluggishness and its possible reawakening, there are differences of opinion on the philosophy behind the country's trade policy.

Meciar sees the deficit as a result of Slovak companies' purchases of modern technology. "We started investment development this year and at such a pace unlike any other country," the premier said. "We are almost afraid that we overheated the economy."

But Masar discounts the value of the imported technologies. "Very often, we import equipment that does not guarantee future exports," he said at the press conference. Just as disturbing, Masar added, Slovak exports are becoming more costly. While at the beginning of 1996, imports made up 60 hellers for every 1 Sk exported, that figure had risen to 66 hellers/1 Sk exported at 1996's halfway point.

"If the import structure were suitable and if we were certain that the import structure would in one to two years lead to a restructuralized economy...it would be no problem to give $1 billion to cover the deficit," Masar said. "But the import structure does not show what we would like to see."

Hungary: Kovacs Discusses Romanian Basic Treaty

AU2808081596 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 24 Aug 96 p 5

[Interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Lajos Pietsch; place and date not given: "We Are Making the Best Achievable Treaty, Kovacs Says"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The treaty cannot be said to be overhasty either from the viewpoint of principles or from practical considerations. It is in full agreement with the government's consistent neighborhood policy, whose essence is that Hungary is fundamentally interested in improving its relations with its neighbors, Laszlo Kovacs told MAGYAR NEMZET, refuting the claim that Budapest made the agreement hastily, primarily under the pressure of integration. According to Kovacs, the government felt that it was possible to make the best achievable basic treaty.

[Pietsch] What events facilitated the finalization of the basic treaty, which for a long time seemed impossible?

[Kovacs] I made a proposal at the foreign ministerial talks in Bucharest last summer on how to reduce Romanian resistance to the inclusion of the Council of Europe Recommendation No. 1201 in the basic treaty as a legal norm. I suggested that we should jointly formulate that the two terms which visibly caused the main problem for the Romanian side—specifically "collective rights and ethnically based territorial autonomy"—are not part of Recommendation 1201 and of its most disputed Paragraph 11. The Romanian side saw this as a forward-looking suggestion but did not give a concrete answer to it and did not return to the issue for 11 months. However, they have now, somewhat modifying the wording but not affecting the essence of the original suggestion. Therefore, the Hungarian willingness to agree has always existed. The process was accelerated by the indication of the Romanian willingness to agree. In my view, it is the Romanian foreign minister who could precisely tell what role certain international circumstances played in this, including the recognition that the decision on the countries to be included in the first round of NATO expansion will be made at the end of this year or the beginning of the next.

[Pietsch] Did the Western, especially American, critical remarks in the wake of the so-called Hungarian-Hungarian summit's declaration, and the extremely heated Slovak and Romanian attacks, play a role in the quick agreement?

[Kovacs] No, they did not, because, as I have indicated, we proposed a similar agreement to the current one to the Romanian side as early as last summer. If the Romanian side had accepted it at that time then the current events would have already taken place. As for the heated reactions of Bratislava and Bucharest to the Hungarian-Hungarian summit, we gave answers to the problems raised by both governments, emphasizing that the joint statement formulated at the meeting did not mean a deviation from the foreign policy chapter of the Hungarian Government's program accepted in July 1994. Our support for autonomy efforts in accordance with European norms and practice was also included in this, and the same was laid down in the Hungarian-Hungarian joint statement. The former did not cause any problem for our neighbors in July 1994, when the government program was accepted. We have also said several times that we consider the kind of approach that identifies autonomy with separatism as unfounded; there are no examples to justify our neighbors' suggestion that autonomy would destabilize the country. We said the same to our Western partners, to EU and NATO member states, emphasizing that, with the Hungarian-Hungarian summit and its joint statement, Budapest's foreign policy did not deviate from the government program or from the foreign policy practice followed in the past two years.

[Pietsch] Does this mean that it was the Hungarian proposal to attach a kind of explanatory footnote to Recommendation 1201 which made it possible to remove the Romanian resistance to the inclusion of this recommendation? Was it this proposal that Romania has now accepted in a somewhat modified form?

[Kovacs] I would like to emphasize again and again—because those who attack the agreement and the basic treaty are simply unwilling to realize this—that the footnote in question is not an interpretation; rather, it states the facts. It does not exclude or rule out anything; it only registers the facts that are indeed included in Recommendation 1201. It does not rule out collective rights; it simply says that collective rights, as a term, is not in the basic treaty. At the same time, it is included in the basic treaty in several places that individuals belonging to the national minority can exercise their rights individually or together with other members of their group. This form of exercising the rights in a joint, collective form stems from the nature of national minority rights.

[Pietsch] Should it not have been clarified earlier what stance the government was taking in connection with the content of Recommendation No. 1201? The Hungarian stance seems to have changed in this respect.

[Kovacs] It has not changed at all. From the beginning, we tried to achieve the inclusion of three international documents on minorities both in the Hungarian-Slovak and the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty as legal obligations. This is important because these are three rather good international documents but none are legally binding, all three are political documents. In the past, the Romanian side was only willing to go as far as to take the three documents into consideration in forming the national minority policy. I made the aforementioned offer in the interest of progress, starting from the fact that the inclusion of Recommendation 1201 as a legal obligation was visibly causing a problem to the Romanian side because it was afraid that certain extreme Romanian forces would accuse it of bringing the definition of collective rights and ethnically based territorial autonomy into the basic treaty. Therefore, the Hungarian Government's stance has not changed in any way. We precisely assessed that we would have prevented the basic treaty by insisting on the term collective rights—which, incidentally, is not part of the basic treaties with Slovakia or Ukraine, or in fact with any other country, like Croatia or Slovenia.

[Pietsch] The government was very sharply criticized by the opposition parties, the World Federation of Hungarians, and Hungarians living beyond the border, including the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] and the Hungarian coalition in Slovakia. Does the government find any of the points of these criticisms worth considering, and which points does it reject outright?

[Kovacs] Unfortunately, we cannot find anything worth considering. In the whole negotiating process, I would have welcomed proposals that would have facilitated a better basic treaty. I am very well aware that this is not the best possible we can think of, is not ideal, is not the one we would dream of, but the best one achievable in our view. I cannot do anything with the unfortunately typical opposition attitude that they vehemently attack things in the basic treaty that are not even part of it, or lack something that is clearly visible in it. Sadly, the current debate has further confirmed my assumption that the opposition has a crippling fear in view of the possibility that the European Union and NATO will start the admission talks with this government.

[Pietsch] The stance of the RMDSZ, which is most affected of all, seemed more politic. It emphasized that the treaty did not satisfy the justifiable demands of the Hungarians in Romania, but at the same time recognized some positive elements. What are your views on this?

[Kovacs] I reacted to the statements of RMDSZ Chairman Bela Marko and some other RMDSZ leaders with understanding because, rather than a rigid rejection, they reflected a concern that is understandable in their situation. I find it very important that they carefully assessed the positive elements of the basic treaty and they naturally spoke about the deficiencies, which we can also precisely see. The prime minister and I are ready to hold consultations about the RMDSZ's concrete suggestions with the organizations leaders before we sign the document. The main goal is to dispel their fears.

[Pietsch] What are your views about Parliament's possible extraordinary session, will there be another Hungarian-Hungarian summit, and when can we expect the signing to take place?

[Kovacs] As for the extraordinary session, I find it pointless because international agreements always come to Parliament for approval after signing. Parliament does not normally hold debates on agreements before signing. Naturally, if the opposition collects the required number of signatures, the government will not reject—it cannot, anyway—a debate. I do not see a need for another Hungarian-Hungarian summit because the treaty is only a matter for the Hungarian and Romanian Governments, the Hungarian community in Romania, and the Romanian community in Hungary. For our part, we are willing to sign the basic treaty any time from the beginning of September.

[Pietsch] What does the government expect from the basic treaty, how can it help the implementation of its foreign policy?

[Kovacs] With the confirmation of the inviolability of borders, we expect the basic treaty to remove the grounds once and for all for the nationalist slanders that Hungary has territorial demands against Romania or any other neighboring country. On the other hand, with the formulation of national minority rights, also supported by international documents and laid down as legal obligations, we expect it to give an important point of reference to the Hungarians living in Romania to have their rights recognized and to implement them in practice. We expect that all this will contribute to settling the disputed issues and thus to improving our relations, and indirectly it will have a positive influence on the public's thinking in Romania and promote a more tolerant attitude to the national minority issue. Finally, we expect it to contribute to strengthening the region's stability and to its Euro-Atlantic integration.

Hungary: Controversy Over Treaty With Romania Assessed

AU2708191096 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 27 Aug 96 p 7

[Editorial by Katalin Karcagi: "Interpretation Confusion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] is deeply disappointed and does not understand the reason behind the haste; the opposition in Hungary has opened a frontal attack on the government. It seems that the bark of the initiative to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Hungarian Parliament is more than its bite. However, this step is fully in harmony with the rules of parliamentary democracy. It is natural that the opposition wants to express its opinion at the highest forum and to force the government to change its position. The opposition does not agree with the finalized text of the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty; moreover, they speak of abandoning the ethnic Hungarians in Romania and of betraying their interests.

However, the opposition could express its rejection of the appendix to the basic treaty and its arguments against excluding the collective rights in the course of the parliamentary ratification debate. Even the most emotional opposition deputies admitted that, given the government's majority in Parliament, they do not stand a chance of vetoing the basic treaty. Thus, with this loud protest, the opposition wants to draw the attention of the public in their direction and prove that Gyula Horn and its cabinet have already given up their principles in foreign policy too. This, because Horn and his cabinet are striving to gain acceptance in the Euro-Atlantic organizations by all means, and naively gave in to Western "nudging." The cabinet thought that the hastily concluded basic treaty after the long negotiation hiatus might help achieve quick acceptance in Western integration organizations.

In the current situation, it is very difficult to calm down the opposition emotions and ease the bitterness of the RMDSZ. There would have been more chances of achieving all this if the government had informed and consulted with the relevant parties on all details of its compromise proposal at the proper time. In that case, the finished text would not have affected the representatives of the ethnic Hungarian minority as a cold shower either. The government should have come to the public in time and explain the reason why it agreed to separately deal with the Romanian side on the fate of church and community properties. The fact that the government has kept silent all this time is a sign of uncertainty.

Hungary: Opinion Poll on Coming Treaty With Romania

AU2708195496 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 27 Aug 96 pp 1, 3

[Report on results of opinion poll carried out by the Szonda Ipsos Research Institute on 22 August 1996: "The Fate of Minorities and EU Membership Are Equally Important"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Szonda Ipsos carried out an opinion poll among the adult population living in cities on the people's opinions regarding the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty. The poll also surveyed the people's opinion on Hungary's foreign policy efforts aimed at developing good-neighborly relations with the neighboring countries and at joining the European Union.

The Hungarian population living in cities support almost unanimously (93 percent) the Hungarian foreign policy efforts to develop good-neighborly relations with the countries in this region and to guarantee long-term rapprochement with our neighbors. Only 4 percent of the people in the survey said they did not agree with this foreign policy orientation.

Likewise, a majority of town inhabitants (63 percent) think that, among the tasks to be implemented, joining the EU and improving the situation of ethnic Hungarians beyond the borders and guaranteeing their rights are equally important.

Fewer people, 17 percent, prefer the task of Hungary's European integration. People with higher education, Budapest inhabitants, and supporters of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] attribute greater importance to gaining EU membership.

Some 63 percent of the people in the survey think that separate bilateral agreements are necessary in order to develop harmonious relations with the neighboring countries. Some 76 percent of the people think that the governments of Western democracies expect us to do that.

Some 55 percent of the people in the survey think that bilateral basic treaties accelerate Hungary's EU membership. Some 23 percent think that the basic treaties do not really affect this endeavor, and 8 percent of the people think that these bilateral treaties hinder our EU integration.

Some two-thirds of the people in the survey (67 percent) are urging the signing of the basic treaty with Romania, a treaty that stipulates the inviolability of the existing borders and guarantees the national minority rights of the ethnic Hungarian minority living in Romania in accordance with international norms. Some 21 percent of the people in the survey voiced opposite views.

The opinions of city dwellers are divided on one of the essential element of the basic treaty, namely the settling of the situation of ethnic Hungarians living in Romania. One-third (32 percent) of the people think that the treaty will improve the living conditions of the ethnic Hungarian minority in Romania, while 37 percent think that we cannot expect any genuine change in this respect. Some 17 percent of the city dwellers presume that signing the treaty will actually deteriorate the situation of ethnic Hungarians in Romania. People with higher education and Budapest residents are even less confident that the average on this issue.

In your view, how will the basic treaty affect the situation of ethnic Hungarians in Romania?

	Percent
It will not really affect them	37
It will rather improve the situation	32
It will rather deteriorate the situation	17
Do not know or no answer	14

Which foreign policy effort do you regard as the most important?

	Percent
Hungary's EU membership	17
Improving situation of Hungarians abroad	12
Regard both efforts as equally important	63
Do not know or no answer	8

B-H: Prlic Comments on 'Herzeg-Bosnia,' Future Policy

AU2708183796 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 21 Aug 96 pp 6-8

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic by Fahrudin Djapo and Ahmed Salihbegovic in Sarajevo; date not given: "Mostar Is the Last Multiethnic Town in Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the day when he gave the interview for LJILJAN, Jadranko Prlic, head of the Bosnian diplomatic corps, met in Sarajevo with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who was visiting Bosnia-Herzegovina. The visit took place at a time when the U.S. engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is again being stepped up and the election temperature in Bosnia-Herzegovina is rising. Apart from that, Christopher's visit took place only several days after yet another decision on the dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia had been taken. Immediately before the interview, Minister Prlic had been meeting with Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, of whose government he is a member. Prlic said this about the meeting:

[Prlic] When I told Mr. Muratovic that I would be giving an interview to LJILJAN, he told me that that was good and useful, since 100,000 people would be reading what I said. By way of a joke, I said that they would be his voters, not mine. [Prlic is a member of the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, while LJILJAN is read mainly by Party of Democratic Action, SDA, supporters.]

[LJILJAN] This "long march" toward the establishment of the Federation of Bosniaks and Croats has aready been going on for 28 months. Was the Geneva summit between Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman, at which the agreement to dissolve "Herzeg-Bosnia" by 31 August was signed, the last stop on the way?

[Prlic] This is one of the very important stops on that way. The agreement signed in Geneva relates to the strengthening of the Federation. Within that context it was also agreed that the powers of the Republic regulated by the Dayton agreement be transferred to the Federation and that those not regulated by the Dayton agreement would remain in the domain of the Republic. Apart from that, it was decided that all the functions of the "Herzeg-Bosnia" authorities would be ceded to the authorities of the Federation, the cantons, and the municipalities. This is what I discussed with Prime Minister Muratovic. Of all the functions that "Herzeg-Bosnia" has retained, there is only one Federation function—defense—whereas all the others are foreseen for the cantons or will be ceded to the Federation authorities. Another significant thing decided in Geneva, which had effectively been decided on before, is that the Federation had to become a functioning mechanism before the elections, since the elections would determine the people to carry out certain duties within the Federation. I consider the Geneva agreement exceptionally important in the light of the Dayton agreement. It supports the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the form possible at the moment. It is only natural that various political options, the wishes of single nations, the Muslim-Bosniak, Croatian, and Serbian, will certainly not come about to the maximum. The process of "sobering up" that each nation will go through will show this. The leaders who promised more than would come about will probably be blamed. Ultimately, I think that the interpretation of this agreement is one-sided. There is no agreement that can be useful for one side only, if it is signed by two. I was a businessman and I can say that a business transaction or an agreement is good only if it is reached by two partners. At this level, everything has also to be seen in terms of the elections. Everything that you say and do not say, everything which happens and does not happen has, objectively speaking, this function too. [sentence as published]

[LJILJAN] "I do not think that there will be any ruptures; 'Herzeg-Bosnia' cannot be dissolved on one 'D-day' by cutting a ribbon that would mark the end." This is what Bozo Rajic, the chairman of the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina, said. Is the Geneva agreement on the dissolution of "Herzeg-Bosnia," which President Franjo Tudjman signed, only a tactical move made under Christopher's pressure or is it a decisive change in Zagreb's policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Prlic] I was present at the talks with Warren Christopher and this issue was not discussed at all. President of the Presidency Izetbegovic spoke about the powers and functions of the Republic. I was a member of the delegation headed by Mr. Izetbegovic. The topics discussed with Mr. Tudjman were probably different, but I do not know anything about them at the moment. Your question points to the fact that it cannot be asked whether they oppose each other. If we are building a joint structure, everything has to be seen in that context, not how will one party cheat on the other; efforts have to be made so that everyone is happy. I do not want to assess who has won and who has lost. I think that both nations and both partners have won.

[LJILJAN] Which functions of the Republic are controversial, as you mentioned, regarding their transfer to the Federation?

[Prlic] I have not mentioned anything about this. Since I became the minister, I have seldom spoken as a representative of the Croatian nation, on behalf of only one nation, or as a supporter of one option. Croatian representatives have been warning, however, that all functions not regulated by the Dayton agreement are controversial. No one in this building or in the building across the street (the Presidency) is aware of what will happen after 14 September. After that day, according to the Geneva agreement, the high representative will be playing the main role and will decide on all controversial issues in all situations. Immediately after the election results have been published, a new Presidency will be formed, which will consist of three members. It will not be possible to pass a single decision on the wish of one person only. All the institutions that now consider themselves irreplaceable, infallible, protectors of sovereignty, etc., will change. This process of "sobering up" may be very painful for some people. It is not painful for me, since I was already aware of it the moment the Dayton agreement was signed. A month before the Dayton agreement was signed, we were told by the United States: "If you want to retain Bosnia-Herzegovina, you will be able to achieve this only with a very weak central government." This is the price that had to be paid.

[LJILJAN] In other words, you consider 14 September the key political event in Bosnia-Herzegovina....

[Prlic] Find someone who does not.

[LJILJAN] Will the forthcoming elections legitimize the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina or will it be a step toward its reintegration?

[Prlic] It could be one or the other. This depends on all three sides, since there are three nations in every part. The elections can legitimize the existing situation, in which the results of ethnic cleansing have been achieved in part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the latest information about registration with the P-2 form, it is evident that the results of ethnic cleansing are particularly evident in the "serb republic" [no initial capitalization as published]. Mr. Robert Frowick, with whom I spoke yesterday, told me that such examples in the Federation were practically negligible in comparison with the "serb republic." These are his words. The difference between the entities is drastic in this respect.

[LJILJAN] The Fourth HDZ Convention was held in Neum at the same time as Croatian President Tudjman was on a visit to Washington. There were many exalted speeches that rejected the idea that the Mostar election results or any compromise in connection with them could be accepted. Is this a precedent in the political life of Bosnia-Herzegovina so that everyone is be entitled to either accept or ignore democratic principles to the extent to which this suits his political interests or aims? How could this reflect on the 14 September elections?

[Prlic] You have expressed an attitude in the question, so I need not give an answer. [sentence as published] Viewed formally from the legal popint of view, the municipal electoral commission annulled the election results at one polling station. The municipal electoral commission is the only body in charge of such decisions. A body that has no such powers has verified the elections.

[LJILJAN] The EU has declared the elections final and successful.

[Prlic] Yes, but it is not in charge of this issue. According to the legal regulations, only the municipal electoral commission is in charge of this issue. I think that the problem with the Mostar elections is exclusively a legal problem. As soon as we introduce political and highly democratic elements into something, we get lost in the network of various interests and attitudes. Two lists were important in Mostar. One of them was the HDZ list and the other the list of Citizens for a Unified Mostar, which were effectively the Croatian and the Bosniak-Muslim list respectively, which is also true of many other things in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The basic problem was how to overcome the interregnum, since the HDZ has appealed to the Constitutional Court of the Federation. This body is in charge of this issue, but it has not been established yet. The problem is how to overcome the time until the final decision is made by the Federation Constitutional Court. The question is, in other words, whether to establish temporary authorities, which do not correspond to the election results or to form authorities according to the election results, temporarily, until the Court has made its decision. As is common in this country, an eruption of emotions and similar things happened, which overshadowed all the starting points. And the starting point is—and this is the attitude of the Croatian side—that it is not important whether there are 26 votes more or less in Bonn, but the fact that it is regulated by election rules that, if an inappropriate number of ballot papers are found at one polling station, the election in that polling station has to be annulled. I do not even think that the Muslim-Bosniak side opposes a new election in Bonn or at least this is what I was told by their representatives in Sarajevo. The Muslim-Bosniak side expects to pick up even more votes in Germany in a new election. I think that a way of thinking has to be found to solve problems, not create new ones.

[LJILJAN] Is it possible for the same thing to happen at the 14 September general elections? It is only natural to expect that a minor irregularity can occur at a polling station. Can a party dissatisfied with its results reject and refuse to recognize the elections because of this?

[Prlic] There are election rules that regulate such matters, including the right to appeal. There is also a body that defines all this and takes the ultimate decisions. It was stated even in the papers offered in Geneva this time, which were accepted by both parties, that the election results would have to stand once they had been officially proclaimed by the body in charge of them and this is the OSCE. This is probably redundant, since it is obvious.

[LJILJAN] Can you comment on the very common allegations in the press and in occasional political speeches that there are strong connections between the political leadership and the mafia in the western [Croat-occupied] part of Mostar and in "Herzeg-Bosnia" in general? Michael Steiner claims that the Mostar mafia controls the politicians, thus blocking the peace process.

[Prlic] This is difficult to say. I obviously have a much higher opinion of the Mafia than Mr. Steiner. I have seen in films that the Mafia is well organized and has sophisticated working methods. I think there is just simple crime in Mostar, on a small rather than a large scale. I do not think that we can speak about a significant influence of crime on politics, but we can perhaps speak about fear.

[LJILJAN] Have you personally had any such experiences?

[Prlic] I am a public figure. Many people agree with me, many do not, and in times like these agreement or disagreement with someone's attitude is expressed in a significantly different way than in normal democratic societies. Attitudes toward a certain act by a public figure can be expressed in all possible forms. This is typical of wars and postwar periods. The Croatian side, "Herzeg-Bosnia," was the first part fully to open itself up to the world. All parts of "Herzeg-Bosnia" are completely public. Both in their plans and their implementation. It is known how every German mark and every kuna [Croatian currency unit] has been received and spent. These are the views of the World Bank, too. Under the circumstances, "Herzeg-Bosnia" has not succeeded in introducing full order to the territory under its control, especially in Mostar, which is a town that experienced total human and material destruction. Some consequences of this will last for many years to come. In the territory of the Serbian entity and in the one controlled by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, business will develop, there will be investment and donations, so that the degree of state control over income and expenditure will develop, too. This process will take some time, which is a normal consequence of the stress with which Bosnia-Herzegovina has been confronted until recently.

[LJILJAN] Do you personally know Mladen Naletilic Tuta and how do you think he will react to the dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia? Is his reaction relevant?

[Prlic] We are speaking about the transfer of power from the institutions of Herzeg-Bosnia to the authorities of municipalities, cantons, and the Federation. I have met with Mr. Naletilic. I do not know how he will react. Relevant and binding for everybody are only the decisions taken by the Croatian political leadership, which takes care of Croatian interests in general.

[LJILJAN] Are there tendencies among some Croatian and other politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina to create an internal division of the country into three parts, i.e. into three entities, which could also be an explanation of why there were attempts to retain "Herzeg-Bosnia"?

[Prlic] There are various options. The Dayton agreement is in effect now and I do not think that significant changes are possible; I do not think that it is possible to reject the general framework of the Dayton agreement. Bosnia-Herzegovina can function with these two entities or not at all. The Federation itself can function only if it is realized what the Federation really is. I think that the Muslim-Bosniak side will have to change its behavior much more.

[LJILJAN] Does the Croatian side still consider the Federation a federation of two peoples rather than of cantons? How strong is the Croatian resistance to the existence of the two mixed cantons: the Mostar-Neretva and the Travnik-Central Bosnia Cantons?

[Prlic] This is a federation of two nations, of Croats and Bosniaks, as well as a federation of counties. Regarding mixed cantons, all cantons in the Federation are mixed. The two that you have mentioned have a special decisionmaking systems and proportional representation of both nations. It is certainly not the best option that one of them becomes ethnically pure. How and to what degree these two counties are able to function will certainly be determined by the political life in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in general.

[LJILJAN] Can you comment on Ejup Ganic's latest initiative to invite all Croats to return to their homes in territory controlled by the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Will the Croatian side respond to it adequately?

[Prlic] Yes, we shall invite all Croats to return and test Mr. Ganic's promise.

[LJILJAN] Will you invite all Bosniaks to return?

[Prlic] Certainly. According to statistic indicators, if you compare the Croats who should return to territories controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, as you say, and Bosniaks who left the territories under Croatian control in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the number of Croats is three times larger than the number of Bosniaks.

[LJILJAN] Do you have information on the number of Croats who have left Bosnia-Herzegovina and how do you interpret the effects of the HDZ's policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina in that respect?

[Prlic] It was not HDZ policy to make Croats leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. What kind of a political party would force its people to leave a country in which it is active? General circumstances have led to the phenomenon that you are speaking about; it is a result of what was going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian population was the smallest in Bosnia-Herzegovina, dispersed all over Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the war conflicts broke out only in places where the size of one population equalled the other two. Serious analyses will show this. Mostar is the last multiethnic town in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[LJILJAN] Is the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina autonomous in taking key political decisions or does it depend on the dictates of Zagreb?

[Prlic] The HDZ for Croatia and for Bosnia-Herzegovina are two parts of the HDZ global political organization and the same is true of the SDA. There is no significant difference in that respect.

[LJILJAN] Croatia has recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina and so, if I understand you correctly, your political party is in another state.

[Prlic] Yes, but the SDA exists in Croatia, too.

[LJILJAN] The SDA is a small opposition party in Croatia, whose members are members of the local Bosniak minority, but the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the leading parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which represents the largest part of one of the constituent nations.

[Prlic] Regardless of whether it rules, whether it is relevant or irrelevant, both the SDA and the HDZ exist in both countries. The HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina is a party registered in Bosnia-Herzegovina and participates in the political and parliamentary life in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It had the votes of 98 percent of all Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina though perhaps an insignificantly smaller number of Croats voted for the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina, since there were also some other voters who voted for the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is, in other words, a constituent part of the HDZ and it discusses the most important things with the HDZ for Croatia.

[LJILJAN] Do you consider Franjo Tudjman president of Croatia or president of all Croats?

[Prlic] I consider Franjo Tudjman president of the Republic of Croatia and chairman of the HDZ.

[LJILJAN] What are your relations with former HDZ Chairman Stjepan Kljuic?

[Prlic] We greet each other.

[LJILJAN] Do you personally believe in the survival of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Prlic] Yes.

[LJILJAN] Do you, as the foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, know about the arrest of Mirsad Catic, a colonel in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who has been arrested in Croatia. What are you going to do about it?

[Prlic] I do not know anything about it. I am hearing about it now for the first time.

[LJILJAN] What is your foreign policy concept for Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Prlic] Under the circumstances, I have been trying—to the extent that this was possible—to implement a foreign policy appropriate for this form of the state. We are a small multiethnic state, we belong to the foundations of European civilization. Bearing all this in mind, I have been trying to promote such ideas in my contacts. The positive things done in Bosnia-Herzegovina have come from abroad. The things done within the country created problems. The peace introduced into Bosnia-Herzegovina, the reconstruction, and all forms of behavior that correspond to the behavior in modern democratic states, have come from abroad. The conditions for our diplomacy, which are sometimes led by criteria inappropriate for proper diplomacy, which can partially be explained by the consequences of the war, have determined our diplomacy; certain things had to be improved, changed, or developed. The first meeting with all ambassadors was held in Sarajevo last week, which was exceptionally productive and determined some of our future tasks. We have restructured the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as I promised the public, which has its headquarters here and is a respectable institution, unlike the past period. It is an institution with a collegiate body, with an organization for both bilateral and multilateral relations. There is a department for reconstruction, which succeeded in making the assessment of $1.8 billion needed for this year together with our ministry. We have full control over all details. We have 41 diplomatic and consular offices abroad; this is in other words the total number of our embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions. Until the reorganization we employed

360 employees, 230 fully and 130 as contractors. With the reorganization we have succeeded in reducing that number to 270, that is by 90 employees. We have succeeded in bringing 70 people in from abroad, although no one believed that it would be possible.

[LJILJAN] What is the present national structure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Prlic] It has only partially improved. Two Croats have been appointed ministerial aides. Other things have been changed only partially and we have done practically nothing abroad.

[LJILJAN] Are there people from "Herzeg-Bosnia" in the ministry?

[Prlic] There are Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs in "Herzeg-Bosnia." I do not understand your question. If certain positions are filled with the representatives of the Croatian nation....

[LJILJAN] Are there some who have been in the leadership of "Herzeg-Bosnia"?

[Prlic] Yes, some.

[LJILJAN] You told Croatian Television some time ago that you were implementing a uniquely Croatian policy. Is this a help or a hindrance for you as head of the diplomatic corps of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Prlic] We discussed the party a moment ago. The HDZ is the party that won in Croatia and it is the absolute winner among the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats. It is only logical that the HDZ and the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina implement a mutual policy in some of their basic elements. The controversial issues in the election campaigns of some Western countries such as abortion, energy supply, taxes, etc. are completely irrelevant and insignificant here; but other problems are significant here. Our political culture and circumstances and our political environment are completely different. Is this an advantage or not? Basically, it is an advantage. In these big, tectonic, historic changes now going on on this territory, at the time when the Croatian nation is getting two states for the first time—Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which it is a constituent nation, and Croatia—it is, globally speaking, good to have a joint policy. In concrete situations, however, it can sometimes be bad. I would maintain that the HDZ is doing a good job and manages the circumstances well when important political decisions are being taken.

[LJILJAN] Your interview for the independent Belgrade magazine VREME carried as its headline your statement that Sarajevo was a greater problem than Pale.

[Prlic] The interview was published correctly. The headline, however, contains a statement that was not part of the text. This happens very often.

[LJILJAN] What is your political cooperation like with representatives of the "Croatian alternative in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Mr. Komsic, the HNV [Croatian National Council], and the HSS [Croatian Peasants Party]?

[Prlic] I do not know what kind of cooperation you have in mind. We have not had any experiences of political dialogue so far. Mr. Komsic and I happen to be state officials, as he is a member of the Presidency and I am the foreign minister. We cooperate in this respect.

[LJILJAN] Do you officially travel on a Croatian or Bosnia-Herzegovina passport?

[Prlic] Only on a passport of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[LJILJAN] Is it difficult to harmonize all the positions of the foreign policy of Bosnia-Herzegovina, since it is a relatively small country between central Europe and the Balkans, partially the Mediterranean, with a relative majority Muslim population, which, apart from the wish to participate in European integration and apart from special relations with Muslim countries, also considers relations with the United States of America important?

[Prlic] It is possible to harmonize all this, if we bear in mind that we are a small country with three constituent nations and that we have to develop good relations with anyone who wants them. There is no reason for us to have hostile relations with any country. We do not need to be patronized by anyone, however. We have similar aims to all the new states and former socialist countries in central Europe: To come closer to European integration and Western security and military mechanisms. From this aspect of foreign policy, we have no problems with either of the two aspects, but we have problems with our domestic policy and the situation in the country. Regarding Europe and America, NATO, and Partnership for Peace, these issues depend on us and our internal situation. When I met with Javier Solana recently, the NATO secretary general, he told me: "Everything depends on you. Create a Federation army."

[LJILJAN] Although you are the foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina in general, formally at least, and although Bosnia-Herzegovina, not the entities, is in charge of international relations according to the Dayton agreement, relations with NATO will obviously be at the entity level, since defense ministries and armed forces function on that level. To what degree is this controversial?

[Prlic] I am the real foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only formally. What I say is binding on the Serb Republic. As for Partnership for Peace, it seems that it will function at the level of the Federation. How it will develop, whether it will function with some joint functions at the level of the whole state at a later stage, we cannot say. We are a specific state in every respect. Our priority is our relations with our neighbors, but we do not want to develop any institutional connections, especially not in the Balkans. We belong to Western civilization, to central Europe, and want to develop relations in the Mediterranean. We pay special importance to relations with Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, Germany, and especially the United States. In the next circle are large and influential states such as France, Britain, Japan, etc. Our relations with the Islamic countries are important and useful. We have observer status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the OIC, and I have nothing against our being a full member. We need communications and relations with that side and Muslims account for over 40 percent of the population in our country. Many countries are full members, even though their Muslim populations account for less than 50 percent of their respective populations, even those in which Muslims are not even a relative majority, as long as they have an important Islamic community. The OIC is an organization of states, not an organization of nations. We have to realize that the state is responsible to its citizens and nations who have elected their representatives, not to individuals. When we realize this, we shall achieve better results than now.

[LJILJAN] If the force that imposes and maintains peace in Bosnia- Herzegovina withdraws now, do you think that this would lead to a war between the Croats and Bosniaks. Do you think that IFOR will be able to withdraw at the end of the year without considerably affecting the stabilization process in the Federation and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in general?

[Prlic] Some form of international military presence will be inevitable. This will be discussed over the next few days and we have already discussed it. It is difficult to say now whether a conflict could break out. I think that the presence of all those elements that are preventing clashes from breaking out and are stabilizing the situation in the country and in the whole region will be necessary for some time to come.

B-H: OSCE Official Finds 'No Obstacles' to Abdic Candidacy

AU2808073396 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 15 Aug 96 p 4

[Article by Bo. Rudic: "Abdic Can Participate in the Elections!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Fikret Abdic, the leader of the People's Democratic Union [DNZ] and candidate for the future three-member presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, can participate in the September elections because the international court in The Hague has not issued a warrant against him. This was said at the press conference held on Wednesday by the officials at the office of the OSCE Mission in Sarajevo.

"The rules and regulations that have been established by the OSCE Provisional Election Commission foresee the prohibition of election participation by all those persons against whom the international tribunal has started a procedure. Moreover, those persons fulfilling a sentence issued by the court in The Hague or have who not responded to the summons of the court also cannot participate in the elections. After verification, we have established that none of these three regulations pertain to Fikret Abdic, and, thus, there are, for now, no obstacles to his participation in the elections," a OSCE official explained.

Jeff Fisher, the director of the OSCE elections office, told correspondents that two candidates of the Party of Serbian Unity were removed from the list of candidates. This was because the tribunal suspects them of having committed war crimes.

"These candidates are Dusko Sikirica and Gojko Jankovic, and they will be deleted from the list," Fisher said.

The correspondents asked Fisher about the reaction of the OSCE to the incidents that were reported at the promotional gatherings of primarily the opposition parties in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and in the Serb Republic. Fisher said that the OSCE and the elections appeals subcommittee had not received even one complaint from the political parties and coalitions regarding the disabling of the promotional gatherings.

"We can react only when we receive complaints, and that is why we are appealing to the all journalists to inform the public as well as the political parties that complaints regarding the violation of rules, regulations, and the code of behavior need to be given to the OSCE and the election appeals subcommittee. We can take the appropriate measures only after the complaints have been inspected," the OSCE official told correspondents.

B-H: Effect of Election Delay on Abdic Supporters

AU2808115696 Paris AFP in English 1106 GMT 28 Aug 96

[By Sonia Bakaric]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Velika Kladusa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Aug 28 (AFP)—Thousands of sympathisers of former rebel Muslim warlord Fikret Abdic have seen their hopes of winning power in municipal elections dashed by the decision to delay the polls.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) decided Tuesday to postpone the municipal polls—one of seven elections scheduled for September 14—over abuses of the voter registration process.

For supporters of Fikret Abdic, the millionaire businessman who ran a fiefdom based in this northwest Bosnian town near Bihac during the war, the decision means they are unlikely to win power before the next elections.

Abdic is regarded as a traitor by Sarajevo for having allied himself to the Serbs during the war, and his party, the Democratic People's Union [DNZ], is unlikely to score well in national polls. Its hope lay at the municipal level.

Abdic's lawyer, Bozidar Sizel told AFP Wednesday the decision was "a dirty blow" for the party.

"It is a knife in the back of all its members and only serves the interests of (Bosnia's ruling party) the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]," he said.

Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia, said Tuesday that the decision was not just because of Serb abuses of the voter registration system.

He said that tensions in the Bihac region were another reason.

"The OSCE has had more problems with the Muslims up in the Bihac area. The Muslims in Sarajevo are very concerned about the fact that the Bihac area remains a stronghold of Mr Abdic," he told CNN.

He said that the OSCE had been targeted for its decision to allow Abdic's party to participate in the polls, something he said was "unacceptable."

Abdic, who won the most votes in the first Bosnian presidency elections in 1990 when he stood for the SDA, remains enormously popular in the area where before the war he was head of the gigantic Agrokomerc food group.

During the war, he proclaimed an "Autonomous Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" in the region and allied it to the Serbs who held the surrounding area.

In 1994 and 1995 his supporters fought and were eventually defeated by Bosnian government forces. Many fled and the area is now controlled by Sarajevo.

In recent weeks, there have been a spate of bomb attacks against Abdic sympathisers in the region and in Velika Kladusa tension is high.

"The SDA doesn't want to lose Velika Kladusa.... All the tension in the town, which appears calm on the surface but where the people are very afraid, stems from this," an OSCE official, who did not want to be named, said.

Police constantly patrol the town. According to their estimates, there are 45,000 people living here of whom 18,000 are refugees, including 11,000 Abdic sympathisers recently returned from exile in Croatia.

SDA supporters have plastered the region with their posters and portraits of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic.

No opposition posters are evident, yet voters are reminded of Abdic's presence by the ubiquitous advertisments for Agrokomerc.

"The people are still with Abdic and if he doesn't win now, he will do so in two years' time," his supporters say.

B-H: Zubak Says 'Nothing' To Gain by Postponing Elections

LD2708202996 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have asked Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak to comment on this OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] decision [to postpone local elections in Bosnia].

[Begin Zubak recording] Our stance on local elections was well known. We believed that conditions for holding these elections had not been met because the administrative division was taken over from the earlier system. That was not coordinated with the Washington and Dayton solutions. This is why we demanded that the existing municipalities should be reorganized and new ones set up, and that the elections should be held only after this is done, on the basis of those new municipalities and municipal electoral units.

Everyone from the international community acknowledged and approved our stance, but ignored it. Now they have finally concluded that the municipal elections must be postponed. From that point of view, we should be satisfied, but the postponement that is being demanded now is not for the reasons we suggested, but for completely different reasons.

After reports were distributed to all of us, we could see that many people opted for the P-2 form, which means that they want to vote in the municipalities where they did not live before the war. All these reports show that many new voters have registered on voters' lists, especially in the Bosnian Serb Republic territory. The fact is—and Sarajevo media do not report enough about it—that important changes have occurred in Sarajevo, too. Around 50,000 to 60,000 people have registered to vote in Sarajevo's municipalities, or for example in Tuzla more than 20,000 have registered. I do not doubt that the Party of Democratic Action—I am not saying that they suggested to those people to register—was neutral in this respect. But the fact is that a huge number of people, and I am sure that they are Bosniak Muslims, registered to vote under the P-2 form. They exercised their right to choose. So we cannot now make a sweeping statement and say that this is all wrong. This is something that enables people to choose freely where they will live in the future.

I pointed this out to Mr. [Robert] Frowick [OSCE head in Bosnia]. I said that this did not mean that this ruling could now be abolished. So, in light of this, what will we gain by postponing the elections? Nothing. We will face this problem in two, five, or six months' time. [end recording]

B-H: HDZ Head: Local Election Postponement in Muslim Interest

LD2708183196 Zagreb HTV Television
in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The last news in this bulletin is about the decision to postpone the municipal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Srecko Vucina, head of the election headquarters of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has said that this decision will have a negative impact on the overall process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is unclear how cantonal and central authorities will function without the establishment of local authorities, Vucina said. He added that the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina would continue their election campaign in order to find a peaceful solution. He said that with that decision Robert Frowick [head of OSCE office in Bosnia] went along with the political aim of the Party of Democratic Action, as the leading Muslim party. Vucina said that this put other parties in an unfavorable position.

B-H: Croat Leader Blames Muslims for Assembly Impasse

LD2708182396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The municipal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been postponed. Elections at the level of the entities and counties will go ahead as planned. Here is a report on this and other events by Andjelko Perincic in Sarajevo:

[Perincic] [Passage omitted] This morning, the assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo debated the postponement of all elections after a proposal to do so by the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action [SDA]. As no agreement was reached, no conclusions have so far been adopted. Immediately after this session there was a session of the federation assembly. Near the end of the work of this assembly, we asked Ivan Bender, leader of the Croat group of deputies, for his comments.

[Begin Bender recording] This constituent assembly session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation should be working on implementing the measures agreed in Geneva and Sarajevo and everything we have agreed and finalized at lower levels over the past few days. The Croat deputies received clear instructions. We agreed on everything and we have specific proposals that the agreed measures be realized in line with the documents signed.

However, it is evident from our session—after seven or eight hours we are only just moving to establish the agenda, and we still haven't established it—that the Muslim deputies are trying to interpret a good many of the agreed measures in their own way. They are again trying to bring into question the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and its abolition, without at any time relating this to the status of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The agreed measures are clear and things cannot be otherwise. The transfer of authority from the institutions of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation must be carried out at the same time and in parallel. After all, two or more authorities cannot function and exist in one area. [end recording]

[Perincic] The Croat deputies envisage that if the Bosniaks fail to stick to the rules, international factors will perhaps have to intervene. The federation assembly will continue tomorrow.

B-H: Party Reactions to Municipal Election Delay

AU2708190496

[FBIS Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian in its regular evening newscast at 1700 GMT on 27 August reports on the Liberal Party's and the Civic Democratic Party's [GDS] reactions to the OSCE decision to postpone municipal elections.

The Liberal Party believes that the good aspects of this decision are that "hope is being restored in the return of a great number of refugees and displaced persons; form P-2, which could have had far-reaching consequences on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is being treated as invalid; the general atmosphere prior to the elections has improved; and those who would have boycotted the elections no longer have any arguments for this course of action." The party stresses that another good sign is that the "OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown readiness to stay in the country and supervise the local elections although they are not bound by the Dayton agreement to do so." The unfavorable aspects of the delay are "the legalization of the situation on the ground, particularly in the Federation where the return of refugees is being awaited; the fact that current authorities will stay in power even in those municipalities that have been assessed as not constructive; and another winter after which it will remain to be seen how many people will want to return to their former place of abode."

The GDS supported the OSCE decision to postpone municipal elections and expressed regret that the flaws had not been dealt with earlier.

B-H: RS Advises OSCE on Conditions for 'Fair Elections'

AU2708154096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1035 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 27 Aug (BETA)—The government of the Serb Republic (RS) has sent a letter to Flavio Cotti, chairman of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia, that says that all conditions for holding democratic and fair elections at all levels, including local elections, have been met in the RS.

In the letter sent after its extraordinary session held last night, the RS government says, citing Dayton agreement provisions and Geneva principles, that the same rules must apply to all levels of the elections, particularly when active and passive electoral rights are involved.

In the letter sent to Frowick and Cotti, the RS government warns that postponing elections at any level, at the moment when voting abroad has already begun, would mean "direct violation of Dayton agreement provisions and the regulations of the Provisional Electoral Commission" and that it would cause harmful consequences on the entire situation.

B-H: Serb PM Assails OSCE Decision To Postpone Elections

LD2708195896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 27 Aug (SRNA)—Commenting on the OSCE decision to postpone the municipal elections, Serb Republic Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic has said that the basic reason for this decision was the assessment that nothing significant will change on the political scene and that national parties will win in this region.

"The OSCE is concerned about assessments that the [ruling] Serb Democratic Party [SDS] will win the elections in the Serb Republic. The only way to prevent this or postpone it is to postpone the elections. We are ready for the elections to be held at all levels, in keeping with the Dayton agreement, and we will carry them out," Klickovic told SRNA.

According to him, the Serb Republic is ready for local elections to conducted by the OSCE and in accordance with OSCE rules.

"The decision to postpone the elections is a shameful act designed to prevent the victory of the Serb national party and promote notions of the reintegration of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina," Klickovic said.

He pointed out that if the assembly and main committee of the SDS so decide, the elections will not have to be held on 14 September but a week later.

"Large sums of money are needed for the holding of the elections and this is one of the reasons why we are in favor of them being held simultaneously at all levels," Klickovic concluded.

B-H: Serbs 'Most Probably' Will Accept OSCE Decision

LD2808104296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0915 GMT 28 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Doboj, 28 Aug (SRNA)—By taking part in the forthcoming elections and voting for the Serb Democratic Party [Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS], the citizens of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic will verify and strengthen the state they got after a liberation struggle which lasted three years and six months and the Dayton agreement—this was the common message of those who addressed the SDS rally in Doboj last night.

The acting SDS chairman, Dr. Aleksa Buha, told the 20,000 citizens of Doboj present at the magnificent rally that the Dayton documents gave the [Bosnian] Serbs a state, "because if you have an army and borders, you also have a state."

"They have realized this now. They see what has been done; two states, i.e., three states, have been set up in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and now they are trying to annul this by, as always, fulfilling Muslim demands," Buha said.

He said that annulment was not possible and that the Dayton Bosnia, as a new state, will have as much sovereignty and independence as its nations agree on. Buha called on the citizens of Doboj to take part in the elections and vote for the SDS in order to strengthen the Serb Republic and its self-reliance.

He described the decision by Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE mission in the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation, to postpone the municipal elections "as a major violation of the Dayton agreement by the organization [OSCE], which the international community had entrusted with carrying out that job [elections]."

Buha said that the Serb side would most probably accept the [OSCE] decision. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Parties Condemn Frowick Decision

AU2708203996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1535 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 27 Aug—Slavko Zupljanin, president of the Serb Patriotic Party [SPAS] and head of the candidate list for the party's deputies in the Serb Republic [RS] Assembly, said today that the postponement of local elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina is "a direct blow to the provisions of the Dayton agreement."

According to him, the decision made by U.S. Ambassador Robert Frowick is a calculated move with clear political goals aimed against the Serbs.

Radoslav Brdjanin, president of the People's Party of the RS [NSRS] and candidate on the party's deputy list for the RS Assembly, said that this decision is evidence of the international community's siding with the Muslim side.

He added that this decision had been made to the detriment of the Serbs and even Croats and that it is "a flagrant violation of the provision of the Dayton agreement which the representatives of the international community and other sides invoke when it is in their interest."

Igor Radojcici, spokesman of the coalition bloc Alliance for Peace and Progress [SMP], said in Banja Luka today that "Frowick's decision is fatal for the RS because the entire structure of authority consists of local and republican bodies of authority."

"There can be no real changes unless elections take place at all levels. However, based on recent events, we can conclude that this is a result of pressure exerted by the other side, that is, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina," Radojcic said and stressed that such a decision was aimed against the RS and the Serb people.

The SMP spokesman concluded that the most logical thing to do would be for parties in the RS to reach an agreement on holding local elections.

B-H: SDS: OSCE Decision Aimed at Suppressing Serb Interests

AU2708204796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1505 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 27 Aug—Borivoje Sentic, vice president of the Main Committee of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] said today that the decision to postpone local elections "is yet another sign of the international community's insecurity regarding decisions made earlier."

According to him, the decision implies the suppression of the significance and interests of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Commenting on his party's future actions, Sentic said that the SDS would probably not decide on a general boycott of elections "because that would provide the Muslim side with a chance to win all the positions which it is interested in with a minimal number of votes."

B-H: RS's Plavsic, Buha Address Election Rally in Knezevo

LD2708163796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1520 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Knezevo, 27 Aug (SRNA)—Biljana Plavsic, vice president and acting president of the Bosnian Serb Republic [RS], addressed a Serb Democratic Party [SDS] election rally in Knezevo [Skender-Vakuf, Serb-held town in western Bosnia, south of Banja Luka] today. She warned of "sly traps set by the international community and accusations by certain parties that claim that the SDS is not a party of the future."

"We have shown that the Bosnian Serbs have and will have their own state. You have survived and you will stay on your land, but do not let them take away our memory," she told thousands of citizens of Knezevo and recalled that the SDS "had put itself at the head of the people in order to save them from pits [many Serb civilians were thrown into Bosnian pits during WWII] and aggression."

"We have to provide for the families of dead and wounded soldiers and refugees, and we will show the world that we know how to make and preserve a Serb national state, as it is the guarantee of our survival," Dr. Biljana Plavsic stressed.

Aleksa Buha, the acting chairman of the SDS and foreign minister, warned that "history has taught us that we cannot survive without our own state, and that the SDS was set up and led by people who were aware of this.

"These are the reasons why we insist on a national state, but we do not deny this right to other nations. This is why we have to persevere and preserve what we have shed blood for. We will have as much independence and sovereignty as we agree on. There will be no Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina without equality, and we will know what to do then," Buha stressed.

He called on the people of Knezevo to take part in the elections in a calm and dignified manner "because we are a serious nation and we will never give in to anyone." [passage omitted]

B-H: Plavsic Expresses Need for 'Serb National State'

LD2808093996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0835 GMT 28 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Doboj, 28 Aug (SRNA)—Biljana Plavsic, vice president and acting president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, addressed a Serb Democratic Party [Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS] election rally in Doboj last night and warned that "we have to create a strong state that will govern in the interest of the people and not above them."

"We will make a strong and good state with strong and good institutions. The Serb people are aware that they were in a good position only when they had a Serb national state, between 1903 and 1912," she said and added that that state had been "a model for other European states, a most democratic state."

Greeted by more than 20,000 citizens of Doboj, Dr. Plavsic said that the SDS had not had a chance to show how to set up a state structure because it had to wage a war for the fatherland to save the people from genocide.

Recalling the history of the Serbs from Kosovo until today, she called on the citizens of Doboj to vote for the SDS on 14 September, "to vote for a party which had never betrayed Serb national interests." [passage omitted]

B-H: Belgrade Reportedly Wants Radic To Pull Out of Elections

AU2708141796 Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 27 Aug 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Radic 'in Consulation' in Belgrade Yesterday?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka—Predrag Radic, presidential candidate of the Democratic Patriotic Bloc [PDB], did not hold a regular news conference yesterday.

As DNEVNI TELEGRAF has learned from well-informed sources, Predrag Radic had been invited to Belgrade to see Slobodan Milosevic to agree on his withdrawal from the candidacy for the president of the RS [Serb Republic] for the benefit of Zivko Radisic, candidate of the Alliance for Peace and Progress [SMP], which enjoys the support of the Serbian authorities.

Radic was exposed to pressure even before he announced his candidacy, but he did not agree to withdraw. At that time, it was only agreed that Mladen Ivanic would be a joint candidate of the DPB and the SMP for a place in the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the RS.

B-H: SRS Leader Vows Not To Hand Karadzic to Hague Tribunal

LD2708203096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1750 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Serb Gorazde, 27 Aug (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), in Serb Gorazde today, called on the Serb electorate not to be divided, and to vote with the Serbian Radicals for Dr. Biljana Plavsic [acting president of the Bosnian Serb Republic] and Momcilo Krajisnik [speaker of the Bosnian Serb Assembly].

"When the Bosnian Serb Republic is saved and when it is secure, safe, and protected, the Serbian Radicals will compete with the Serb Democratic Party," Seselj said at today's election rally in Serb Gorazde.

Speaking about the bias of the international community and the Hague tribunal, Seselj said:

"Not a single Serb and not a single Serb patriot should be handed over to the Hague tribunal, and that is why we will not hand over Radovan Karadzic, Milan Martic [former rebel Serb leader in the Krajina region of Croatia], or Ratko Mladic."

Nikola Poplasen, chairman of the SRS of the Serb Republic; Nikola Spiric, candidate for vice president; and leaders of the Radicals in this region called on the several hundred citizens present at the electoral rally to vote for the best and not for thieves, criminals, and those who have profited by dirty deals.

B-H: SDS Election Posters of Karadzic Seen in Rogatica

AU2808110396 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by E.T.: "Poster War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As the elections are drawing nearer, the number of posters in the election campaign is also growing. They are being plastered on every free space available. However, this is not only characteristic of the territory of the Federation. "The poster war" is also being waged in the Serb entity. Our team learned of this when traveling from Sarajevo to Gorazde. Rogatica, in particular, was covered with election posters. The Party of Serbian Unity [SSJ], whose leader is Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, spent the most money in this town, judging by the number of posters. However, the number of posters of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], on which war criminal Radovan Karadzic can be seend, was not negligible either. Although the OSCE banned posters with Karadzic's picture, they nevertheless still exist. In Rogatica, one could also see posters of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] of Vojislav Seselj.

Croatia: Government Opposes Postponing Bosnian Elections

AU2708142296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 27 Aug 96

[Report by Nada al-Issa—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Government of the Republic of Croatia opposes [word indistinct] of elections, Damir Zoric, commissioner for refugees and displaced persons stated. Nada al-Issa reports from Zagreb.

[Al-Issa] According to the official attitude of the Croatian Government, there is no reason for any postponement of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina because IFOR will reportedly guarantee full security for voters. Therefore, in Croatia, it is said that all those in Bosnia who support a possible postponement of the elections actually want thereby to postpone the return of the refugees to their homes. In Croatia, voting will be carried out next Saturday [31 August] and Sunday. As is known, around 135,000 people have registered for the vote, of whom around 132,000 will vote in Croatia and around 14,000 will vote in their native municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Elections Postponement Said To Undermine Dayton

AU2808122296 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by Ivan Sabic: "Undermining Dayton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The OSCE has had its say—the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of whether they filed the P-1 or P-2 form during voter registration, will only elect their representatives at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the two entities, and cantons (those from the Federation), because the elections for the municipal authorities have been postponed until some better time. This ended the dilemma of whether the OSCE, that is, Robert Frowick, chief of the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would give preference to the deadlines contained in the Dayton accord or the claims that the Serbian side with the abuse of the P-2 form, on the basis of which a voter can freely chose in which municipality to vote, prepared the ground for victory in the local elections in the municipalities in which the Serbs had been in the minority before the war.

It is not at all immaterial whether the threat of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and some of the parties close to it to boycott the elections contributed to this decision or whether the OSCE concluded by itself that the irregularities in the voter registration in the Serb entity were such that they could not be tolerated, but the consequences of this decision are nevertheless more important.

In principle it is true that the September elections will consolidate the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and accelerate further realization of the peace agreement; however, it is questionable if this still stands after the latest OSCE decision, because it would be difficult to expect the newly elected Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and the two entities to find common language on the inherited local authorities without any major difficulties. Besides, the role of the municipal authorities is crucial in the realization of the Dayton accord, and these same authorities, at least for the time being, have not demonstrated particular effectiveness in this direction.

The OSCE decision on the postponement of the elections perhaps prevented the legalization of the ethnic cleansing for some time, which was the main motif of those who sought this decision; however, with its disrespect for the envisaged deadlines it simultaneously undermines the Dayton accord. Bearing in mind that this decision does not remove for good the possibility of the permanent settlement of the refugees in the territories of their current abode and that the OSCE, by practically siding with the Muslims, paved way for the new tensions in the peace process, it is clear that a lot will be said on this OSCE decision, and especially the P-2 form.

Croatia: Accord With Belgrade Seen To Hasten Reintegration

AU2708125196 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24 Aug 96 p 1

[Commentary by Marko Barisic: "Agreement for Lasting Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The signatures Ministers Granic and Milutinovic have put on the Agreement on the Normalization of Relations Between Croatia and FRY could mean a long-term turn in the relations between the Croats and the Serbs in general. Instead of constant disputes and mutual wars, in the future, if this agreement becomes reality, these two neighboring countries could have their relations settled. The reasons for that are in the very Agreement, and particularly in the Article 1, which says that Croatia and FRY recognize each other within their international borders. That means that neither state has any territorial aspirations, and in that context Prevlaka, too, is no longer either a territorial or security problem, but only a "disputable" issue. Regarding Article 1, that de facto means that Prevlaka remains sovereign territory of the Republic of Croatia, and FRY deems disputable only the access to the bay of Boka Kotorska, which is under the control of that peninsula. All the same, there are no more unclear things regarding Croatian Podunavlje [Danube River basin—eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem] ("Podunavlje" is the term Milutinovic accepted to sign). Belgrade recognizes that it is the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and it is probable that the border will be established between the two states soon, which will run through the center of the Danube River.

The agreement also arranges the relations of the Croatian ethnic community in the FRY, and of the Serb and Montenegrin community in Croatia. And those relations, just like recently with Italy, are arranged by the principle of reciprocity, which is a great success, particularly for the Vojvodina Croats, because so far they have had no status at all. In the end, Zagreb recognized the continuity of the statehood to the FRY, but since Belgrade agreed to participate on the same footing with other newly appeared states in the succession of the former SFRY, that does not have the significance it has had. It is not without importance for Croatia that through this agreement, it won the recognition of the "continuity" of its statehood, too. The agreement, regarding the Croatian side, is a great success. It will contribute to the acceleration of the integration processes, and it will also contribute to the final and conclusive solution to the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis. By this agreement, Serbia will, however, open the door to return to the international community. However, the most important thing in this agreement is that it could provide for peace in the long term. And which is today even more important for the totality of Croatian interests than the arrangement of Croatia's eastern borders.

Croatia: Granic Calls Prevlaka 'Indubitably Croatian'

AU2708133196 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Aug 96 p 1

[Article by P. Jancic: "Granic: Prevlaka Is Croatian Territory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs of Croatia, was a guest on Dubrovnik radio during yesterday afternoon's program. Dr. Granic was asked the following question: "Article 4 of the Agreement on normalizing relations, in which the two sides are prepared to resolve the controversial issue of Prevlaka through mutual negotiations, has aroused special interest in the region of Dubrovnik. Why the word controversial?"

"Where Prevlaka is concerned, we must refer to Articles 1, 2, and 4 of the Agreement," Granic said. "This means Croatia has been recognized within its international borders, of course, including Prevlaka. Prevlaka is an open issue for Belgrade. For us the only open issue is security. We have to resolve the boundary on the sea, and we have to resolve the issue of free passage into the Bay of Kotor.

"We must keep in mind that the UN mission, the monitoring mission, has been established, and that is a fact. We have also agreed that this is an important security issue. It will be resolved within that framework, and that means through negotiations. But it must be said that according to this Agreement, Prevlaka is indubitably Croatian territory. Prevlaka as a security issue will be resolved in future talks. For Belgrade it is a territorial issue, for us—we do not accept that. Therefore, Prevlaka was not an obstacle to signing the Agreement."

Croatia: Serb Party Leader on Normalization of Ties to FRY

AU2808120796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1840 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 27 August (BETA)—In Croatia at the moment two completely opposite processes are unfolding simultaneously—the normalization of the Croatian-Serbian relations, which is being presented to the domestic and the world public, while, at the same time, state terrorism is being carried out against the Serbs, which is not being sanctioned in any way, Milan Djukic, chairman of the Serbian People's Party [SNS], said today.

Djukic illustrated his assertion by saying that, after Operation Storm in former Krajina, 917 people of Serb nationality were killed, and he pointed out that the perpetrators of those crimes always remained unknown.

"I consider the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia to be inevitable, but, for a real normalization, it is necessary that the authorities change their current attitude toward the Serb people in Croatia," Djukic said.

He stressed that the SNS, as a precondition for the real normalization, demands the urgent adoption of a law on a general amnesty for all those who did not commit war crimes, because such a law opens up the possibility for refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes.

Djukic assessed that 23 August "will not be a historic day for the Croatian and the Serbian peoples if the signed agreement is not implemented, since the Serbian-Croatian normalization can be understood as a pretext used by two barons to highlight their make-believe peaceful policies."

Croatia: Croatian Serb Charges Government With Genocide

LD2808113696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1021 GMT 28 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 28 Aug (TANJUG)—According to Milan Djukic, chairman of the [Croatian] Serb People's Party [Srpska Narodna Stranka-SNS], "genocide has been carried out against the Serbs in Croatia."

Speaking at a news conference in Zagreb, he said that "an ethnic community has been displaced and expelled because of ethnic and religious hatred and intolerance" and that those who remained were being terrorized and their property looted.

Djukic said that 917 Serbs had been killed during the Croatian Army's operation in Krajina [former Serb enclave in Croatia] last year and that no one has been punished for these crimes.

Therefore, the survival of Serbs in their ancestral homes is being prevented in the worst possible way while the official [Croatian] authorities are encouraging Croats to settle in these areas.

Djukic welcomed the agreement on the normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and Croatia, and stressed that it could bring peace to this part of Europe.

The agreement offers a mechanism for resolving problems, Djukic said and added that the Croatian authorities must protect the Serbs and their property and punish those responsible for the terror campaign, because, as he said, this would lead to a real normalization.

Djukic said that Croatia should urgently adopt a law on a general amnesty for all those who had not committed crimes. However, he said in conclusion, the Croatian authorities have not adopted this law despite three consecutive presidential statements issued by the UN Security Council.

Croatia: Serbs Demand Simultaneous Opening of Graves

LD2708194496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1936 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vukovar, Aug 27 (TANJUG)—A Serb association is demanding the exhumation of Serb bodies from mass graves in Croatia parallel with the opening of the Ovcara grave at Vukovar.

The request has been made in letters to the United Nations and the Hague-based War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia by the Association of Persons Victimised by the Croatian Regime in 1990/91.

The opening of the Ovcara grave in the Serb region of East Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem is set for Sept. 1.

The principle of simultaneous exhumation of Serb and Croat graves was agreed at Geneva in 1993 by head of the U.N. expert team Sherif Bassouni and director of the Serbian Council Information Centre Vojin Dabic, the letters said.

There are more than 100 Serb mass graves registered in Croatia, the association said, adding it had submitted to the Hague-based tribunal extensive documentation about Croatian crimes in Vukovar and its environs.

The association is asking for an investigation first of crimes against Serbs committed before the outbreak of war in 1991, when 200 Vukovar Serbs disappeared, and during war operations, when 80 Serb bodies were fished out of the Danube River alone.

FYROM: Leftist Group Threatens ROK Embassy in Belgrade

AU2708171096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1104 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 27 Aug (BETA)—A little known group going by the name of the Communist Party of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] from Gostivar has faxed a threatening letter to the ROK Embassy in Belgrade on the occasion of the recent clash between the police and students in Seoul, the embassy has confirmed to BETA.

In the letter to the ambassador, which the embassy received yesterday, the group "most energetically protests the unprecedented terror against young communists and students ... and all those people who are fighting for unification with the free North Korea and the joint road to socialism."

"No evil can defend itself from the organized communist youth," the letter reads, along with a warning that Korean interests in Macedonia will be "most strongly, ferociously, and mercilessly attacked" and that "the same will be done by communists of all Balkan countries" under the communist youth command.

The banner of the faxed message of the "New Communist Party" clearly gives the address and bank accounts of the Gostivar organization.

"We are not taking the threat too seriously, but we have not ignored it either, ROK Embassy Advisor Jong Ceng Li [name as transcribed] said and added that the people in the embassy were surprised by the letter's 'unusual' contents."

"It is not impossible that the organization is connected with the DPRK and the most radical leftists in Seoul and that it is from there that it got its stimulus and support for this act," he added.

In the clashes between students and police in Seoul this month, a policeman was killed and 400 demonstrators arrested. The authorities called the violence an act of terror.

"We asked of the embassy (in Belgrade) urgently to increase security against a possible terrorist attack," an unidentified official told REUTER.

The ministry has sent similar warnings to other Korean diplomatic missions, including embassies in Canada and Bangladesh, where leftist groups have demonstrated against the police clash with the students.

The embassy in Belgrade is functioning normally and nothing has so far been done, but it is examining possible security measures, advisor Li told BETA.

FYROM: U.S., NATO Interests in Bulgaria Analyzed

AU2708192496 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 24-25 Aug 96 p 9

[Commentary by Tomislav Trajcevski: "Are the Balkans the Cornerstone of European Stability?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the historical tradition, the superpowers have always demonstrated a great interest in Balkan events and this is where they have attempted to secure a presence and influence over the countries in this region and have hoped to intensify and expand them as much as possible. In determining its global strategy, the United States long ago included the Balkans among its ambitions. In the newly created international circumstances, with its new foreign policy concept, the United States still wants to intensify its influence over the Balkan countries.

Within the framework of the changes in Europe and by using the newly created security and political situation after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the United States and NATO are rushing to take adequate measures to push Russia's influence out of the region.

In its previous attempts, the United States managed to secure a military presence in Albania, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], and Greece a long time ago. The United States is still outside Bulgaria in the military sense, but this does not mean that this territory is less important for overall U.S. policy in the Balkans. Actually, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, of which it was a member, Bulgaria soon found itself in the focus of interest of the United States and NATO.

What are the primary U.S. interests in influence or a presence on Bulgarian territory?

Any serious analysis will conclude that the U.S. presence on this territory or its influence on it will significantly strengthen control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the access for the Russian Federation's Black Sea Fleet to the open seas, at the same time making it even more vulnerable in the Black Sea.

It would be much easier to control possible crises in the current theater of NATO's operations and to maintain the internal stability of NATO's southern flank, which is the widest-spread battlefield, geographically speaking, as well as the most sensitive and least stable. The latest events around Cyprus and the present problems between Greece and Turkey have actually confirmed the current instability of NATO's southern flank.

The shortest land connection between Europe and Asia leads across Bulgarian territory: The Panonnian Valley-the Morava Valley-the Marica Valley-Tsarigrad, as well as the land connections between the Sarmat Valley (in Russia) and the straits.

From a historical point of view, the southern European countries have always had a problem with the formulation and execution of foreign and defense policy on the basis of regional cooperation, which represents the biggest obstacle to the formation of a stable and secure structure in Europe.

The United States is bring about its strategic objective for this region through NATO and the Partnership for Peace initiative. Indeed, it is the general opinion that there is a strong coincidence between U.S. and NATO strategies in practice.

What are Bulgaria's interests in joining Partnership for Peace?

The transformation process of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact has had an important effect on their security and defense identity. The new role of the Republic of Bulgaria in the Balkans was defined with the signing of the agreement on Partnership for Peace and the Vienna Agreement on reducing conventional forces. Bulgaria was accepted as member of Partnership for Peace on 17 February 1993, when it started intense military and diplomatic activities with Greece and Turkey, which are old NATO members. Above all the rest, Bulgaria sees a chance through these countries for a more rapid integration into NATO. Vice Admiral Peter Woodhead, former head of the Army Command of the joint NATO forces in the Atlantic, on a three-day visit to Bulgaria in March 1993, said the following: "The North Atlantic Treaty is the best guarantor for security in the Balkans, which is clearly shown in the Bulgarian leadership's wish at this time to join NATO."

After Bulgaria's admission into Partnership for Peace, in Sofia on 21 June 1993, there was a meeting of the NATO Cooperation Council on political planning, attended by representatives of central and east European countries. After the meeting, Bulgaria's participation in Partnership for Peace program was stepped up.

The following year, 1994, an agreement was reached between NATO and Bulgaria to upgrade and equip a battalion of the Bulgarian Armed Forces according to NATO standards and on its full inclusion in the implementation of the agreement. In addition, it was also agreed that Bulgaria would be visited by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry by the end of July 1994 or by General John Shalikashvili, the head of the joint General Staff of NATO in Europe [title as published], for a direct exchange of views on the future activities of Bulgaria within the framework of the designed program and the promotion of relations with NATO. During the three months following Bulgaria's admission to Partnership for Peace, three delegations of high-ranking NATO officers visited Bulgaria.

Last year in May, elements of the Bulgarian Armed Forces took part in a joint military exercise in the Peloponnesian region of Greece, together with the armed forces of the host country, and Turkey, Albania, and Romania. In August, a contingent from the Bulgarian Armed Forces took part in joint military exercises held on U.S. territory together with Albania, Slovenia, and Romania. Joint activities were carried out at these exercises for possible incidents on state borders and the formation of multinational forces to create buffer zones to prevent any escalation of the incidents.

Early this month, military and naval exercises were held in Bulgarian territorial waters in the Black Sea under the name "Breeze '96." The exercises coincided with Navy Day in Bulgaria.

Just before the end of "Breeze '96," the Bulgarian daily 24 CHASA reported on 12 August, a unit of 40 Bulgarian blue berets left for the North Carolinan Camp Lejeune base, where they are expected to take part in humanitarian military exercises, together with members of the armed forces of another nine countries.

According to what STANDART wrote on 17 August, Bulgaria's membership in NATO will occupy a prominent place in the Bulgarian presidential election campaign. The debate on NATO will represent the main trump card for the two most serious contenders, Petur Stoyanov, who has endlessly reiterated his intention to have Bulgaria join the North Atlantic Treaty, and Georgi Pirinski, who says the following about Bulgaria's admission to NATO: "We must confirm our desire to join NATO and we confirm this. After that, we must present all the questions that are of interest to us, as well as all the conditions for admission." It is apparent that Pirinski's position toward NATO is much more moderate, although he is the representative of the so-called Atlantic Wing of the Bulgarian Socialists. Most probably, Pirinski's moderation is affected by the assessment of Bulgarian financial experts, who have estimated that Bulgaria will need $19 million to reach compatibility with the NATO system, which is how much it will cost to join NATO.

FYROM: Background on Proposed Territorial Division

96BA0264A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 5 Apr 96 pp 19-20

[Article by Vladimir Jovanovski: "Geography of Wishes and Possibilities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] will soon have 100 opstinas [townships]. Do we need such "luxury"? Are fears of further bureaucratization of the country justified? What share of the wishes for new opstinas expresses the real need to revitalize the ravaged Macedonian villages, and what is exaggeration, personal ambition and careerism?*

The frustration that we live in a small country could be eliminated soon. Very quickly we shall have the opportunity to see the actual size of our fatherland. The new territorial divisions call for increasing the number of Macedonian opstinas from the current 32 to 100. The ordinary mind would probably be surprised: is it possible for Macedonia, given its size, to contain 100 approximately similar rounded entities?

In order to think more maturely about the introduction of a new communal system in Macedonia, we should define the very concept of our native commune. The communes that exist in our country and are known as opstinas greatly differ from Western European standards. If in Great Britain or The Netherlands, for instance, the population of one of their communes is 5,000 people, in our country it is ten times greater—50,000. Is this proper?

It is generally agreed that in 1955 an error was made in the planned units. Few people would be able to explain it. We probably relied on the fact that the concentration of all local functions within the larger cities would enable them to become the boosters of the development of their entire surrounding area. Although, in a most general sense, the accuracy of this concept cannot be denied, for usually it is the larger cities that promote development, in the case of Macedonia, we can see the extent to which such an underdevelopment triggered thousands of unforeseen problems. Today, the 1955 division is a pillar of shame around which piles of curses and accusations accumulate, caused by its impact on the "precipice of the Macedonian state-national space."

We must admit that the current division of the land resulted in a huge concentration of a variety of activities in the cities. Today they encompass the largest industrial buildings and agrocombines, virtually the entire trade and the numerous private companies that have appeared of late. Also included are all cultural and other amenities expressing the social standards, the administrative services needed by the citizens, and the entire communal operational system in charge of maintaining and developing the local infrastructure. The accelerated development of industry, which mercilessly poisons the already polluted city air, the crowded windows in front of which the citizens bitterly fight heartless bureaucrats for various documents, the massive expansions or, as the Brazilians call them, favelas, settled by emigrants from the countryside, where human excrements are dumped in open sewers lining unpaved streets, the violence in the public transportation system, and the thick smog of discharged gases....all of this makes "the cities become unable to sustain life." This quotation is the first of the reasons cited by Professor Dr. Mitko Panov, who is probably the most frequently consulted person in the country on this topic, which he cites as proof of redefining the division of the national territory.

The second reason, he says, is directly related to the first. It is the devastation of the Macedonian village (120 settlements in the country are totally uninhabited), resulting from extensive migration to the large cities. "More than three quarters of the country, or 77 percent of its area are inhabited by no more than 17.82 percent of the people." In other words, more than 1.6 out of 2 million people living in Macedonia live in an area totaling 6,000 square [sq.] km., while another 280,000 inhabit an area of 19,000 sq. km. Such uneven population distribution is extremely bad, the more so since the age structure of the people inhabiting this passive area of the land is extremely bad. This applies to rather elderly people, whose descendants have left or are preparing to leave for the cities, and who will not "last" too long on that land. We could expect that quite soon, a few years, for the situation in that area to worsen drastically and, in practical terms, to result in a situation in which we shall have huge uninhabited areas in an otherwise quite small country. On the other hand, the demographic imbalance intensifies the process of abandonment of agriculture, which already terribly devastates our villages. Macedonia has 700,000 hectares of arable land, less than 300,000 of which are under cultivation. The highest share of the currently unused arable land is located precisely in the abandoned areas. Whereas the optimal size of a farm cultivated by a household is five hectares, or roughly one hectare per person, in those areas the average is 30 hectares per family, which cannot be cultivated even if the age structure of the population would be much improved. Leading in this connection is Mariovo. Conversely, some areas are experiencing a so-called agrarian overpopulation. Unlike the hilly-mountainous areas, such areas are found mostly in Polog and the other parts of western Macedonia, including the majority of Skopje-area villages (Aracinovo, Kolicani, Saraj). This is a case of excessive concentration of the farming population on a relatively small area of arable land. Considering that this area is inhabited by large families, with some ten children, for example, there is less than half a hectare per family member. This situation is no better than the one already mentioned, the noncultivation, claims Professor Panov, adding that "Whenever the land resources are inadequate in terms of the number of people inhabiting it, this results in a restriction of economic and social development not only of the family but of the entire community."

One of the issues which arises in the discussion of this problem is the threat of further bureaucratization, the recruitment of new detachments of opstina employees, who can hardly wait to "rush" to the office chairs and spend days working on crossword puzzles, sipping coffee, and smoking. Donco Gerasimov, the deputy director of the Statistical Institute and active participant in the two commissions drafting the new territorial division of the country, claims that the danger is by far not so severe. "In order to revitalize the neglected land local self-governing units may be organized. We cannot expect the abandoned land to be cultivated by itself. Someone must organize on the spot the local economic and social life. As to the alleged excessive numbers, look at the Slovenian case. In Slovenia, the number of townships was increased from 62 to 142. Let me point out that Slovenia is smaller than Macedonia by some 5,000 sq. km., or by about one fifth."

Dr. Panov also believes that the fear of an increase in the number of government employees is groundless. "In general, the new opstinas should not resemble the current ones, distinguished mainly by a cumbersome and inefficient administration. If indeed another 70 opstinas are organized, the number of newly hired employees, assuming some 15-20 people per opstina, the sum total would be about 1,000. In my view this is, in general, not much." (The more so since, as the size of the current opstinas is reduced, the reduced volume of work would require fewer employees.) In the opinion expressed in NOVA MAKEDONIJA, entitled "A New Territorial Division," Professor Dr. Vlado Stamenkov as well describes the aspect of the new opstina. He reminds us of the administration of the old opstina: one mayor, two scribes, a secretary, a registrar, a mailman, a courier, and a cashier. Adding to them a few specialists in communal-urbanization problems would complete the structure.

In order to perform a "lobotomy" of the future Macedonian communal system, it would be best to best to analyze the criteria to be applied in determining which area is and which is not mature enough to manage its local affairs. It is a question of five conditions—of which no more than two—should be met by the candidate for local self-government, according to Dr. Panov. The first sets the number of settlements that would be combined within an opstina. The number should be no less than ten. This stipulation can be met by the Gostivar competitors Cegrane and Vrapciste, toward which some 30 villages near the Sara and Suva Gora mountains gravitate, or nearly 40,000 people. Another one is the Bosavo-Rozden area, located in the southern parts of the Kavadarci Opstina, with 21 registered villages. At present, however, only 12 of the 21 show any life, concentrated in five of them. The total population there does not exceed 600. This indicates that the area fails to satisfy the second prerequisite for establishing an opstina: the size of the population. The approved figure should be no fewer than 2,000 (and not exceeding 20,000) people. The golden middle should be between 5,000 and 7,000. The ideal example in this case is the future (and former) Kosel Opstina, which would incorporate the villages along the road from the Djavato Pass to Ohrid (Dolni Lakocerej, Gorni Lakocerej, Kosel, Vapila, Sirula, Leskoec, etc.). This area not only has the necessary critical mass of people (7,000) but is also ideally spread. It covers some 400 square kilometers, this meeting the third prerequisite concerning the size of the future opstinas, which should be between 100 and 500 square kilometers. The fourth criterion—a total of 2,000 hectares of arable land will present no difficulty, for there is hardly an opstina that would be unable to meet it. Mariovo, for example, totals 18,000 hectares, but only half of one percent is first-grade soil. Most of the remaining soil consists of uncultivated terrain and pasture land.

The final prerequisite is for the area of the future opstina to constitute a rounded-up entity containing the necessary infrastructural and other facilities. Most likely, this will not pose a problem for the newly hatched townspeople. Mr. Gerasimov, from the Statistical Institute, says that by virtue of its geography, Macedonia has already become divided into approximately the same number of areas, and all that is necessary is to verify what nature itself has accomplished. In that sense, literally all claimants boast of their village as being super-equipped, with an "opstina house, electricity, road and water systems, and a soccer field." Frequently, they also have telephones. This especially applies to the rich Skopje, Bitola and Prilep villages and places which are looked upon as towns. This applies, for example, to Demir Kapija, Bogdanci, Gradsko, Pehcevo, Makedonska Kamenica, and the small but tourist-developed Dojran and Mavrovo.

It is already clear that villages will predominate among the new opstinas. The existing cities will retain the status (Skopje will be a city including the existing opstinas). This will ease the burden of suburban and rural settlements. A typical example in this case is Gostivar, which has requested permission to administer its immediate city surroundings only. The probable reason is the difficulties that the opstina has had in caring for distant settlements, such as, for instance, Galic, Rekan, etc. The case of Stip, "the most citified" opstina in the country, with an urban population exceeding 90 percent (the Macedonian share being 58.7 percent) clearly proves what happens when the communal authorities no longer worry about the surrounding villages.

It is possible to say, therefore, that the majority of the 129 candidates will meet the requirements of forming local self-governing units. However, are such requirements truly inspired by the good intentions of reviving the abandoned areas, or are they motivated by different intentions? Dr. Novica Veljanovski, from the National History Institute, cautions that in this area one frequently detects exaggerations, "rivalries among units and groups, personal ambitions, careeristic motivations, and others." Consider the Strumica case. Within its opstina territory, Novo Selo includes Mokrievo and Turnovo, which too would like to be independent communes. Turnovo has laid a claim, on Bosilevo, while Bosilevo is claiming Turnovo. As to careerism and the advancement of individuals, personally we are convinced that a great proportion of the promoters of specific initiatives, following an eventually positive resolution of their claims, can imagine occupying the chairmanship chairs. In this case, we must take equally into account the political aspects of the future territorial division (which, luckily, for the time being these aspects are not being emphasized). The division in the ethnically mixed areas of western Macedonia may lead to the further ghettoization of the minority or an increase in the majority population. The impression is that it is precisely the ethnic aspect that will be one of the more serious tests in gauging the success of this model.

The two commissions working on the new division of the Macedonian space are due to present soon a unified proposal which must quickly be considered by the state. According to the executive authorities, the proposition should reach the National Assembly sometime toward the end of the spring. According to the plan, the Law on Territorial Division should be passed by June. Followed by local elections?

FYROM: PDP Demands Agreement on Territorial Division

AU2708162696 Skopje MIC in English 26 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The last government session did not bring the expected draft-law on the Law on territorial division of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], although last Monday [19 August] the ministers discussed exactly this draft proposal, today's edition of NOVA MAKEDONIJA comments. The newspaper says that according to all announcements the draft-law will reach Parliament soon.

The reason why the government has still not determined the new municipal map of the country is that the representatives of the Albanian parties insist on certain changes to the proposed territorial division of 11 municipalities. They are saying that without the adoption of the proposed changes, they will not back the government's proposal.

"Our main remarks deal with a couple of regions in Western Macedonia, particularly the solutions that are offered for the current municipalities of Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, Kicevo, and Skopje," says Mersim Polozani from PDP, Deputy Minister of Justice. "We feel that this kind of territorial division disrupts a certain established rhythm in the life of the population, it disrupts some relations, that is, the ratio of the figures of representation of the inhabitants according to the national basis in the newly-drawn municipalities, which will have a serious reflection on the formation of the electoral units, and thus, the course and results of the local, and then, the future parliamentary elections," said Polozani.

FYROM: Government Discusses Territorial Division

AU2708173996 Skopje MIC in English 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] feels that the minimum of its requests in relation to the new territorial division of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] have literally been realized and that there is no need for additional activities for realizing its goals, the head of the PDP parliamentary group and member of the party leadership, Ismet Ramadani told DNEVNIK.

In effect, a couple of "controversial questions" remain, Ramadani explains, adding that he believes they will not represent an obstacle to the adoption of the law and the determination of the future political map of Macedonia. In order to settle these problems, it was decided at the last session of the party leadership in Tetovo, which was also attended by the presidents of the branches in the towns, whose division, according to PDP is disputable, to engage the ministers from this party in the Macedonian government. The government was in session yesterday, and as DNEVNIK has unofficially learned, the key issue at this session was precisely the territorial division, as a necessary condition for holding the upcoming local elections.

"We are more convinced that we will reach an agreement rather that we will not reach an agreement over the remaining open questions," Ramadani said, answering the question in regard to PDP's future activities in the event its minimal requests are not fulfilled. Mersim Polozani, member of the PDP presidency and Deputy Minister of Justice, stated for DNEVNIK yesterday that one more meeting with the coalition partners is necessary, as many undefined municipalities remain. Cities with a majority Albanian population are in question here, in which, as he told DNEVNIK, the aim is to influence the structure of the electorate in the future electoral units. The territorial division, according to Polozani, will represent an "exceptionally important, maybe even final test" for the coalition partners. Nevertheless, as Polozani stated yesterday, "it will be necessary to lower the ball a little during the holding of the government session," that is the results of the debate in the government have to be seen.

The head of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] parliamentary group Ljubomir Popovski, who attended last week's talks between the coalition partners, in relation to this question, categorically dismissed the possibility of holding some kind of new meeting between the parties from the coalition (PDP on one and SDSM and Socialist Party on the other side).

Popovski says he is amazed by the statements of some of the PDP leaders, that a new meeting has to be held for coordinating the stances over the future territorial division. "What has been agreed also remains and there is no more discussion over that," Popovski is categorical.

Poland: Miller Supports Clinton, Views Coalition

WS2808100096 Warsaw Radio RMF FM in Polish 0605 GMT 28 Aug 96

[Interview with Minister Leszek Miller, chief of the Office of the Polish Council of Ministers, by Konrad Piasecki at the Office of the Cabinet of Ministers in Warsaw on the "Guest of Radio RMF FM Morning Program"—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Piasecki] You have returned from the United States, where you attended the Democratic Party convention. How much truth is there in the statement that it is solely due to your support that Bill Clinton will receive the Democratic Party's nomination? [as heard]

[Leszek] This is not the entire truth, of course. However, frankly speaking, I would be happy if Bill Clinton won the presidential election in November. Judging by what I have heard regarding the Democratic Party's program, this option would be very attractive. Certain provisions of that program are close to what we are trying to do in Poland.

[Piasecki] However, there is a popular opinion that a Democrat in the post of U.S. President is not very good for Poland. Republican presidents usually did good things for East European countries. They defeated communism and may accept us into NATO. Bill Clinton does not make these kinds of declarations.

[Miller] Speaking about the past, we should keep in mind that it was an entirely different epoch. In fact, only now the U.S. Administration, both current and future, is faced with great challenges. Naturally, I touched upon the issue [of Poland's admission to NATO], and pointed out to my counterparts that, given that Mr. Dole had made very serious and far-reaching declarations regarding Poland's membership in NATO, Polish-American voters—who have not made up their minds on how they will vote—will surely listen with great attention to Bill Clinton's speeches, expecting that the U.S. President will make a similar declaration. Perhaps this kind of declaration will persuade those who still have doubts about voting for Clinton.

[Piasecki] Did your counterparts pledge that this kind of declaration will be made in Clinton's Thursday [29 August] speech at the Democratic Party convention?

[Miller] My counterparts primarily pointed out that for obvious reasons the weight of a president's words is different from that of a candidate's words. At the same time, they suggested that perhaps on Thursday—particularly since the convention is being held in Chicago, which has a large Polish community—or during the later stage of the presidential campaign in the United States Bill Clinton will make a statement about Poland's NATO aspirations.

[Piasecki] You have said that the Democratic Party's prgram appeals to you. Is this a statement on behalf of the SdRP [Socialist Democracy of the Polish Republic], the Polish Government, or your personal impression?

[Miller] This is definitely not the standpoint of the Polish Government. The governmento should keep equidistant from each of the two major political groups in the United States. As for the SdRP, I can say that from the perspective of our party's program, the Democratic Party's program is undoubtedly much closer to us than that of the Republican Party.

[Piasecki] Thus, those who see a certain analogy between Bill Clinton and Aleksander Kwasniewski are not all that wrong. Once we have touched upon the foreign policy field.... You were not in Poland when your party colleagues staged a news conference on Sunday and harshly criticized the opposition Foreign Policy Council established by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, and others. Why does this council irritate you so much?

[Miller] Perhaps it is not so much the council itself which irritates us as its first declarations and statements. I think that only people with ill will can claim that Poland's foreign policy is in a stalemate and that the West has grounds to criticize it. Nothing of the kind. On the contrary, I think that Poland is in a much better situation today than it was two years ago. Undoubtedly, we are closer to NATO and to European structures at this point. Thus, what irritates us most is that despite these facts, opposition politicians and politicians who implemented Poland's foreign policy in the recent past express opinions that have no relation to reality.

[Piasecki] The aforementioned stalemate can be observed in situations such as when the newly appointed Polish ambassador to Belarus stated that Poland is situated between the Odra and the Bug rivers [as heard]. It was not a slip of the tongue, because this was the wording used in the text of her speech.

[Miller] I do not know anything about this particular case, but I would rather regard it as a simple slip of the tongue.

[Piasecki] Coalition talks will be resumed at the Parkowa Street hotel today after a one-week recess. Do you think a breakthrough of some kind will be made?

[Miller] Perhaps. We will continue the discussion of ways of making changes in the government. It may turn out today, after the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] and the SLD [Socialist Left Alliance] exchange their experts' appraisals, that one of the two options has been accepted. As you know, there are two of them. One is to hold a constructive vote of no confidence and the other is to undertake a replacement of ministers suggested by the prime minister and approved by the president.

[Piasecki] Could you tell us, the ordinary people, why the PSL so strongly insists on a constructive vote of no confidence, while the SLD would prefer a gentle replacement of ministers? What are the real stakes in this game?

[Miller] From the PSL's viewpoint, there are two reasons. First, they fear that Prime Minister Cimoszewicz will receive the president's consent and make personnel changes in the government, disregarding the PSL's opinion.

[Piasecki] Thus, they fear that noblemen will reach agreement and peasants will be defeated in the open field?

[Miller] Perhaps this is what they think. Naturally, there are no grounds for this. Theoretically, this is doable. However, the coalition agreement envisions prior political consultations, and I do not believe that that option can be seriously taken into account. Nevertheless, this fear has been planted in the minds of our PSL colleagues. Also, there is another reason. In my opinion, they would like to eliminate the president's role. This was understandable in similar situations of this kind, when we had to deal with Lech Walesa who, mildly speaking, did not support the coalition. But there is no need for this now. Finally, there is the third reason, probably forgotten by our PSL colleagues. Namely, new regulations will come into effect on 1 October in accordance with which the government's resignation will be accompanied by the resignation of all deputy ministers, voivods, and deputy voivods. Therefore, more and more often my SLD colleagues express the opinion that from this perspective, the idea of holding a constructive vote of no confidence is tempting since this would mean that voivods and deputy voivods would be reevaluated. Given that the PSL decisively dominates in this field, the SLD would have an opportunity to somewhat weaken this domination. Those are more or less the fears haunting our PSL partners. Therefore, they insist on a vote of no confidence.

Poland: Rosati Defends Prospective Russian, Belarusian Envoys

LD2708184696 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission has approved the candidacy of Andrzej Zalucki for the post of Poland's ambassador to Moscow and the candidacy of Ewa Spychalska [chairwoman of the National Trade Union Alliance] to Belarus. Both candidacies were met with vehement protest from opposition deputies.

Piotr Nowina-Konopka from the Freedom Union [UW—main opposition party] raised the issue of the lack of diplomatic experience and qualifications in the case of Spychalska and the issue of Zalucki's past. Prior to 1990, Zalucki worked in the foreign department of the Polish United Workers' Party [PZPR] Central Committee.

[Begin Nowina-Konopka recording] It has turned out that even [former communist leader] comrade Gierek could now become Poland's ambassador, an ambassador of the Third Republic, to anywhere. A longtime employee who reached the position of a PZPR Central Committee foreign department instructor can now be appointed ambassador to an important country despite the fact that relations with that country are of crucial importance to Poland. [end recording]

[Foreign] Minister Rosati maintained that the candidate's past was of no significance. What is important is how he will be received in the country of destination and whether he is capable of representing Polish interests. According to the minister, today's discussion within the commission went beyond the assessment of the candidates' qualifications and referred to matters linked to history and political divisions.

[Begin Rosati recording] I was not surprised by the controversy the candidates had aroused. However, I was surprised by the vehemence of the discussion. Sometimes I felt that there was a lack of impartial assessment of the candidates' qualifications. Instead, too much time was devoted to general political judgements. But the Sejm commission, of course, has the power and sovereignty to discuss any subject in the manner it sees fit. [end recording]

The ambassadorial candidacies must also be approved by the president.

Poland: Military Prosecutor Revokes Kuklinski Arrest Warrant

LD2708124196 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1146 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 27 August—The Warsaw Military District Prosecutor's Office has revoked the decision on the temporary arrest of Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski and withdrawn the warrant for his arrest, the press officer for the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office, Colonel Wlodzimierz Pospiech, reported today.

This means that Kuklinski could come to Poland without fear of being arrested immediately after crossing the border.

After the Supreme Court's revocation of the sentence of 25 years' imprisonment last year, the former high-ranking officer of the Polish Army General Staff, who, among other things, warned U.S. intelligence of the plans to impose martial law in Poland, is still formally suspected of treason and desertion. He has been living in the United States since he fled from Poland 15 years ago.

Romania: Melescanu on Basic Treaty Talks, Conciliation

AU2708203596 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Aug 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Sandor Blaga; place and date not given: "The Treaty Serves Mutual Interests"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In the opinion of Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, the basic treaty is a sensible compromise. In an interview with NEPSZABADSAG, he explains that the completion of the document's text is only one step, albeit rather an important one, on the road to an historic conciliation between the two peoples. Melescanu, who is on holiday, just as he was at the time when the document's text was being finalized, trusts that everyone will soon be satisfied with the treaty, because they will understand that it opens up new prospects for relations and can also give a boost to the two countries' integration goals.*

[Blaga] Were you surprised that the talks were restarted in your absence?

[Melescanu] No, I was not, because last week's talks in Bucharest had partly been facilitated by an exchange of letters between myself and Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs. Therefore, I played a role in the process even during my holiday. Actually, the location of my holiday can also be said to be significant because I was in Covasna, where I found a favorable basis for the bilateral talks.

[Blaga] Were you called back to Bucharest during the talks between Ferenc Somogyi and Marcel Dinu [state secretaries]? Or did you have some kind of consultations with President Iliescu and Mr. Dinu during the talks?

[Melescanu] I was called up a few times, but I thought that the talks were progressing well, as they had been ever since the Horn government came into office. After the initial spectacular achievements, we had a period of stagnation; after overcoming this, we have now arrived at finalizing the text of the treaty. I have not had any consultations with Mr. Dinu, as he had his mandate from the government, which the president and the prime minister had coordinated with the leaders of the political parties. Therefore, he had a proper and clear mandate.

[Blaga] How was the expert negotiating team's report received at the 23 August government session?

[Melescanu] I myself submitted the report. The government unanimously accepted it and agreed that the basic treaty should be signed as soon as possible.

[Blaga] Did the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], the coalition partner, also agree with the finished text? Party Chairman Funar has been making contrary statements for days.

[Melescanu] Transport Minister Novac, representing them, also spoke in agreement. The PUNR and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania have also made some critical remarks in recent days, but I would like to emphasize that these are political statements. At the session, the stance of the Romanian Government was presented.

[Blaga] How does the opposition approach the issue? I am mainly thinking of the Democratic Convention.

[Melescanu] The issue will be brought before the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee early in the week and President Iliescu is planning to convene the leaders of parliamentary parties on 29 or 30 August, and the opposition's view will become clear after this. From the statements made so far, it seems that the basic treaty also enjoys broad support from the Democratic Convention.

[Blaga] According to Romanian plans, in what diplomatic form can the signing take place? Gyula Horn said that he is equally willing to sign in Budapest, Bucharest, or in a third place. Does President Iliescu also hold the same view?

[Melescanu] After this coordination, we consider the text prepared by the experts ready for signing. We hope that the signing can take place as early as the beginning of September. I have not discussed this with the president, but the stance of the government and the prime minister at our 23 August session was similar to that of the Hungarian prime minister. However, apart from the theoretical possibilities, we would be happy if Bucharest could host the event.

[Blaga] Is the Romanian side worried that, after the signing, the Hungarian side will make the signing of the other two documents in progress, which the Romanian side is urging, the political agreement and statement on historic reconciliation and the conciliation and partnership agreement dependent on implementing the stipulations of the basic treaty?

[Melescanu] I have no such doubts. In my view, the proposal initiated last year by President Iliescu and supported by the Hungarian leadership is part of the process of historic conciliation in which the basic treaty is an important, but not the only element. In the course of our talks, we have not found such conditions. If we accept that there is a common will for an historic conciliation, then it logically follows that this has to be advanced as soon as possible. I believe that all our achievements contribute to conciliation and things do not need to be made dependent on conditions because this can easily lead to a vicious circle. I hope that the basic treaty and the whole conciliation process will soon find broad support in both countries.

Romania: Iliescu Aide Rejects 'Aggressive' Opposition 'Campaign'

AU2708194896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 27 Aug 96

[Statement by Marian Enache, member of Romanian President Ion Iliescu's electoral staff, in Bucharest on 27 August—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lately, by means of the mass media, an aggressive campaign is being waged against Mr. Ion Iliescu's officially registering as a candidate for Romania's presidency. In connection with these aspects, I have been authorized to state the following:

This campaign is an obvious attempt to prevent Mr. Ion Iliescu from running for the presidency. Furthermore, by means of speculative and confusing allegations, which is the manifestation of excessive politicking, an attempt is being made to create suspicion regarding the legitimacy of Mr. Ion Iliescu's running in the 3 November elections with the clear intent to influence the electoral ballot.

Such positions make us believe that the genuine reason behind such speculations is the fear of certain opponent candidates to engage in an open and correct electoral battle. The way and the arguments by which they contest the legitimacy of Mr. Ion Iliescu's candidacy are apt to exert unacceptable pressure on the electorate, as well as on the legally empowered institutions set up to organize the elections and resolve possible legally founded objections.

The excess of their imperative tone, as well as their stubborn reiteration of certain points of view that tend to make culpable one part of the electorate, may affect the free expression of the vote, as well as the normal functioning of the democratic mechanism. As an example we would like to recall the out-of-place assertions, of an intimidating nature, made by a certain electoral campaign director, who publicly claimed that those who vote for Iliescu would become accomplices to fraud. Similarly unacceptable are the appeals and even warnings addressed to certain personalities, opinion leaders, as well as heads of political parties and other bodies of civil society, calling them to involve themselves to contest Mr. Ion Iliescu's candidacy.

Essentially, we consider that the transfer into the plane of political tensions of certain issues underlying exclusively the authority of the Constitutional Court, the sole body able to decide on possible litigious aspects regarding the presidential elections, instead of strengthening institutional authority and supporting the democratic process in Romania, tends to become a disturbing factor and the expression of lack of respect for our legal institutions as well as juridical order in the rule-of-law state.

With respect to any kind of objections, Mr. Ion Iliescu intends to submit himself to the authority of the institutions authorized to decide on technical-juridical aspects of his candidacy, without, however, intending to give in to malevolent and interest-driven pressure exerted by certain persons who are engaged in the presidential race or belong to their supporter groups.

Romania: CDR Leader Constantinescu Denies Being Monarchist

AU2708120796 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 22 Aug 96 p 17

[Interview with CDR President Emil Constantinescu by Aura Titiriga; place and date not given: "I Am Running for the Presidency, So I Cannot Be a Monarchist"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Titiriga] Professor, first I would like to ask you whether the interview [for an American paper] was recorded....

[Constantinescu] I talked with thousands of people in America. I granted hundreds of interviews and there were cameras in the car. Everybody was taking pictures of me. Thus, at one point there were scores of cameras and scores of voice recorders and everybody was recording. However, journalists in America take notes. It is important that I know what I am saying. And in any event, I have an assistant who was taking notes of everything that I was saying.

[Titiriga] Can I assume that here in Romania we failed to receive correct information about what you said in America?

[Constantinescu] That interview was published in America a month ago. Being busy with electoral campaign preparations, I did not follow what was happening with all the interviews that I gave in America, because, otherwise, I would have noticed the inadvertence in the respective interview. I realize that others have followed my interviews with selective vigilance. The reprinting of that particular interview one month after it was published clearly shows that this was done with an electoral purpose.

[Titiriga] Are you a monarchist or not?

[Constantinescu] I am running for the Presidency of Romania, which, according to the Constitution is a republic. Hence, I cannot be a monarchist.

[Titiriga] Then how will you be able to hand over power to the king if you win the presidential elections? Will there be a referendum on the Constitution?

[Constantinescu] Once elected, there is no question of my handing over power to anybody. During my mandate, several referendums might be held on various issues. Through them, the nation will express its sovereign will, which I, as president, am obliged to respect. If, as a result of such a referendum initiated by Parliament or other means provided by the Constitution, the majority of Romania's citizens were to decide through two successive referendums to change Romania's form of state, I would be compelled to comply. If the will of the Romanian people alone can change Romania's form of state, where does the panic regarding the possible act of a presidential candidate or of an elected president to undermine the form of state come from?

[Titiriga] I cannot believe that you did not expect such attacks now or in the election campaign....

[Constantinescu] I said that...I would be hypocritical if I said that I am surprised. When I decided to run for the presidency I knew very well what to expect. I was perhaps the most frequently attacked person in Romania. [passage omitted]

[Titiriga] Why is the position of the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] on the monarchy not defined in the contract with Romania?

[Constantinescu] There are no monarchist parties in the CDR. This issue was discussed by the Executive Committee at its meeting on Tuesday, 20 August, which examined the stupid accusations that the Party of Social Democracy of Romania [PDSR] rushed to make. In the parties that belong to the CDR, there are some people with monarchist views and others with republican views. In fact, they reflect the positions of Romania's citizens. The rudimentary way in which the issues of nationalized dwellings, the monarchy, most-favored-nation status, and national security are mixed in the PDSR communique is an insult to Romania's citizens, and it positions the PDSR in this tiring area of the issues ventilated in the 1990-92 campaign. Moreover, one can see that the problems confronting the PDSR are different from those confronting Romania's citizens. [passage omitted]

[Titiriga] From an electoral viewpoint, was the publication of this interview positive or negative for you?

[Constantinescu] I believe that your question requires a more thorough answer than a simple electoral accounting. On the one hand, it should be clear to everybody that Romania's president must be the president of all Romanians. This means that he must listen to everyone's viewpoint and create a framework for dialogue in which every democratic opinion, even if it belongs to a minority group, can be expressed and, at the end of this dialogue, he accepts the will of the majority and promotes its options. On the other hand, we should never mix up the election excitement and election propaganda with people's options. I spend most of my time traveling through the country, I talk to tens and maybe thousands of people who are not interested at all in these disputes. People are interested in the poverty in which they live, prices, lack of social assistance, unemployment, corruption, and the robbery in this country and not in this sort of dispute. I believe that if the PDSR continues to divert attention from the country's problems, it will err seriously because people are much better informed and this way of approaching issues is just defiance of the Romanian people's intelligence and of their ability to understand the country's real problems.

Romania: Press Reacts to CDR Leader's Stance on Monarchy

AU2708202496

[FBIS Report] Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian on 22 August on page 1 carries an editorial by the newspaper's director Ion Cristoiu, entitled: "The Emil Constantinescu Scandal," dealing with the uproar caused in Romania by an interview allegedly given by Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) to journalist Adrian Munteanu of the U.S. Romanian-language magazine MICRO MAGAZIN during his visit to the United States on 25 July, which was reproduced by JURNALUL NATIONAL on 20 August. In the interview, the CDR leader is quoted as saying that he is a "monarchist" and that one of the first things that he is going to do after being elected president is to "bring King Mihai back home" and "reinstate the historical truth about the institution of monarchy in Romania"; then, after "two referenda" are held, "one on changing the Constitution and the other on a return to the monarchy," he would "like to have the honor of handing over power to the true leader of Romania, His Majesty King Mihai."

The EVENIMENTUL ZILEI editorial doubts the authenticity of the MICRO MAGAZIN interview since "Emil Constantinescu has repeatedly maintained that he is a republican" and wonders "why it was not reproduced in the Romanian press the day after its appearance," but was launched "as a sensationalist bombshell only one month later" at the start of the electoral campaign. Cristoiu concludes that the whole scandal, "rather than being a gaffe by Emil Constantinescu" is actually "a gaffe by the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]," which has "launched demented attacks, reminiscent of the miners' incursions, against the CDR, on the basis of a dubious interview, whose authenticity it did not bother to check." The whole affair will prove to the Romanian public at large that "the ruling party is going to resort in its electoral campaign to the same tactics as in 1992, namely compromising its adversary."

Meanwhile, the progovernment dailies DIMINEATA and VOCEA ROMANIEI of 21, 22, 23, and 24 August devote entire pages to the affair, describing Constantinescu as "a candidate for the monarchy" (DIMINEATA 23 August) or as "a lackey of the former king," who has "insulted the Romanian nation," which "overwhelmingly voted for a republican Constitution." (VOCEA ROMANIEI 22 August). In their 21 August issue, these newspapers give pride of place to a news conference held by PDSR President Adrian Nastase on 20 August, who said that Constantinescu's statements "disqualify" him as a serious contender for the presidency and even put in question "the country's national security in the event that the CDR becomes the government," because, in his opinion, this formation, together with its leader, was prepared to encroach upon the Constitution without the citizens' accord.

Under the headline "Puppet With a Key," the key being the CDR's electoral emblem, the strongly antimonarchist independent daily ADEVARUL on 21 August carries a 1,000-word editorial by Cristian Tudor Popescu saying that "it is more than an abuse, it is a crime to accredit the idea that the hundreds of young people murdered during the December 1989 revolution gave their lives so that Mr. Mihai [the former king] should be installed in Peles or Cotroceni Palace." The affair even prompted Petre Roman, a likely postelectoral ally of the CDR, president of the Democratic Party (PD), and the presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Union (USD), to issue an "Open Letter" to Ion Diaconescu, president of the main CDR member party, the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (PNTCD), published by EVENIMENTUL ZILEI on 23 August on page 2, saying, among other things: "I believe that I ought to point out that the USD will not participate in any alliance that includes political parties or leaders who wish to initiate in or outside Parliament actions intended to alter the form of government in Romania. Furthermore, as the USD candidate for the Romanian presidency, I consider that fidelity to the republic is the very first precondition for loyalty to one's state and citizens."

ROMANIA LIBERA on 23 August carries on page 3 certain "clarifications" by the journalist Adrian Munteanu, the author of the interview in MICRO MAGAZIN, who admits that he "retouched" Constantinescu's statements so as to make them "more palatable" to the magazine's readers, who are "Romaninians from the diaspora." Munteanu adds: "Had I written what Mr. Constantinescu said, namely 'I will respect the people's choice, whatever that may be,' the U.S. Romanians would have thought that he was referring to the choice that the Romanians 'blindly' made back home in 1990 and 1992. Therefore, at my own risk and for the sake of better information, I retouched some of his ideas."

Under the headline "The Emil Constantinescu-Monarchy Diversion Was Initiated by the PDSR and PD," the daily ZIUA on 24 August quotes Constantinescu's aide Dorin Marian, director of the Romanian Foundation for Democracy, who accompanied the CDR leader on his U.S. tour, as saying that the MICRO MAGAZIN interview was "compiled" from answers given during a "meeting with sympathizers from Los Angeles, which is on film." According to the daily, the video cassette with the recording of the meeting was presented at a news conference in Bucharest on 23 August. It contained "the full passage incriminated by the PDSR and PD leaders except for the CDR president's statement that he is a monarchist. Without any noticeable cuts in the film, Emil Constantinescu is seen talking with respect about the monarchy, but there was no word at all about him being a monarchist." On the contrary, the tape shows Constantinescu beginning his statement with a warning: "It would be a great danger if the monarchy issue were used in the election campaign."

ROMANIA LIBERA on 24 August carries on page 1 an article entitled "The Vulgar Attack Against Emil Constantinescu Is a Diversionist Maneuver by the Authorities," which sums up a news conference given by Remus Opris, PNTCD vice president and director of the CDR electoral campaign, on 23 August. Opris is quoted as saying that "Emil Constantinescu gave no interview to MICRO MAGAZIN" and that "the published text, as its author himself later admitted, is a compilation of answers given by the CDR president at a meeting with his supporters in the United States." The article then cites Radu Buroianu, vice president of the National Liberal Party (PNL), as saying that "the text of the interview, which is full of omissions and awkwardnesses, is an obvious diversion by the left" and is "highly unlikely to fool the people."

Constantinescu himself, in an interview published by JURNALUL NATIONAL on 22 August on page 17 under the headline "I Am Running for the Presidency, So I Cannot Be a Monarchist," denies having said that he was a monarchist in any of the interviews that he gave in the United States. "I granted hundreds of interviews and there were cameras in the car. Everybody was taking pictures of me. Thus, at one point, there were scores of cameras and scores of tape recorders and everybody was recording." However, he does admit that "being busy with election campaign preparations, I did not follow what was happening in all the interviews that I gave in America, because, otherwise, I would have noticed the inadvertence in the interview in question."

Of course, the progovernmental press reacted promptly to the disclaimers of the CDR camp, with such articles as "The CDR Leaders Are Desperately Trying To Give 'Republican' Emil Constantinescu a Clean Bill of Health" (DIMINEATA 24 August, page 2) and "Caught in Flagrante Delicto, Emil Constantinescu and His People Are Launching Operation 'Wiping Out the Traces'" (DIMINEATA 24 August, page 1) or "Mr. Diaconescu and the Ostrich Tactics" (VOCEA ROMANIEI 24 August, pages 1, 2]. Referring to the various meetings with the press "feverishly organized by the opposition in recent days," DIMINEATA reaches the inevitable conclusion that "the attempts to exculpate Constantinescu have ended in a lamentable fiasco."

Only King Mihai "is reiterating his position of impartiality on all aspects of the country's political life," according to a communique issued by the "Press Bureau of His Majesty King Mihai," reproduced in ROMANIA LIBERA of 23 August on page 3. After pointing out that "all the principles of the Romanian constitutional monarchy and the means for its implementation have been presented in detail by His Majesty on various occasions," the royal message concludes as follows: "His Majesty rules out any comment on this subject, particularly at such a complex political time as that of the elections. His Majesty King Mihai considers that Romania's main responsibility is to have free and democratic elections and thus, ensure a durable government in the future."

Romania: Cernavoda's Nuclear Safety Features Discussed

AU2708150196 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 23 Aug 96 p 17

[Interview with Anton Coroianu, state inspector and head of the Nuclear Protection State Inspectorate, by Cristina Neamtu and Cezar Marin; place and date not given: "A Catastrophe in Kozloduy Would Affect Craiova, While a Catastrophe at the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Station Would Not Be Felt 1 Meter Outside the Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [JURNALUL NATIONAL] As it is known, work is currently fully under way to render the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Station [CNEC] operational. What stage has been reached and when do you expect it to reach its nominal output?

[Coroianu] Currently they are completing tests to render the CNEC's Unit 1 operational. They are about to conclude the final tests. From 19 to 24 August, the National Commission for Control Over Nuclear Activity [CNCAN] within the Ministry of Waters, Forests, and Environmental Protection, on the basis of the results of these tests, is to issue a permit for the power output to be increased to 75 percent [of the nominal value], following which, also on the basis of further test results, the CNCAN is to authorize an increase in output to reach the nominal value.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] How much of our country's electricity needs are to be covered by the CNEC?

[Coroianu] According to the schedule of the RENEL [Romanian Electric Power Authority] and the AECL [expansion unknown], and the Ansaldo Consortium (AAC), nominal output is to be reached by the beginning of September. It is then that Unit 1 of the CNEC will reach an output of 360 megawatts. For the sake of comparison, this is half of the electricity output delivered to our national grid by the Iron Gates hydroelectric plant. As a matter of fact, Unit 1 of the CNEC has already become the largest electricity producing unit in the national power grid, as it exceeds the output of the 315-megawatt power stations. To answer your question, the CNEC is to cover 7-8 percent of our country's electricity needs.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] As you know, public opinion is closely watching the issues related to nuclear power stations. What can you tell us about the warning system in place at Unit 1 if emergency situations should occur at the CNEC?

[Coroianu] I think that it is quite normal for public opinion to devote special attention to the way in which nuclear power stations are run, especially after the 1986 nuclear catastrophe at Chernobyl. This is why it is particularly important that both the organizations running the CNEC and the bodies controlling the observance of nuclear safety regulations, that is, the RENEL and the CNCAN, should correctly and promptly report on the performance of the plant, including any possible emergencies that might occur. As a matter of fact, the CNCAN authorization to render Unit 1 operational includes very precise regulations regarding their duties to report such events and the holder of the permit is compelled to observe them very strictly. Past practice and experience in countries with advanced nuclear power technology, such as Canada, the United States, and some EU countries, have been adopted by Romania as well, including those aspects referring to public information. Romania, with its specialized body, which is the CNCAN, has also implemented the

International Nuclear Events Scale (INES) devised by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in Vienna. This scale classifies nuclear events according to an eight-point scale from 0 to 7, depending on the implications that various events might have. The Chernobyl accident, for instance, was classified as grade 7. However, the vast majority of events reported to the IAEA by its member countries do not exceed grade 0 or do not even reach that, remaining off the scale. The IAEA promptly informs the CNCAN about all events occurring throughout the world, using the INES scale. We, in turn, are compelled to inform the IAEA and the public about any event that occurs at the nuclear facilities and equipment in Romania.

In connection with the incident that took place on 3 August in Cernavoda—I am referring to the "freon gas container" case [exposed to direct sunlight, a container burst open in the CNEC yard]—I think that it is a convincing example for the biased way in which communiques issued by authorized public bodies can be interpreted and even distorted. Using the CNCAN communiques as a basis, which correctly and promptly informed the public, the facts were interpreted differently and even distorted by the press. While the communiques pointed out that the incident had nothing whatsoever to do with the nuclear safety of the equipment and that there was absolutely no danger, the news circulated by the mass media had a taste of "sensation." As far as we are concerned, I can reassure the public that in the future the CNCAN will continue to report, promptly and correctly, on all events that take place at nuclear facilities in Romania, including the CNEC, as stipulated by the international conventions and treaties of which Romania is a signatory.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Can you give us any details about the nuclear safety norms at Unit 1 of the CNEC?

[Coroianu] On this subject, both the RENEL and the CNCAN have presented on various occasions the safety performance of the first Romanian nuclear power station. Therefore, I will merely sum up its principal characteristics. Above all it has to be mentioned that the CNEC was designed, located, built, and rendered operational in accordance with international standards and the guidelines of the Vienna-based IAEA and it incorporates the experience accumulated in Canada, Argentina, the Republic of Korean, and the United States, all countries working with advanced nuclear power technology that which are acknowledged for high security standards at their nuclear stations. Our plant is equipped with a CANDU-type reactor, one that is fueled by natural uranium and cooled and modulated by means of heavy water. Similar reactors are currently operating and being exploited for their high power output in Canada (at Point Lepreau and Gentilly 2), in Argentina (at Embalse), and in the Republic of Korea (at Wolsung.) The CNEC is actually a Romanian copy of the Canadian Point Lepreau plant, which ranks first among the top 10 nuclear power stations in terms of their utilization factor. The CNEC represents the safest and most modern nuclear plant in the entire Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the CIS.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] What are the main features of these CANDU reactors?

[Coroianu] One of the characteristic features of the CANDU-type reactors is their high safety levels in operation, which are ensured by the way in which they are conceived, designed, built, and rendered operational, and their operating procedures. By the way in which they are conceived and manufactured, such nuclear reactors observe the principle of the in-depth protection, as well as that of multiple barriers to stop escaping radioactivity. There are four special nuclear safety systems and many other support systems in place to shut down the reactor rapidly and securely, as well as to keep its power strictly correlated with the level of the energy evacuation capacity, be it under normal or abnormal running circumstances or in case of accidents. Furthermore, there are also auxiliary systems, which ensure the necessary electricity and act as reactor cooling source in cases of emergency.

Unit 1 has two command rooms, a principal and a secondary (reserve) one, which allows for the operators to continue with their duties under any foreseeable emergency circumstances. Unit 1 is also equipped with two on-line processing computers, one of which is running and a backup one, their task being to ensure the safe running of the energy group. From the seismic point of view, the nuclear plant has been designed, built, and equipped in such a way as to ensure a safe shutdown and surveillance of the shutdown state in case of earthquakes up to 8 degrees on the Richter scale, that is earthquakes much stronger than the one that we experienced in March 1977. The special nuclear safety systems, as well as the support nuclear safety systems, have been designed in such a way as fully to maintain their efficiency in case of earthquakes of the caliber envisaged by the blueprint [aparitia unui cutremur de baza de proiect]. For the entire project they considered the possibility of horizontal accelerations up to 0.2 g [gravity] which could be caused by earthquakes possibly shaking the site. Our complex nuclear safety analyses prove that the protection of the population, personnel, and the environment is fully ensured in all the situations and credible scenarios that have been anticipated. Every aspect of the possible impact of sporadic liquid or gas discharges into the environment, including the Danube River and the Danube-Black Sea Canal, has been examined by Romanian and foreign experts, who have made rigorous impact reports. Their results clearly prove that the level of radioactive waste, as well as that of the liquid and gaseous discharge jets, lies well below national and international standards (they are below 5 percent) and therefore the high-degree protection of the environment, operating personnel, and population is guaranteed.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Could the CNEC be compared, from the safety point of view, to the Kozloduy or Chernobyl nuclear power stations?

[Coroianu] No way. Kozloduy and Chernobyl are not sheath-protected, so the impact of possible accidents is extremely great. A catastrophe in Kozloduy, for instance, would affect Craiova, while a similar accident at Cernavoda would not be felt one meter outside the plant, as the radiation would remain trapped inside the concrete sheaths.

Slovenia: Drnovsek, U.S. Official Discuss NATO Membership

AU2808080696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] During a meeting with Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek, Robert Hunter, permanent U.S. representative to NATO, voiced recognition of the Slovene success in the consolidation of democracy and the market economy and stressed that, as regards the fulfillment of the criteria for NATO membership, Slovenia is on the right track.

Drnovsek repeated that full-fledged membership in NATO is one of Slovenia's strategic goals, for which the country is well prepared.

General (Arne Soli), commander of defense of the Kingdom of Norway, is also visiting Slovenia today. He and Defense Minister Jelko Kacin primarily discussed the development of the Slovene defense forces and army and its harmonization with NATO standards. They also exchanged experiences in the command of multinational units and commands and agreed to strengthen the cooperation between the Slovene and Norwegian armed forces in the realm of expert training.

Slovenia: Kwasniewski, Drnovsek See No Reason for Competition

AU2808073296 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 27 Aug 96

[Report on the statements by Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Tomaz Gerden in Ljubljana on 27 Aug—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gerden] Polish President Kwasniewski assessed highly the contacts between the two countries.

Slovenia and Poland are partners rather that competitors. This is also the case in the economic sphere among CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Agreement] members.

The Polish president stressed similar historic and cultural traits of both nations which are shaping similar views on the problems in the Central Europe and its neighborhood. Mr. Kwasniewski ended his statement with hope that after the elections Dr. Drnovsek will continue to be his partner in talks and his guest in Poland.

Slovene Prime Minister said the following after the talks:

[Drnovsek] With the Polish President, Mr. Kwasniewski we completed very thorough and intensive talks. Poland is the country with which Slovenia has very highly developed and very friendly relations. We established that we have many similar problems and experiences in the transition, that our goals are similar, that we are both serious candidates, the first cadidates for the entry into NATO and the European Union, and that these are the points in which we can cooperate. There is no reason for any sort of competition but the reason for mutual assistance and cooperation.

[Gerden] Dr. Drnovsek stressed that we also had a sound formal basis for the cooperation with Poland within CEFTA.

The Polish president afterward toured Ljubljana and was also received by Ljubljana Mayor, Dr. Rupel. Tomorrow he will continue his official visit to our country with the talks with the representatives of the State Chamber and the business.

Slovenia: Kucan Says State, Poland Have Similar Interests

AU2708161196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski has arrived for an official visit to Slovenia today. The delegation, which also consists of some Polish Government members, was first received by President Milan Kucan. After the talks, the two presidents made statements for the public. Here is a report by Tomaz Gerden:

[Begin recording] Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski gave thanks for the invitation and said that he and President Kucan had already met in Paris, Lancut, and Atlanta this year. Poland was viewing favorably the strengthening of cooperation between the two countries and also supported Slovenia's membership of CEFTA [the Central European Free Trade Association].

The presidents also discussed the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They would maintain permanent consultations on the problems connected with entry into the EU and NATO. They would also be signing several agreements on cooperation between the interior ministries. President Kwasniewski invited our president to visit Poland.

President Kucan assessed the Polish-Slovene relations as follows:

[Kucan] It is evident that Poland and Slovenia at the moment have many joint interests and also very similar ambitions, be it as over internal developments or the international situation. This means that they are also encountering similar problems and difficulties in realizing these ambitions. In the light of this, it can be understood why our cooperation has intensified so much over the past few years and especially this year. This year alone we have signed six agreements, which together with the agreements that are to be signed now, will total nine agreements. Many of our ministers and officials at other levels have also met this year.

[Gerden] The Polish delegation, headed by President Kwasniewski, subsequently also met with Prime Minister Drnovsek. They primarily discussed economic issues, on which we will be reporting more extensively in the evening newscast. [end recording]

Slovenia: Oman To Enter Politics as Independent Candidate

AU2808084796 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 24 Aug 96 p 4

[Interview with Nicholas Oman by Andrej Brstovsek in Bled; date not given: "I Am Now Moving Into Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bled, 24 August—As of a few days ago, Nicholas A. Oman is no longer the honorary consul of the Republic of Liberia to Slovenia. He said that this decision was unexpected, but that he is now free to do as he wishes. He will run in the elections as an independent candidate. The notorious documents on arms trading during the time of gaining independence will probably remain locked up for a while longer. [passage omitted]

[Brstovsek] And you are now considering a move into politics?

[Oman] Yes, I am moving into politics, as I can see that there is no other possibility than for me to do so. Although politics is what I hate most, I will now have to deal with it.

[Brstovsek] Even before the elections?

[Oman] That is so.

[Brstovsek] Have you already decided on how you will run?

[Oman] As an independent candidate. However, I will support those parties that are most honest.

[Brstovsek] Which option are you closest to?

[Oman] Why am I running as an independent candidate? Because I think that I have been banished and punished by this government to such an extent that it is now time for me to ask the people, the common Slovenes, what they think about this matter. The best way for me to do this is by running as an independent candidate. If they think that I have done nothing for Slovenia, then they should not vote for me. If, however, they think that I have done something for the country and that the actions of the government are incorrect, then they should vote for me. When I am a deputy, if I am elected, then I will have my office open every day at a certain time so that the people will be able to come to me with their problems. I will then be able to pass their problems on and cite them in the parliament. None of the deputies do this at the moment, unless you know him personally and say: "Come on, Joze. Arrange this matter for me."

[Brstovsek] Which municipality will you run in?

[Oman] In this one here [Bled].

[Brstovsek] How will you prepare for the elections? With posters, television...?

[Oman] I have many possibilities. I will probably prepare myself simply by knocking on doors and saying: Good day, it is me. But I will not go on television, wave, and talk about who did what incorrectly. My program is as follows. The people will vote for me if they remember that we, in 1990, stated that we would be an independent Slovenia. I gave what I had, and did what I could. This is not a lie, this has been proven 100 percent. I have remained clean, and this will be seen at the elections.

[Brstovsek] Have you made up your mind to run 100 percent?

[Oman] I have made up my mind. Yes, 100 percent.

[Brstovsek] Will the documents regarding the arms trading during the time of gaining independence remain locked up until the elections?

[Oman] The issue is still of strategic value for Slovenia. I am the one person that knows what came into Slovenia, what kind of weapons—I even know the amount. However, I cannot exactly say what and of what kind, as this is a military secret. I have to avoid these questions and will continue to avoid them. The basic issue regarding the matter is the following. If these arms remained in Slovenia, then it is all right, but if they did not, then we have a problem. Then we have nothing at all, and we are barefoot and naked. In any case, we must leave this matter until we have an alternative way of purchasing weapons. We cannot now start thinking about who got what and how much, since almost everyone received money. The greatest tragedy would be if we went into the warehouses and found nothing. It is better that those abroad think that we have more weapons than that they think we have none.

Federal

FRY: FM Milutinovic Meets Italian Counterpart

LD2708153496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1403 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Rome, 27 August (TANJUG)—Federal [Yugoslav] Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic held talks in Rome today with Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini.

During one-hour talks at the Italian Foreign Ministry, Farnesina Palace, Milutinovic and Dini held extensive talks and exchanged opinions about all current aspects of the Yugoslav crisis. The discussed the tasks ahead of the international community regarding the resolution of that crisis, as well as tasks facing interested parties. These efforts should ensure that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is completely stabilized and, above all, that the elections are held.

Milutinovic and Dini discussed in particular bilateral relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Italy, and agreed that both Rome and Belgrade were very interested in promoting these relations to the level that existed before the Yugoslav crisis, and which both sides believe could be reached in the future.

FRY: Milutinovic, Italian Leaders Discuss Peace, Cooperation

LD2708181896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1754 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome, Aug 27 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic said Tuesday he had discussed with his Italian counterpart Lamberto Dini and Prime Minister Romano Prodi the peace process developments, the promotion of cooperation between Yugoslavia and European Union and all-round bilateral cooperation.

Milutinovic told the press he and Dini had reiterated the endeavors and readiness of the two countries to cooperate in order to ensure the principled and full implementation of the Dayton-Paris peace agreement.

Milutinovic said he and Dini agreed that elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be held as scheduled on September 14, with equal conditions for all participants, as the polls will play a decisive role in the successful implementation of the peace agreement. They also agreed that equal treatment of all sides regarding Bosnia's reconstruction was a necessary pre-condition for confidence-building and successful and balanced development of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Italy has demonstrated its full understanding and support to the full reintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and world financial institutions, and its participation in European integration processes, Milutinovic said.

Yugoslavia has reiterated its positive stance towards the regional approach principle regarding the relations between the E.U. and the states creaed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and towards other regional initiatives, Milutinovic said.

Italy and Yugoslavia have pointed to great prospects for more intensive development of bilateral relations and cooperation in all fields and discussed the need for exerting specific endeavors to this end, including an adaptation of the visa regime.

Referring to his talks with Prodi, Milutinovic said that they had noted that all conditions for a successfull continuation of the peace process had been ensured and that all involved parties must work for consistent and full implementation of the Dayton-Paris agreement. Yugoslavia believes that Italy can play a prominent role to this end, and Prodi had especially hailed Yugoslavia's constructive policy and contribution, he added.

Milutinovic and Prodi noted that bilateral relations characterized by closeness and friendship were developing well and that good conditions existed for their further strengthening. It was agreed to encourage future contacts between the two governments and parliaments and among Yugoslav and Italian businessmen and scientific and cultural institutions, Milutinovic said.

On behalf of Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, Milutinovic invited Prodi to visit Yugoslavia and he accepted the invitation.

Referring to his visit to the Vatican, Milutinovic said he had held substantial and useful talks with the asistant secretary of state of the Holy See Archbishop Giovanni Batista Re, and noted a similarity of views on further endeavors for consolidating peace, restoring confidence and ensuring economic development in the former Yugoslavia.

Hailing Yugoslavia's constructive role in the peace process and its consistent implementation of the Dayton agreement, the Vatican expressed readiness to contribute to the consolidation of peace, stability and good neighborliness in the region, Milutinovic underlined.

Yugoslavia and the Vatican made a positive assessment of the development of bilateral relations so far and reiterated readiness for futher contacts and political dialogue in order to strengthen relations and cooperation regarding all issues of joint interest, Milutinovic said.

FRY: Milutinovic Appraises Talks in Rome, Vatican

LD2708164296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1618 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome, Aug. 27 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic said Tuesday that his talks in Rome and the Vatican had been very substantive and constructive.

Milutinovic conferred Tuesday with his Italian counterpart, Lamberto Dini, and Prime Minister Romano Prodi and with the Holy See Secretary of State Mgr. Giovanni Batista Re.

The visits came at a right time in view of Yugoslavia's efforts for an end to the crisis in the region and for its own full integration in the international community, Milutinovic told TANJUG and TV Serbia after an hour-and-a-half meeting with Prodi.

The Yugoslav foreign minister said a series of details had been agreed, which he noted would impart an impulse to overall Yugoslav-Italian relations which were expected by Belgrade to reach the once enviable level.

Milutinovic said Yugoslavia was trying to renew ties with the Holy See, since the ties were important both in bilateral and international terms.

FRY: PM Kontic, Ukrainian Ambassador Discuss Cooperation

LD2608151996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1510 GMT 26 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 26 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic met Monday Ukrainian ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Vadim Primachenko to discuss bilateral cooperation.

They underlined that Ukraine was one of Yugoslavia's principal economic partners, Yugoslav information secretariat said in a statement.

Bilateral trade exchange could shortly reach over two billion dollars. Intensive cooperation development is possible in the fields of transports, machine-building, eletronics, chemical industry, agriculture, manufacture of commercial vehicles and shipbuilding.

in addition to traditional forms of cooperation, both countries have expressed interest in new forms of cooperation in production, joint investments and joint ventures at third markets.

Yugoslavia has accepted Ukraine's proposal to conclude a general political agreement on friendship and cooperation, Kontic said.

To this end, the drawing up of agreements on scientific and technical ooperation, avoidance of double taxation, guarantees of investments in transports and health care cooperation should be accelerated.

All these agreements are expected to be signed by the end of this year when Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma will visit Belgrade, the statement says.

FRY: Economic Ties To Be Restored to B-H Federation

LD2708165896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1623 GMT 27 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 27 (TANJUG)—Serbia's Chamber of Economy official Vlajko Stojiljkovic said Tuesday that the return visit of a Yugoslav state-economic delegation to Sarajevo had confirmed that both sides were interested in renewing old and establishing new business ties.

Serbia's Chamber of Economy President Stojiljkovic told TANJUG that the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy was to open its office in Sarajevo in fifteen days or so and the Chamber of Commerce of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina one in Belgrade.

The Yugoslav delegation discussed Monday economic cooperation with representatives of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the government in Sarajevo, who visited Belgrade a month ago.

Stojiljkovic said the talks with federation businessmen were focused on the restoring of railway, road, air and PTT links.

He noted that Yugoslav companies were interested in participating in the reconstruction and development of the Muslim-Croat Federation, for which he said they had great possibilities.

Stojiljkovic said work was under way on restoring payments transactions with the Muslim-Croat Federation.

FRY: Refugee Problems To Be Aired at International Meeting

LD2708233996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2319 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 27 (TANJUG)—A Belgrade-based association for assisting refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia said Tuesday that the creation of conditions for refugee repatriation to Bosnia and Croatia and indemnity were priority matters at this time.

Association President Milorad Muratovic told a news conference in Belgrade that the association's delegation would attend an international conference in Sarajevo on Sept. 3-5 on the repatriation of refugees and conditions for achieving this.

He added that the association's delegation would make clear its position that without creating these conditions there could be no comprehensive settlement of the refugee problem in Yugoslavia.

Muratovic said it would also insist on regulating the question of pensions, children's and disability benefits for about 250,000 beneficiaries.

He quoted the association's figures to show that not a single Bosnian Serb refugee had yet returned to Sarajevo because Muslims had moved into Serb homes, which was a reason for calling the conference at the initiative of high representative Carl Bildt.

The conference will be attended by 13 representatives of refugees from Croatia, 10 each from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia, and 7 from the (Bosnian Serb) Republika Srpska.

The conference has been organised by the Council of Europe, the Office of the International Community's High Representative Carl Bildt and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

FRY: Bosnian Refugees in Serbia Start Voting

AU2808081796 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 28 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees residing in FRY will start voting for the candidates in the general Bosnia-Herzegovina elections today. The voting will last until 3 September. In Serbia the voting will begin in all 17 districts. In Montenegro the voting will commence as of 1 September.

The refugees can vote in one of 60 polling stations or alternatively can send their votes reply pre-paid to the OSCE office in Belgrade.

On the territory of FRY 220,000 refugees registered for the vote of which 85,000 will vote in FRY while 135,000 will vote in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

FRY: Preparations for Bosnia's Elections Completed

LD2708133596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1308 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 27 (TANJUG)—A Yugoslav Government commission for the rights of refugees in Bosnia's Sept. 14 elections said on Tuesday that everything was ready in Yugoslavia for voting to start on Wednesday.

The Yugoslav Information Secretariat released a statement saying that the monitors had arrived, as well as supervisors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Reports from the field say that the hosts and supervisors had established good relations.

The supervisors alone have the right to receive complaints in regard with the vote, and then hand them over to the president of the elections commission.

For purposes of building confidence and consolidating peace in Bosnia, the commission is expected to hold united elections, as envisaged by the Dayton Accord, said the statement.

Otherwise, tensions would mount and mistrust arise in the former Yugoslavia, plus additional expenses, said the statement.

Preparations for the transportation of refugee voters to the Muslim-Croat federation and Republika Srpska are nearly over, it was heard at a session of the commission, chaired by Bratislava Morina.

The commission said cooperation was good with the OSCE provisional office in Belgrade and that refugee voters in Yugoslavia had not been pressured.

The commission has drawn a report on its work to be submitted to the government for examination, said the statement.

Serbia

Serbia: Seselj Demands Removal of 'Border' on Drina

AU2808080096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1505 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 27 August (BETA)—Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), stated today that "the Serb people must dispose of the artificial border on the Drina River and oppose all those who want to erect barriers and walls between the Serbs living east and west of the Drina River."

As the SRS information service announced today, speaking at the party's election rally in Visegrad, Seselj expressed the hope that the elections in the Serb Republic (RS) and the FRY "will confirm the wish of our people to live in one, single state of the Serb people."

"The SRS expects a victory by national and patriotic parties in both the RS and the FRY, where, in addition to beating the Socialists, we Radicals must also beat the anti-Serb-oriented forces in Serbia," Seselj stressed, adding that the SRS will take part in the upcoming elections on its own.

Serbia: Parties' Aspirations for B-H Elections Viewed

AU2708135096 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 26 Aug 96 p 2

[Commentary by S. Risovic: "Banja Luka Is the Most Attractive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Out of the total of 58 divided or undivided municipalities in the Serb Republic and 63 in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Banja Luka seems to be the most attractive to parties from the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As many as 18 parties and coalitions have nominated candidates for the Banja Luka municipal government, including five parties from the Muslim-Croat federation [Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina].

Complete tickets for the municipal government (90 candidates) of Banja Luka have been submitted by the Alliance for Peace and Progress, the Democratic Patriotic Bloc, the Serb Democratic Party, the Party of Serb Unity, the Serbian Radical Party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).

Brcko Without the SDA

After Banja Luka, the second most interesting town for party rivalry is Doboj, with 15 political parties from the Serb Republic and six from the Muslim-Croat federation taking part in the municipal elections. Next on the "top list" after Doboj are Bijeljina and Prijedor with 12 registered parties each, then comes Brcko (seven parties), etc. However, Brcko is specific in that only two parties from the Muslim-Croat Federation have shown an interest in taking part in the municipal elections for this town: Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina [SBiH] and the Civic Democratic Party [GDS] of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is unbelievable that the SDA did not nominate its own list of candidates for Brcko, even though its candidates are running in the municipal elections in almost all the towns of the Serb Republic.

How does one explain the fact that SDA candidates are running only in the part of Brcko which, according to the Dayton agreement, has become part of the Muslim-Croat federation? In that part of Brcko, in addition to the SDA, other parties taking part in the elections include the HDZ, the SBiH, the Liberal Party, the Croatian Party of Right, and the Joint List of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is it mere lack of information or something else? Malicious rumors suggest that the SDA is not taking part in the elections in Brcko because the Muslims are convinced, or perhaps they have been promised, that Brcko will be proclaimed some kind of free zone and will be under UN protection. Be that as it may, the Serbs will win the elections in Brcko, because over 40,000 [Serb] refugees have chosen to live in this town and they have automatically earned the right to vote for the municipal government of Brcko.

HDZ Alone in [Bosansko] Grahovo

As far as the other towns in the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation are concerned, it is interesting to note that only the HDZ has appeared in Grahovo and that the SDS is running in the local elections for Serb Sarajevo, in the municipality of Stari Grad.

A partial survey of the ballots for the "higher level" shows that both the Muslims and Croats are interested in taking part in the elections in the Serb Republic, because 16 parties and coalitions have nominated candidates for the Serb Republic assembly, including four parties from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina: the SDA, the GDS, and the Party of Women of Bosnia-Herzegovina [number of parties as published]. It is interesting to point out that only the SDS, the Democratic Patriotic Bloc, and the Alliance for Peace and Progress have nominated complete lists of candidates, while the SDA even has an "excess" of potential deputies, which is against the Serb Republic's constitution.

Six parties and coalitions from the Serb Republic and four from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina have nominated candidates for the 14 places reserved for the Serb Republic in the joint house of representatives of the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Many parties and coalitions, including those from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have nominated candidates for president and vice president of the Serb Republic. The presidential candidate from the SDA is Abid Djozic from Srebrenica, who might even win, since six parties and coalitions from the Serb Republic have six presidential candidates and it is conceivable that the votes of the Serb electors become so split that Djozic, a Muslim, is elected president of the Serb Republic.

Serbia: PVD Leader Talks About Elections, Communal Issues

AU2508172096 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 21 Aug 96 p 7

[Report by Avni Jusufi on the meeting of the Leading Council of the Presevo-based Party for Democratic Action: "The Serbian Power Wants To Ruin the Political Organization of Albanians"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Presheve [Presevo] 20 August—On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the foundation of the Presheve-based Party for Democratic Action [PVD], the PVD Leading Council held a meeting in Presheve yesterday. The meeting was attended by members of the communes in which the PVD is acting: Presheve, Bujanovc [Bujanovac], and Medvegje [Medveda].

PVD Chairman Riza Halimi gave the opening speech at the meeting, detailing the current political situation in these three communes. [passage omitted]

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the PVD's creation and activity, the PVD has found itself facing significant challenges that could greatly influence the further development of the political trends in Presheve, Bujanovc, and Medvegje, Halimi said.

This year is the year when elections for local administrations and the federative parliament will be held. At the same time, we are facing a situation in which the Albanian-Serb dialogue for resolving the Kosova issue is being increasingly dealt with in a more concrete way.

Considering these important points, its is completely obvious that the Serbian power is utterly interested in ruining the independent political organization of the Albanians in this region. Riza Halimi went on to say that the greatest attacks by the Serbian antidemocratic power are directed against the PVD structures, as this party represents the sole Albanian party that is politically organized in the three communes and is present almost in all Albanian-populated areas of our region.

Through its state bodies, the PSS [expansion unknown] is resorting to all types of pressure, information talks, raids, and the imprisoning of PVD activists to achieve its aims. Blackmail is also being implemented against the Presheve Council advisers. A chaotic situation has been created following the impediment of the local self-administration by state bodies, particularly after the appointment of the government's special representative only for Presheve commune and the paralysis created after the break up of the advisers' groups. Communal administration has gone away from the control of local authorities, with the state bodies actually bearing a great influence on it.

This reflection of the difficult situation in the region can in no way dare to be understood as a commitment not to take part in the upcoming elections. On the contrary, the aim is to discredit the current antidemocratic practices and laws of the Serbian state and to make very serious preparations so that Albanians in Presheve, Bujanovc, and Medvegje become more organized in the future to realize all the rights pertaining to them according to international conventions. [passage omitted]

Continuing his speech, Riza Halimi stressed the PVD commitment to internationalize the issue of the Albanians, mentioning the organization of Albanians in Presheve, Bujanovc, and Medvegje to hold a referendum for political and territorial autonomy with the right to become united with Kosova. He also mentioned the PVD's cooperation with the Albanian political parties in Albania, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Montenegro, etc.

Regarding the 3 November federative elections, Halimi said that we should make all preparations for these elections, but the definitive decision on participation will be issued later. [passage omitted]

Halimi told the PVD members that the party will hold its assembly in September, in which it will issue a memorandum addressed to the highest authorities regarding the Albanians living in the region and beyond. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Stambolic Blames Milosevic for War, Defeats

96BA0437A Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene 6 Aug 96 pp 34-39

[Interview with former Serbian President Ivan Stambolic by Svetlana Vasovic; place and date not given: "Path Into the Wilderness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Ivan Stambolic, former president of the League of Communists of Serbia [LCS] and until 1987 president of the Serbian Presidency, through an apparently insignificant personnel proposal, launched an avalanche of events at the end of the 1980's that in later years changed the face of his world and ours. Specifically, he proposed his friend and colleague for many years, Slobodan Milosevic, for the position of chairman of the LCS Central Committee. As he soon realized, that was precisely his biggest mistake, since even though he had opened Slobodan Milosevic's way into politics, he became his first victim; immediately after coming to power, Milosevic removed his long-time* *political mentor from the political scene and began his campaign against Yugoslavia.*

[Vasovic] In spite of numerous campaign rallies in Serbian cities, the opposition here seems rather impotent. How is that possible after everything that has happened in recent years?

[Stambolic] From the very beginning, the opposition has been the most help to Milosevic and has consolidated his position. The inappropriate attacks against him and several mistaken arguments undoubtedly confirm that. The position that we in Serbia are in, however, is not a consequence of the role of just one man, regardless of how decisive that role could have been. The opposition would now like to reduce everything to that, as if it had not contributed to that situation itself. It is for that very reason that one cannot obtain answers to basic questions. One of those is also the question that you posed—why it is so impotent itself.

At the last congress of Milosevic's SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], the congress of forgetfulness and a new fog, as I call it, they were obviously counting on the amnesia of the Serbian population. In regard to all this, the Serbian population is suited by forgetfulness not only consciously, but also subconsciously. Everyone would rather see those "glorious" years of the "the happening of the people" erased forever. Milosevic knows what the population wants, takes its desires into account, and knows what the majority wants, especially since that is also precisely what would suit him best. The basic driving force behind all of this evil—no one is even denying it any longer—is nationalism. It is true that the initiator, exponent, and organizer of that destructive energy said at the previous SPS congress, "We have also experienced nationalist attacks"—as if nationalism were not the dominant ruling policy, and as if this had to do with coffeehouse squabbles. Actually, if there is anything at all in all of these inroads of evil that we can call a random "attack," it is the antinationalist statements. At that time, after the SPS congress, the opposition held its first rally, on the anniversary of the 9 March 1991 demonstrations, with the purpose of holding Milosevic to account. Those are not just Milosevic's accounts, however! They are the accounts of all those who supported him. The mischief is over with and the time has come to settle the accounts. And now everyone is running away. In any case, the bulk of the opposition is also still avoiding a critical confrontation with itself and with the truth.

The second mistake that the opposition is making is that in these most difficult times, when everyone is struggle for bare survival, it is underestimating social issues, even though that is potentially the most powerful force that could launch changes in Serbia. There is no doubt that the Socialists are capable of exploiting that lack of attention. What cynicism! Those who reduced the population to poverty are consoling them with socialist slogans and, shamelessly, even with Marx, since when a person is hungry even badly baked bread smells good to him. After all, to such a person it is ideologically not even important what kind of ownership will bring him a better and bigger piece of bread. The party that most opposes privatization is counting on that, and even though it is supposed to be a leftist one, it is assembling, creating, and expanding the lobby of the richest people, exclusively from a desire for power.

[Vasovic] How is that possible?

[Stambolic] Because ties with the state suit that "private capital." The dispute over privatization is a profound and important one; it is a dispute associated with the nature of power, since if we undertake the privatization of socialized enterprises, they will no longer be the basic social welfare institutions, which are only prolonging the agony. Now domestic enterprises are precisely that, and are not even organizations focused on profits. Among other things, many workers would have to be dismissed if we want the remaining workers to get wages of approximately 500 marks, not as it is now, and if we want people to start working seriously.

The authorities, however, are well aware of where that would lead them. Thus, everyone now has low wages, they do little work, they have some sort of alleged social security guaranteed to them, but the majority are living on the gray economy. With that system, the SPS has admittedly lost 50 percent of its supporters, but the opposition has lost just as many, so the regime of personal power is still solid. Furthermore, the regime also has behind it the still enormous lobby of the state and quasi-private economic sectors, which are very dependent upon it.

[Vasovic] You used the expression quasi-privatization....

[Stambolic] The authorities and most employees are most interested in "privatization" in which people would work "privately in the state manner," the employees because of their mentality and the habits that they acquired in the former self-managing socialist enterprises, and also because of fear of the uncertainty that would be caused by the process of true privatization—what will happen to them if it starts—and the regime feels a twofold fear of real privatization: It is afraid of the anger and resistance of the dismissed workers, and of an emerging new ownership structure that could be politically dangerous to the authorities.

In any case, the worst possible form of privatization is at work in Serbia now: privatization of the state and statization of the economy. The goal of preserving the former type of social ownership is therefore to take it and drag it out. Undermining the entire system along with its superstructure, while preserving the social ownership on which that superstructure is based and by which it was somehow protected, means simply abandoning it to robbery and theft, i.e., privatization as a criminal process.

[Vasovic] It seems, then, that Milosevic has no alternative?

[Stambolic] There is always an alternative, and the question is only whether we see it and whether we are ready for it and capable of it. It seems to me that we are closer to chaotic methods. I am afraid that we are in danger of an undemocratic outcome. For example, when I returned from Sarajevo I noticed something that amazed me; I noted that people there were emotionally tougher than here. I looked for an explanation. There is no other explanation except that they lived in the truth, such as it is, but we are living in a lie. What we are living is a lie, and that is why we are so lost and unpredictable. I really do not know what can happen in the fall, in the elections. I will not make predictions, since if someone here has ever relied on common sense, it has always turned out that he acted irrationally. People often look for reasons and explanations, which are actually more clinical than political. Now we are at a stage in which we are instinctively building up our hopes. Memory tells us that we "did such and such," but that has not yet penetrated our consciousness. For the time being, consequently, forgetfulness is putting our conscience to sleep, and without conscience there is no awareness.

Unfortunately, a considerable part of the opposition is still cherishing the hope that all the difficulties will be resolved from outside. No people likes to have anyone impose solutions on it from outside, especially if the Serbs do not want that—the Serbs, who mostly wanted to regulate other people's lives and not to have others do it to them. It is therefore not surprising at all that people are waiting for something to happen outside, especially since on the other hand Milosevic is proving that he has the situation under control and that he is indispensable—although I think that all of us, including Milosevic and Tudjman and Izetbegovic, have found ourselves under a protectorate and that everyone will therefore do exactly what they have to. Milosevic is now also doing what he has to. Defeats have finally forced him into a peaceful policy. He is pragmatic enough that he is now accepting everything, just in order to hold on, but he is outwardly portraying that as if things were going the way he wanted.

[Vasovic] It all started because of Kosovo.

[Stambolic] The way in which Kosovo was "defended" at the beginning of the antibureaucratic revolution only distanced it even further from Serbia. That is why it is much difficult today to deal with the issue of Kosovo than ever before in Serbian history—even without that Yugoslavia. Milosevic now has to go into Kosovo a second time, but this time no longer as he did the first time, when he incited the Serbs to destroy Yugoslavia—this time it will be to tell them that they have to negotiate with the Albanian ethnic majority.

We would have to be in his role and endure it or be him in order to be capable of that after everything that has happened. Look at where his nationalistic slogan has brought us: "Here we are in Kosovo Polje to report to them from this city... to show them... what kind of strength we have..." instead of calm and serious insight into the essence of our interethnic and social crisis and how to resolve it.

Milosevic did not aggravate the Kosovo question just for the sake of the Serbs in Kosovo but rather because that was the way to Kosovize the Serbs on the other side of the Drina, as the most suitable element for the unitarization of Yugoslavia. He was interested in Yugoslavia, not Kosovo. At first he barely knew about the Serbs on the other side of the Drina, and then suddenly he realized that Kosovizing the Serbs on the other side of the Drina and inducing them to revolt was the was to seize Yugoslavia. Slovenia was simply in his way, and then it also blocked the way for him.

[Vasovic] Was that his first defeat?

[Stambolic] Exactly. It was a defeat as a result of which he gave up on Slovenia, and thereby on the Yugoslavia of that time. That saved Slovenia; the way out was suddenly opened wide for it, but that did not apply to the other Yugoslav peoples. Hell was still waiting for them. He decided at that time that he would aim at creating a Serbian Yugoslavia!

[Vasovic] It seems, however, that the initial dispute between Slovenia and Serbia is still deep within people's awareness, and that it will continue to be an obstacle to the establishment of better relations between the two states and peoples.

[Stambolic] At first a lot of crude and untrue assertions were made about the Slovenes. Of course, doesn't that apply to everyone? Literally the entire world was on the chauvinist propaganda list. Slovenia managed to extract itself almost painlessly from everything that followed, it was successful in that, and now it is already rushing toward European integration. At one time the Slovene and Serbian economies were complementary, and trade between them will still take place, although not in the same volume as before for some time yet.

[Vasovic] What actually was Slovenia's role in all of that?

[Stambolic] Slovenia became aware of the danger only after the eighth session; even though the Slovenes were still promising something at it, it was already too late then. Hafner raised his finger in vain, because numerous other fingers were already in action and dickering under the table.

When I attended along with the leaderships of the other republics, I became convinced that neither Slovenia nor any of the other republics intended to destroy Yugoslavia, not even when they displayed the intention of changing it, just as we did. It happened only after the rise of nationalism in Serbia.

Slovenia is still being accused here today of "separatism" and "secession from Yugoslavia," even though Serbia was the first one to "separate" and turn against the others! Let us understand each other: That separatism, if I have to call it that, which was some sort of acquired right of the Yugoslav republics, was recognized as early as the AVNOJ [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] session and in its historic decisions. It was contained in their voluntary merger into Yugoslavia. If that had not been the case, neither Slovenia nor the other states would have joined Yugoslavia. To put it simply, there would not have been a second Yugoslavia! They realized that right in the war and in the battle for the liberation of their peoples.

Then how are Slovenia and the other republics supposed to have seceded from Yugoslavia, as if Yugoslavia was something outside of them? Naturally, that is possible only if one thinks that he is Yugoslavia, with greater rights than all the other Yugoslav republics.

When I was in Zagreb recently, I told Stipe (Mesic—author's note), "You wrote a book about how you 'destroyed Yugoslavia,' but I remember that we talked several times then, and I never gathered from all those conversations that you were opposed to Yugoslavia. A ruse, or every man for himself?" He fell silent in such a way that I understood that he agreed with me....

I would also add that the Serbian nationalists constantly criticized Slovenia for "calculating something." I always said that the difficulty was not that the Slovenes were calculating, but rather that we were not calculating.

[Vasovic] Why did Milosevic even continue to clash with Slovenia and not with Croatia, even though the latter was actually his real target the whole time?

[Stambolic] For two reasons. First of all, because Croatia, until Milosevic's nationalist counterpart Tudjman established himself in it, was passive. The second reason for going against Slovenia before Croatia was that the rally army was used there first and it was certainly the fact that Slovenia advocated the preservation of Kosovo's autonomy and the AVNOJ Yugoslavia, and the eighth session people had sentenced that kind of Yugoslavia to death. The Slovenes saw through the putschist methods of the "Serbian guardians of Yugoslavia" and banned the "Serbian truth rally" in Ljubljana and sent their police to the republic border. Slovenia thereby gave a warning that Yugoslavia could not be preserved with the eighth session's policies. That is why Serbia responded with a retaliatory measure and decided to ban imports of Slovene goods. We are consequently the first ones who imposed an embargo on someone. That was followed by the raid on Yugoslavia's monetary system and the adoption of the Serbian constitution on the basis of tank treads and blood on the streets of Pristina.

That new constitution specified that it had to be observed whenever the federal constitution was not in accordance with it, and so that was the first legalization of Serbia's secession from Yugoslavia. In addition to that, Slovenia was fateful for Milosevic on several occasions. If we analyze his policy from today's standpoint, we can see that since the Slovene resistance (when they did not approve the "truth rally" in Ljubljana) he suffered defeat after defeat. Every defeat was worse than the previous one, and at the same time every new thing that he dealt with was bigger than the previous one. It trampled and covered the previous one. It is paradoxical, but if you look at him, he outwardly gives the impression that he has the initiative all the time and that he decides on events. All the others prepared some sort of initiative, and he rejected them all in turn, fought against each of them, and then later accepted them. That is the way it always happens. New concepts appeared, and and he rejected them. Later, again after a delay, he accepted them. He has never learned from his own or anyone else's mistakes, and so all of us together suffered loss after loss.

[Vasovic] In spite of everything, none of it would have happened if you yourself had not appointed him as head of the Serbian League of Communists. Was that a mistake on your part, possibly your biggest one?

[Stambolic] If it were the only one it would be enough, but it was not just my mistake. Another mistake, built into the system, determined it in advance. It is derived from the unwritten rule that the head of the party decides who his successor will be. If I had not had that power and in a way a duty, Slobodan Milosevic would not have been appointed to my position and I would not have been to blame for the choice. And if he had been elected by chance in spite of everything, but on a democratic and broader basis, then he would have been under greater control. This example, however, also clearly shows why a democratic election is so valuable, even though it sometimes only seems to be formally democratic. As the popular wisdom says, it is most difficult to guard against yourself.

[Vasovic] Then in spite of everything, Milosevic was not selected just by you?

[Stambolic] The most tragic thing about all of this is that I got other people used to considering Milosevic my "favorite," to the point that I no longer needed to put his name forward. Other people simply just noted my personnel "habit." I myself thought that it would be easier for me to curb him than constantly to encourage someone else. Furthermore, Milosevic was well received in Yugoslavia because of the sharp actions that he carried out in Belgrade. He was considered a real communist, even less in doubt than myself. I knew about his mistakes, but I was convinced that his virtues were more vital. It is true that when I proposed him I also stated some misgivings, and he took that very hard. It was the first time that he was not able to conceal his reaction.

[Vasovic] Which of his mistakes did you notice?

[Stambolic] I saw that sometimes he was too abrupt, that he took shortcuts, that he took some step too quickly, that he made superficial decisions, that he judged too harshly... and that he had other similar mistakes characteristic of a hotheaded man. I figured, however, that his mistakes would be less obvious in routine work, and because of the spirit of collective leadership. It must be said that uncertain political struggles for reforms awaited us at that time and that we therefore needed a dynamic and decisive person at the head of the party organization. At that time Milosevic seemed the most suitable to me. The problem is that I did not foresee that all of his traits could turn into ghastly mistakes if they developed to an extreme. At that time I really did not have any reason or occasion to sense in his decisiveness any inclination toward violence at its extreme, or militance in his combativeness, ruthlessness in his energy, a ruthless lust for power in his ambition, rashness in his dynamism....

[Vasovic] Did you later regret that choice?

[Stambolic] If you proceed from the fact that I appointed him to that position while sensing what he and his assistants would do in the next two years, then my choice would not be just crucial, but I should not be summarily convicted because of it! That is why I am afraid that my decision on Milosevic, if we look at it retrospectively, seems as if it were also made retrospectively, i.e., intentionally. According to that historically completely irregular judgment I am apparently his comrade, and I should therefore be dealt with summarily and immediately put up against the wall. I would like to emphasize, however, that at that time that choice did not seem that important. Who today remembers the names of the League of Communists presidents from previous terms? They mean as much as last year's snow.

I escaped from the curse of personal responsibility for Milosevic's appointment after the first and most democratic elections in Serbia, when it was announced that Milosevic had been elected president of the republic with 104 percent of the vote. I felt great relief then. The populace thus assumed full responsibility for his election. The Serbian populace apparently wanted the blindness that Milosevic was offering it, and look at how long it has been living in blindness, in spite of everything that has happened and has happened to it.

[Vasovic] How do you view Milosevic's policy today?

[Stambolic] I would put it this way. He came to power with my policy; with the policy that his wife dictated to him he broke with mine; then he adopted the policy of the Greater-Serbian nationalists, destroyed Yugoslavia, and went to war. Now, by adopting the international community's policy, he is striving for peace! As you can see, he has actually never even had a policy of his own! Other people's policies had him. If he does have any policy, it is merely a policy of staying in power. Our dispute is therefore not just a dispute of ideas but also because of a recognition of the facts. Life has judged the nationalists just as it judged the communists. If we recognize it, the nationalists should also recognize that verdict. Look at the facts. In four years the Serbs have lost four wars with consequences that had never occurred before in our history.

[Vasovic] Is there anything positive at all in this whole story?

[Stambolic] Yes, but too little is known about it. Several very positive things were simply never recorded or simply could not be recorded, even though they were very important in this war. You probably know that during the mobilization in Belgrade and numerous other areas in Serbia they never got more than 10 percent of the people "planned" for mobilization and that the

Serbian tanks that left for Vukovar were seen off by 10 people; Serbian state television filmed them and then triumphantly portrayed them as if there had been thousands of them.... The fact is that the kind of desertion that we saw in this war is unprecedented in the history of the Serbian people. What I mean is that the Serbs did not want to go to war.

At a recent meeting of the Serbian opposition I saw an interesting slogan, a paraphrase of the slogan used by the policy of inciting the war: "Karlovac-Virovitica-The Hague." Perhaps that will seem unimportant to someone, but it is important that we have also begun to laugh at the "war aims." It is good that for some years now I have not heard people in cafes saying "Whoever says that Serbia is small is lying." Obviously it is already clear to everyone now that in every cafe everyone would jump to their feet because they would think that someone was crazy. And don't forget that the authorities finally had to pass a law on amnesty for deserters, which is probably the biggest proof that Milosevic lost the war, since there cannot be an amnesty for deserters if there was no war.

[Vasovic] You are a banker now, the director of the Yugoslav Bank for International Economic Cooperation. Tell us what the cost of this war actually was.

[Stambolic] The human sacrifices are the biggest and are irreplaceable. The material destruction will only be repaired by our grandchildren.

The social and moral consequences of the war simply cannot be recovered from. The Serbs have now been ethnically cleansed from the Krajina, Slavonia, and Bosanska Krajina. That is a consequence of a "self-fulfilling prophecy": The Serbs went to war because they anticipated that the Croats could commit genocide, and so they actually carried out preventive genocide. Now Tudjman has given that kind of policy a justification by ending the war with the ethnic cleansing of the Krajina. Not to mention the moral and ethical impoverishment and the shame that we accumulated for ourselves with this war, and for which several generations of our descendants still unborn will continue to pay. If we learned anything from this senseless war, it is that we have to coexist, in spite of the deep wounds that it inflicted on us and the new rifts.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Bosnian Refugees May Vote Next Month

LD2708135796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1259 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 27 Aug (TANJUG)—Refugees in Montenegro who want to take part in the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections will be able to vote on 1, 2, and 3 September, the republic's [Montenegrin] commissariat for displaced persons announced today.

Polling booths will open in Podgorica as well as in Herzeg-Novi, Mojkovac, and Berane.

Displaced persons who want to vote in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be given more details about the transportation to their voting places in due time, it was announced.

Refugees must immediately take a copy of the voting registration form they filled out earlier from the municipal commissioners for displaced persons, the statement says.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Ethnic Albanians Demand Parallel Classes in Schools

AU2708170096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1304 GMT 27 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 27 August (BETA)—The government-in-exile of the unrecognized republic of Kosovo has today demanded that all measures be taken to ensure that "as of September, ethnic Albanian students begin the new school year in their school buildings," Pristina BUJKU reports today.

In the statement published today by this Pristina daily, it is pointed out that the decision to organize parallel ethnic Albanian classes in private buildings or houses was temporary and did not ensure "even the minimal conditions for adequate education of young generations."

Over the past six years, the ethnic Albanians, refusing to acknowledge the sovereignty of Belgrade's educational system over that of Kosovo, have been holding their own classes from elementary to university level in private houses and adapted school buildings.

The demand that the ethnic Albanians this year organize their classes in regular schools following their own curricula and programs has been supported by the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo, as well as the union of three ethnic Albanian parties, the Party of National Unity, the Republican Party and the Albanian People's Party.

According to the union, "students should begin attending school on 2 September without asking anybody for permission."

The last time that the ethnic Albanians tried to organize parallel classes in regular school buildings was in 1993, which was prevented by the intervention of the Serbian police.

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